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ΎLaw School Professor, University of Maryland Carey School of Law, and
Founder and Director, University of Maryland Center for Health and
Homeland Security (“CHHS”); former Director, Division of Trading and
Markets, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission. The Institute
for New Economic Thinking (“INET”) funded and published this article
as a working paper on the Social Sciences Research Network on June 19,
2018 at https://www.ineteconomics.org/uploads/papers/WP_74.pdf. The
paper was presented that day at a meeting of interested scholars at INET
in New York City. The video of that gathering can be found at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xT-tie8sFog. Former Federal Reserve
Chairman Paul Volcker and former Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Vice Chairman Thomas H. Hoenig were both present at the
meeting and supported the paper’s findings. Professor Greenberger was
also separately interviewed about the paper by INET President Rob
Johnson on June 19, 2018. That interview can be found at
https://www.ineteconomics.org/perspectives/videos/another-financial-cri
sis-could-be-coming. The paper and accompanying presentation received
considerable subsequent media attention: See, e.g., Emily Flitter, Decade
After Crisis, a $600 Trillion Market Remains Murky to Regulators, N.Y.
TIMES (Jul. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/22/business/
derivatives-banks-regulation-dodd-frank.html; The Dodd-Frank Loophole, Creating Black Images, Government Approved Trolling, WNYC
RADIO (August 16, 2018), https://www.wnyc.org/story/ midday-on-wnyc2018-08-16 (radio interview by Jenna Flanagan with Michael
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ABSTRACT
The multi-trillion-dollar market for, what was at that time
wholly unregulated, over-the-counter derivatives (“swaps”) is
widely viewed as a principal cause of the 2008 worldwide
financial meltdown. The Dodd-Frank Act, signed into law on
July 21, 2010, was expressly considered by Congress to be a
remedy for this troublesome deregulatory problem. The
legislation required the swaps market to comply with a host
of business conduct and anti-competitive protections,
including that the swaps market be fully transparent to U.S.
financial regulators, collateralized, and capitalized. The
Greenberger discussing the loophole in Dodd-Frank); Zephyr Teachout &
Morris Pearl, Voters Can Help Avoid Another Costly Bail Out,
TIMESUNION (August 11, 2018), https://www.timesunion.com/opinion/
article/Voters-can-help-avoid-another-costly-bail-out-13149693.php
(agreeing that a loophole exists in Dodd-Frank with “foreign” swaps
dealers); Marcus Baram, Big banks are exploiting a risky Dodd-Frank
loophole that could cause a repeat of 2008, FAST COMPANY (June 29, 2018),
https://www.fastcompany.com/90178556/big-banks-are-exploiting-arisky-dodd-frank-loophole-that-could-cause-a-repeat-of-2008 (interview
with Michael Greenberger); Jim Zarroli, Big Banks Are Once Again
Taking Risks With Complex Financial Trades, Report Says, NPR (June
19, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/19/621543525/big-banks-are-o
nce-again-taking-risks-with-complex-financial-trades-report-says (citing
Michael Greenberger’s paper); Claire Boston, Swap Loophole Leaves U.S.
Taxpayers on Hook for Trades, BLOOMBERG (June 19, 2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-19/swap-loopholeleaves-u-s-taxpayers-on-hook-for-trades-report; Pam Martens & Russ
Martens, Wall Street’s Derivatives Nightmare: New York Times Does a
Shallow Dive, WALL STREET ON PARADE (July 24, 2018),
http://wallstreetonparade.com/2018/07/wall-streets-derivatives-night
mare-new-york-times-does-a-shallow-dive (citing the Flitter article). This
article was completed on April 30, 2019. Since that time, national and
international banking regulations and institutions may have gone
through further change.
© Michael Greenberger, 2019.
ϭ
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statute also expressly provides that it would cover foreign
subsidiaries of big U.S. financial institutions if their swaps
trading could adversely impact the U.S. economy or
represent the use of extraterritorial trades as an attempt to
“evade” Dodd-Frank.
In July 2013, the CFTC promulgated an 80-page,
triple-columned, and single-spaced “guidance” implementing
Dodd-Frank’s extraterritorial reach, i.e., that manner in
which Dodd-Frank would apply to swaps transactions
executed outside the United States. The key point of that
guidance was that swaps trading within the “guaranteed”
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. bank holding company swaps
dealers were subject to all of Dodd-Frank’s swaps regulations
wherever in the world those subsidiaries’ swaps were
executed. At that time, the standardized industry swaps
agreement contemplated that, inter alia, U.S. bank holding
company swaps dealers’ foreign subsidiaries would be
“guaranteed” by their corporate parent, as was true since
1992.
In August 2013, without notifying the CFTC, the
principal U.S. bank holding company swaps dealer trade
association privately circulated to its members standard
contractual language that would, for the first time,
“deguarantee” their foreign subsidiaries. By relying only on
the obscure footnote 563 of the CFTC guidance’s 662
footnotes, the trade association assured its swaps dealer
members that the newly deguaranteed foreign subsidiaries
could (if they so chose) no longer be subject to Dodd-Frank.
As a result, it has been reported (and it also has been
understood by many experts within the swaps industry) that
a substantial portion of the U.S. swaps market has shifted
from the large U.S. bank holding companies swaps dealers
and their U.S. affiliates to their newly deguaranteed
“foreign” subsidiaries, with the attendant claim by these
huge big U.S. bank swaps dealers that Dodd-Frank swaps
Journal of Business & Technology Law
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regulation would not apply to these transactions. The CFTC
also soon discovered that these huge U.S. bank holding
company swaps dealers were “arranging, negotiating, and
executing” (“ANE”) these swaps in the United States with
U.S. bank personnel and, only after execution in the U.S.,
were these swaps formally “assigned” to the U.S. banks’
newly “deguaranteed” foreign subsidiaries with the
accompanying claim that these swaps, even though executed
in the U.S., were not covered by Dodd-Frank.
In October 2016, the CFTC proposed a rule that would
have closed the “deguarantee” and “ANE” loopholes
completely. However, because it usually takes at least a year
to finalize a “proposed” rule, this proposed rule closing the
loopholes in question was not finalized prior to the
inauguration of President Trump. All indications are that it
will never be finalized during a Trump Administration.
Thus, in the shadow of the recent tenth anniversary of
the Lehman failure, there is an understanding among many
market regulators and swaps trading experts that large
portions of the swaps market have moved from U.S. bank
holding company swaps dealers and their U.S. affiliates to
their newly deguaranteed foreign affiliates where DoddFrank swaps regulation is not being followed. However, what
has not moved abroad is the very real obligation of the lender
of last resort to rescue these U.S. swaps dealer bank holding
companies if they fail because of poorly regulated swaps in
their deguaranteed foreign subsidiaries, i.e., the U.S.
taxpayer.
While relief is unlikely to be forthcoming from the
Trump Administration or the Republican-controlled Senate,
some other means will have to be found to avert another
multi-trillion-dollar bank bailout and/or a financial calamity
caused by poorly regulated swaps on the books of big U.S.
banks. This paper notes that the relevant statutory
framework affords state attorneys general and state financial
200
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regulators the right to bring so-called “parens patriae”
actions in federal district court to enforce, inter alia, DoddFrank on behalf of a state’s citizens. That kind of litigation
to enforce the statute’s extraterritorial provisions is now
badly needed.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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Too Big to Fail—U.S. Banks’ Regulatory Alchemy:
Converting an Obscure Agency Footnote into an “At
Will” Nullification of Dodd-Frank’s Regulation of the
Multi-Trillion Dollar Financial Swaps Market
MICHAEL GREENBERGER
I. SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION
It is now accepted wisdom, indeed, it is embedded in the
popular culture,1 that it was the non-transparent, undercapitalized, and wholly unregulated over-the-counter
(“OTC”) swaps/derivatives (“swaps”) market that lit the fuse
that exploded the world economy in the fall of 2008.2
See MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE
200–26 (2011); see also THE BIG SHORT (Paramount Pictures 2015)
(winning the academy award for Best Adapted Screenplay, the film
achieved critical acclaim for its effective translation of complex financial
instruments to the big screen); INSIDE JOB (Sony Pictures Classics 2010)
(winning the 2010 Academy Award for Best Documentary Feature, Inside
Job was also screened at the 2010 Cannes Film Festival); see also Sridhar
Natarajan, Pope Calls Derivatives Market a ‘Ticking Time Bomb’,
BLOOMBERG (May 17, 2018, 11:46 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2018-05-17/pope-goes-off-on-cds-market-calls-derivativesticking-time-bomb.
2 See Ben Moshinsky, Stiglitz says Banks Should Be Banned from CDS
Trading, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 12, 2009, 6:28 AM), https://jessescross
roadscafe.blogspot.com/2009/10/stiglitz-banks-must-be-restrained.html;
Paul Krugman, Looters in Loafers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/19/opinion/19krugman.html?dbk;
Alan S. Blinder, The Two Issues to Watch on Financial Reform — We Need
an Independent Consumer Watchdog and Strong Derivatives Regulation.
Industry Lobbyists are Trying to Water Them Down, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 22,
2010, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527487041
33804575197852294753766; Henry T. C. Hu, ‘Empty Creditors’ and the
Crisis, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 10, 2009, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB123933166470307811.
1
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Because tens of trillions of dollars of notional value
embedded in these swaps were, inter alia, pegged to the
economic performance of an overheated and highly inflated
housing market, the sudden collapse of that market triggered
huge unfunded payment obligations under credit default
swaps (“CDS”) and so-called “naked”3 CDS that were forms
of insurance guaranteeing the full value and sustainability of
the subprime (and then later the prime) residential mortgage
market.
The defaulting and near defaulting CDS and naked
CDS “insurer” swaps counterparties, substantially composed
of big banks, their affiliates, some hedge funds, and insurers,
were also counterparties to many other interconnected swaps
in this almost six hundred trillion dollar notional value
worldwide market, including, inter alia, interest rate,
currency, foreign exchange, and commodity swaps.4
Defaults on any significant portion of these swaps
would have affected the entirety of the swaps markets and
upended the world economy with cascading multi-trilliondollar shortfalls, threatening to leave insurmountable
financial holes in the balance sheets of, inter alia, banks and
other financial institutions, corporations, non-profits and
governments worldwide. The primary “solution” to stave off
this worldwide calamity was principally to have United
States (“U.S.”) taxpayers saddled with paying trillions of
dollars of bailouts for these real and threatened huge capital
For a full explanation of “naked” CDS, see infra Part III.A and
accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 167–174 and accompanying text for the many dozens of
authorities making clear that defaults, or threatened defaults, in the
swaps market were the principal cause of the 2008 meltdown. Included
therein is an assessment of a competing theory about the cause of the
meltdown, i.e., the so-called “run on repos,” which is shown to be
derivative of the threatened swaps meltdown and cannot fairly be said to
be the principal cause of the meltdown.
3
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deficits that would otherwise have led to a worldwide Second
Great Depression.5
As it was, the world experienced a devastating Great
Recession, which “was the most severe economic downturn
and longest-persisting recession since the Great
Depression.”6 In 2008-2009 in the United States alone, 8.4
million jobs were lost, constituting 6.1% of all payroll
employment.7 While the U.S. unemployment rate stood at
5% in December 2007, it topped out at 10% by October 2009.8
U.S. housing prices fell on average of about 30% from mid2006 to mid-2009.9 The U.S. net worth of household and
nonprofit organizations fell from $69 trillion in 2007 to a low
of $55 trillion in 2009. Real gross U.S. domestic product fell
4.3 percent in the fourth quarter of 2007 to its low in the
second quarter of 2009, “the largest decline in the postwar
era[.]”10
See Moshinsky, supra note 2; Krugman, supra note 2; Blinder, supra
note 2; Hu, supra note 2.
6 Andrew Fieldhouse, 5 Years After the Great Recession, Our Economy
Still Far from Recovered, HUFFPOST (June 26, 2014, 12:38PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andrew-fieldhouse/five-years-after-thegrea_b_5530597.html; see infra notes 33, 175, and accompanying text
showing that theories about the “run on repos” were the result of defaults,
and threatened defaults, on the worldwide swaps market and thus were
not the principal cause of the financial meltdown.
7 The Great Recession, STATE OF WORKING AMERICA, http://stateof
workingamerica.org/great-recession/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2019).
8 Robert Rich, The Great Recession: December 2007–June 2009, FED.
RESERVE (Nov. 22, 2013), https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/
great_recession_of_200709.
9 Id.
10 Id.
5
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In a direct answer to this economic calamity, the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(“Dodd-Frank”) was signed into law on July 21, 2010.11
A principal purpose of that statute was to assure U.S.
taxpayers (themselves battered, and many still so, by the
resulting financial storms) that they would never again be
called upon to bail out, inter alia, the very biggest bank
holding companies.12 Among the many financial reforms
prescribed, the most important gave United States financial
regulators the tools to prevent another meltdown of the
previously unregulated, several hundred trillion dollar
notional value, swaps markets.13 It did so by requiring, inter
alia, that the swaps market be fully transparent to federal
regulators, properly collateralized and capitalized, and
subject to pro-competitiveness principles and business
conduct standards.14
The chief U.S. swaps regulator established by DoddFrank is the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(“CFTC”), which oversees 95% of the U.S. OTC derivatives
market.15 The CFTC, in the three years after the passage of
Helene Cooper, Obama Signs Overhaul of Financial System, N.Y.
TIMES (July 21, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/22/business/22
regulate.html?_r=0.
12 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (describing the law’s purpose
as “[t]o promote the financial stability of the United States by improving
accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to
fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect
consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other
purposes.”).
13 See infra Part V.
14 Id.
15 Id.; U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES: CAPITAL MARKETS 117 (2017), https://
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/documents/a-financialsystem-capital-markets-final-final.pdf.
11
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Dodd-Frank, put in place over fifty substantive rules
implementing the Dodd-Frank swaps regulatory regimen.16
During the closing stages of the Dodd-Frank
legislative process, key drafters of that statute responded
directly and immediately to what was then a three-day-old
United States Supreme Court case, Morrison v. National
Australia Bank, Ltd.,17 which made clear that if a statute is
to have extraterritorial effect, Congress must state so
clearly.18 As a result, the lead Senate drafters of Dodd-Frank,
on June 24, 2010, added an extraterritorial provision to that
legislation, which became section 722(i) of the act. That
section provides that Dodd-Frank’s regulation of swaps must
apply to swaps executed outside the U.S. if that trading has
“a direct and significant connection with activities in, or
effect on, commerce of the United States”; or if those swaps,
by their extraterritorial execution, “contravene such rules
and regulation as the [CFTC] may prescribe or promulgate
as are necessary or appropriate to prevent the evasion of any
provision of [Dodd-Frank].”19
In July 2013, the CFTC promulgated its so-called
“guidance,” implementing Dodd-Frank’s extraterritorial
provision.20 For purposes of this paper, the key point of that
CFTC guidance was that “guaranteed” foreign subsidiaries of
U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers were to be subject
to all of Dodd-Frank’s swaps regulations wherever in the
world the subsidiaries’ swaps were executed.21 At that time,
and for more than two decades prior to that time, the
standard industry-wide swaps documentation drafted by the
See infra notes 346–348 and accompanying text.
561 U.S. 247 (2010).
18 See infra notes 344-48 and accompanying text; see infra Part IX.B.
19 Id.
20 See infra Part VI.B.
21 Id.
16
17
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International Swaps Derivatives Association (“ISDA”) (which
swaps dealers are required to use) contemplated that
corporate parents would expressly guarantee any liability of
those subsidiaries in their swaps transactions with third
parties.22
About one month after promulgation of the July 2013
extraterritorial guidance, ISDA, relying on parts of footnote
563 within that document’s 80 pages (triple columned, single
spaced), provided standardized model swaps contract
language to its members allowing them to “deguarantee”
their foreign subsidiaries by checking a “deguarantee” box in
a written declaration, thereby proclaiming that those newly
“deguaranteed” foreign subsidiaries were not subject to
Dodd-Frank.23 In result, it has been reported and understood
among swaps industry experts that a large portion of the U.S.
swaps market shifted from the largest U.S. bank holding
companies, and their U.S. affiliates, to their newly
deguaranteed “foreign” affiliates, even though those swaps
remained on the consolidated balance sheets of these U.S.
institutions. Once attributed to the “foreign newly
deguaranteed” affiliate, U.S. bank holding company swaps
dealers in many important instances treated these swaps as
being outside the reach of Dodd-Frank’s swaps regulation.24
Roughly three years later, the CFTC also addressed
the then newly discovered fact that, inter alia, these huge
U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers were often
“arranging, negotiating, and executing” (“ANE”) these
purported “foreign” swaps in the U.S. through U.S personnel,
but then “assigning” those fully executed swaps to their
newly “deguaranteed” foreign subsidiaries, asserting that
See infra Part II.F.
See infra notes 422–24 and accompanying text.
24 See infra Part IX.B.
22
23
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these swaps were not covered by Dodd-Frank even though
completed in the United States.25
The CFTC, at first unknowingly, and then for over
three years unquestioningly, allowed, inter alia, the four
largest U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers, that
control 90% of the U.S. swaps market, to use the
“deguarantee” and ANE tactics to evade Dodd-Frank at
theirddiscretion.26 Those four U.S. swaps dealers are:
Citibank, JPMorgan Chase, Goldman Sachs and Bank of
America.27
As a result, swaps fully executed in the U.S. by U.S.
bank personnel could, after complete execution in the U.S.,
be assigned to newly deguaranteed U.S. bank holding foreign
subsidiaries where they could be deemed not to be regulated
under Dodd-Frank. Moreover, as a result of CFTC staff—not
Commission—action, truly foreign swaps dealers that are
registered with the CFTC to do swaps dealing in the U.S.
Id.
See infra Part IX.E & F. In December 2013, a CFTC staff advisory
stated that the use of ANE by non-U.S. persons registered with the CFTC
would subject those swaps to some, but not all, CFTC swaps regulations.
Letter from Stephen Hall, Legal Director & Sec. Specialist, Better
Markets Inc., to Christopher Kirkpatrick, Secretary, Commodity Futures
Trading Comm’n (Dec. 19, 2016) (on file with Better Markets). That
advisory was vigorously challenged by U.S. swaps dealers and its
application was so tenuous that the CFTC had to include in an October
18, 2016 proposed rule that ANE swaps were subject to CFTC
jurisdiction. Id. This conclusion, however, only made clear that the
CFTC’s business conduct standards would apply to ANE trading, and
further application of all other swaps regulation to ANE swaps. Id. at 8–
9. But the general tenor of the October 18, 2016 proposed rules was that
the use of ANE to evade Dodd-Frank in any way was to come to an end.
Id. Of course, as shown below, the October 18, 2016 proposed rule was
never made final before the beginning of Donald Trump’s Presidency, and
it is unlikely during his Presidency to be made final.
27 See infra note 388 and accompanying text.
25
26
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with, inter alia, U.S. counterparties, but are from countries
that do not have a full panoply of basic swaps regulations,
are as of July 2017 indefinitely freed from following DoddFrank even if their home country has no, or inadequate,
swaps regulatory protections.28
Each of the four big U.S. bank holding swaps dealers
described above may now, at their discretion, avoid DoddFrank swaps regulation, inter alia, through the deguarantee
and ANE loopholes. Each is headquartered in the U.S. and
has its principal place of business there.29 Collectively, these
four big U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers handle
close to 90% of U.S. swaps trades.30 They have all been
labeled “systemically important” under Dodd-Frank by the
U.S. Financial Stability Oversight Council, meaning that in
another financial meltdown, they would almost certainly
need to be financially bailed out by U.S. taxpayers to avoid a
Second Great Depression.31
Of course, each of these banks benefitted from
substantial U.S. taxpayer subsidies after the 2008 financial
See infra notes 512–20 and accompanying text.
See infra note 350 and accompanying text. On this ground alone, there
is no question that U.S. jurisdiction over these four banks can be had in
almost every, if not every, U.S. federal district court in the nation.
Michael Greenberger, The Extraterritorial Provisions of the Dodd-Frank
Act Protects U.S. Taxpayers from Worldwide Bailouts, 80 UMKC L. REV.
965, 971–72 (2012). Indeed, any financial institution conducting swaps
business that has a “direct and significant” connection to U.S. commerce
and is doing business in the United States would be subject to U.S. federal
court jurisdiction where it is doing business. Id.
30 See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, QUARTERLY
REPORT ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES at 14 (Fourth
Quarter 2017), https://www.occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-mar
kets/derivatives/dq318.pdf.
31 See infra note 350 and accompanying text.
28
29
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meltdown.32 In this regard, studies have shown that the
present widespread expectation within the financial sector
that U.S. taxpayers will rescue these huge banks in times of
economic peril has been capitalized within the stock prices of
these banks to increase those prices above the level that
would be present in the absence of U.S. taxpayers’ expected
status as their lenders of last resort.33 While many U.S.
See, e.g., Mike Collins, The Big Bank Bailout, FORBES (July 14, 2015,
4:22 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikecollins/2015/07/14/the-bigbank-bailout/#20a7755a2d83 (“The Special Inspector General for TARP
summary of the bailout says that the total commitment of government is
$16.8 trillion dollars with the $4.6 trillion already paid out.”); John
Carney, The Size of the Bank Bailout: $29 Trillion, CNBC (Dec. 14, 2011,
5:29 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/id/45674390. Of the $29 trillion, $8.2
trillion went to the U.S.’s six largest banks, including the four banks
discussed at length in this paper. BETTER MARKETS, WALL STREET’S SIX
BIGGEST BAILED-OUT BANKS: THEIR RAP SHEETS & THEIR ONGOING CRIME
SPREE 4 (2019), https://bettermarkets.com/sites/default/files/Better%20
Markets%20-%20Wall%20Street%27s%20Six%20Biggest%20Bailed-Out
%20Banks%20FINAL.pdf.
33 Edward J. Kane, Perspectives on Banking and Banking Crises 6–8
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (“In good times and in bad,
being too big to fail simultaneously lowers both the cost of a firm’s debt
and the cost of its equity. This is because too-big-to-fail guarantees lower
the risk that flows through to owners of both classes of securities. These
guarantees chop off bondholders’ and stockholders’ losses at a specified
point and direct the flow of further losses to taxpayers . . . . The only time
AIG’s stock price approached zero—and it did so twice—was when the
possibility of a US government takeover fell under active discussion, so
that the probability of stockholders’ continued rescue was falling. As soon
as this course of action was tabled, the stock price surged again because
TBTF policies handed the value of the stop-loss back to AIG’s
stockholders.”); Marc Labonte, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42150,
SYSTEMATICALLY IMPORTANT OR “TOO BIG TO FAIL” FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS (2018) 5 (“In some cases, shareholders have borne some
losses through stock dilution, although their losses may have been
smaller than they would have been in a bankruptcy”); IMF Survey: Big
Banks Benefit from Government Subsidies, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/
32
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taxpayers have yet to fully recover from the Great
Recession,34 these four big U.S. bank holding companies have
thrived.35
It was not until the spring of 2014 that CFTC staff first
learned about the “deguarantee” loophole sponsored by ISDA
and adopted by, inter alia, the four big U.S. bank holding
company swaps dealers.36 It appears that it was not until
2016, that the CFTC first addressed the companion ANE
loophole, which allows swaps fully executed in the U.S. by
U.S. bank personnel to evade Dodd-Frank swaps regulations
by later “assigning” those completed swaps to U.S. bank
holding companies’ newly deguaranteed “foreign” bank
subsidiaries.37
04/53/sopol033114a (“In its latest analysis for the Global Financial
Stability Report, the IMF shows that big banks still benefit from implicit
public subsidies created by the expectation that the government will
support them if they are in financial trouble.”).
34 See infra note 375 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Lydia DePillis,
10 Years After the Recession Began, Have Americans Recovered?, CNN
MONEY (Dec. 1, 2017, 10:30 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/12/01/
news/economy/recession-anniversary/index.html (“. . . Americans still
carry the scars of the recession, some of which will never heal.”); Abigail
Summerville, A Decade after Great Recession, 1 in 3 Americans Still
Haven’t Recovered, CNBC (July 13, 2017, 1:48 PM), https://
www.cnbc.com/2017/07/13/a-decade-after-great-recession-1-in-3-america
ns-still-havent-recovered.html.
35 See, e.g., Matt Egan, Too-Big-To-Fail Banks Keep Getting Bigger, CNN
MONEY (Nov. 21, 2017, 3:43 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/11/21/
investing/banks-too-big-to-fail-jpmorgan-bank-of-america/index.html;
Stephen Gandel, By Every Measure, the Big Banks are Bigger, FORTUNE
(Sept. 13, 2013), http://fortune.com/2013/09/13/by-every-measure-thebig-banks-are-bigger/.
36 See infra note 444 and accompanying text.
37 See infra notes 366–67, 457–59 and accompanying text; moreover, a
recent ruling of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit strongly
suggests that the execution of the swap in the United States alone means
that the transaction is not extraterritorial, but a “domestic transaction”
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In November 2014, the then new CFTC Chairman,
Timothy Massad, first questioned the use of the deguarantee
loophole to avoid Dodd-Frank.38 By May 2016, the CFTC
closed the deguarantee loophole for a portion of only one of
the thirteen types of Dodd-Frank swaps regulations, i.e.,
swaps regulation dealing specifically with applying DoddFrank swaps margin requirements to uncleared swaps.39
However, in October 2016, the CFTC proposed a rule
and interpretations that, upon becoming final, would have
ended completely the deguarantee loophole for all of its swaps
regulations.40 At that time, the CFTC also first noted the
existence of the ANE loophole and then attempted to end it
completely in the proposed rule.41 However, the October 2016
proposals were never finalized by the CFTC before the
inauguration of President Trump, and all indications are that
the proposals will never be finalized during a Trump
Administration.42 In sum, the deguarantee and ANE
loopholes will remain in effect at the very least for years to
come.43
Because of the lack of transparency concerning swaps
trading before Dodd-Frank went into effect and because so
and therefore completely subject to Dodd-Frank even if the swaps was
later “assigned” to a foreign subsidiary. Choi v. Tower Research Capital
LLC, 890 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2018).
38 See infra note 445 and accompanying text.
39 See infra Part IX.E.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 See also infra notes 517–23 and accompanying text for a discussion of
yet a further unlimited CFTC complete exemption from Dodd-Frank
swaps rules authored—not by the CFTC itself—but the CFTC staff for
foreign swaps traders registered to do swaps trading by the CFTC with
non-U.S. persons. Id. This exemption is afforded as a matter of
“international comity” so as not to conflict with foreign swaps law even
when there is no applicable foreign swaps law to be applied. Id.
Journal of Business & Technology Law
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much of the trading was done through deguaranteed foreign
subsidiaries of U.S. swaps dealers after Dodd-Frank’s
passage, a fully accurate accounting of the extent to which
swaps have moved abroad from the U.S. is difficult. However,
many market experts noticed a very significant movement of
swaps abroad after the deguarantee loophole was created.
Moreover, a highly cited study by Reuter’s calculated that up
to 95% of certain lines of swaps trading had moved outside
the U.S. under the deguarantee loophole and thus were
considered not to be subject to Dodd-Frank swaps
regulations.44 However, while the trading has likely moved
abroad in great numbers, those trades would still be reflected
in the consolidated balance sheets of, inter alia, the four big
U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers. Moreover, those
trades have only “moved” from the U.S. parent swaps dealers
and their U.S. affiliates to their newly “deguaranteed”
foreign subsidiaries. What has not moved abroad is the
obligation of the lender of last resort to these four big U.S.
banks: i.e., the U.S. taxpayer, who is understood throughout
the financial world to be subject to a call for funds to bail out
these banks should a new crisis threaten worldwide
cascading swaps defaults that, if not stopped, will lead to
financial Armageddon.45
To understand the significance of, inter alia, the
deguarantee and ANE loopholes, it is first important to
understand what, in fact, swaps are and how unregulated
swaps have caused many serious financial dysfunctions, and
then, ultimately in September 2008, the full destabilization
of the world economy. That information is provided in the
next section of this paper.
This background is important because the swaps
market is widely recognized by economists, financial
regulators, members of Congress, and other financial market
See infra notes 358–365 and accompanying text.
See INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 33.
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experts to be the most poorly understood of all financial
markets.46 As Senator Chris Dodd said, after passage of
Dodd-Frank:
One of the problems that I had as a
member of Congress on this issue, is
financial literacy is not [just] a
general problem with the public, it’s
a general problem with too many
people, including my colleagues . . . It
is not well understood . . . . Too often,
in the banking [area] . . . when your
Bill is on the floor of the Senate, the
question would be not [be] “explain to
me the derivatives section,” . . . the
question is “is [the derivatives
section] okay” . . . and that was
basically the only question you’d
get.47

Because swaps markets are so poorly understood, the
import of these extraterritorial loopholes from Dodd-Frank’s
regulation of these markets is, similarly, misunderstood.
Ending these loopholes and a return to protecting the U.S.
taxpayer against multi-trillion-dollar bank bailouts are made
that much more difficult by this lack of knowledge.48
See Discover GW, Sen. Chris Dodd: Cohen Lecture at The Shape of
Things to Come, YOUTUBE (Jan. 17, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=WlIUcO-OGwE; see also Letter from Dennis M. Kelleher,
President & CEO, Better Markets Inc., to Brent J. Fields, Secretary, U.S.
Sec. and Exch. Comm’n (October 26, 2015) (on file with Better Markets)
(describing the swaps market, Secretary of the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, Brent Fields states, “[D]erivatives are so complex
and poorly understood by even sophisticated market participants . . . .”).
47 See Discover GW, supra note 46.
48 See, e.g., A User’s Guide for the Bank Holding Company Performance
Report, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, (Mar.
2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/BHCPR_Publica
46
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Moreover, with all the attention being given to
President Trump’s claims that Dodd-Frank will be “rolled
back,” there is a surprising reticence on the part of the big
Wall Street banks and the Trump Administration about
rolling back specifically Dodd-Frank swaps regulatory
provisions. 49
One could rationally conclude that, with the benefit of
the “deguarantee and ANE” loopholes to evade application of
Dodd-Frank swaps rules, there is no need for these too big to
fail U.S. banks to “roll back” U.S. Dodd-Frank swaps rules by
new legislation.50 Moreover, there are recent important
Congressional statements by even outspoken supporters of
weakening Dodd-Frank showing a strong political distaste
for Congressionally enacted deregulation that helps the very
biggest U.S. bank holding companies;51 and any legislation
advanced to repeal Dodd-Frank swaps regulation for those
huge banks might also be the target of a legislative rider to
reinstate a “modern day” Glass-Steagall in a format which
could force these big U.S. swaps dealer banks tostructurally
and completely suspend that part of the bank that buys and
tion_2017_03_FINAL.pdf (explaining the meaning of data contained
within quarterly reports of Financial Holding Companies by Peer Group);
see also Bank Holding Company Performance Report, Peer Group Data,
Peer Group 01, at 10 (Sept. 2016), BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL
RESERVE SYSTEM, https://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/content/BHCPRRPT
/REPORTS/BHCPR_PEER/Sept2016/PeerGroup_1_September2016.pdf;
Silla Bush, Wall Street Faces New U.S. Scrutiny of Derivatives Tactic,
BLOOMBERG (July, 30 2014, 8:48 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2014-07-30/wall-street-facing-new-u-s-scrutiny-of-deriva
tives-rule-tactic (describing a CFTC staff letter, discussing how five
banks “control 95 percent of cash and derivatives trading for U.S. bank
holding companies as of March 31, according to the Office of Comptroller
of the Currency.”).
49 See infra notes 374–410 and accompanying text.
50 See infra note 419 and accompanying text.
51 See infra notes 379–400 and accompanying text.
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sells investments, including the sales and purchase of swaps,
which might not then be included in the commercial bank
functions, wherein only federally insured deposits and loan
making might be done.52 Investments and swaps might then
only be done by wholly separated investment banks—and
thus JPMorgan Chase, Citibank, and Bank of America at
least would likely have to either completely or substantially
abandon swaps trading.53
The deguarantee and ANE loopholes, which originated
in the Obama Administration’s CFTC, are certainly not likely
to be closed in the Trump Administration. Relief is also
unlikely to be found in a Congress with a Republicancontrolled Senate. However, the relevant swaps statutory
framework now affords state attorneys general and state
financial regulators the right to bring so-called “parens
patriae” actions in federal district courts to enforce, inter alia,
Dodd-Frank on behalf of a state’s citizens. State attorneys
general, for example, have aggressively litigated in federal
district courts to enjoin U.S. banks’ financial irregularities.54
However, little (if anything) has been done by the states in
the swaps arena. This is because there is so little knowledge
of swaps even in the otherwise highly capable offices of state
attorneys general and state financial regulators.
It is the hope that this paper may remedy that lack in
understanding of a market that has brought, and, if not
properly regulated, will once again bring, the most severe
adverse economic consequences imaginable worldwide. A
history of the market and its traditional poor regulation
begins in the next section of this paper.
See infra notes 401–10 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 406–10 and accompanying text.
54 See infra Part XII.
52
53
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Finally, as is also shown in detail below,55 there are
well publicized pronouncements, most prominently by
President Trump, Congressional Republicans and Fed chair
Jerome Powell56 that the U.S. economy is booming with low
unemployment, solid GDP growth and benefits purportedly
to be derived from the touted stimulus effect of the passage
of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017; and it is not now
foreseeable under conventional wisdom that the “too big to
fail” U.S. banks could face the insolvency or the threatened
insolvency that occurred in 2008. It is this sense of financial
euphoria that undergirds arguments for Dodd-Frank
deregulation.
However, the short term effects of the purported
stimulus to be derived from the tax cut are at best, as of this
writing, fast wearing off.57 Many have characterized any
stimulus from the tax cut as a “brief sugar high.”58 Indeed,
many Americans are facing additional hardship from
unexpectedly smaller tax refunds under the new tax
See infra notes 272–75 and accompanying text.
Id.
57 Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, US Business Confidence Recedes from
Post-Tax Cut High, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.ft.com/
content/e06122d2-4b1f-11e9-8b7f-d49067e0f50d (“An index of CEOs’
economic confidence compiled by the Business Roundtable, one of
Washington’s most prominent business groups, declined for the fourth
quarter in a row, falling 9.2 points to 95.2.”). See also Ruchir Sharma, The
Miracle Years are Over. Get Used to It, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/01/opinion/economy-debt-inflation.ht
ml (“Stimulus measures like the Trump tax cuts can lift growth above
this path, but at best temporarily, at the risk of higher deficits and debt.”);
Paul Krugman, The Incredible Shrinking Trump Boom, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/30/opinion/the-incredibleshrinking-trump-boom.html (contending that the tax cut is a “brief sugar
high”).
58 Id.
55
56
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legislation.59 Moreover, there is an equally persuasive, if not
as well publicized, counter assessment by distinguished
financial observers that there are too many similarities
between today’s economy and the seemingly strong economy
leading into the 2008 meltdown.60 The country is now again
awash in defaults on consumer indebtedness in the multitrillion dollar credit card, student loan, and auto loan
markets.61 Even worse, the indebtedness in these markets is
accompanied by the very same financial engineering
infrastructure, including swaps, that collapsed in the 2008
mortgage crisis.62 These observers have persuasively argued
that the rising defaults and the likely resulting failure of the
accompanying financial engineering structures could very
well lead to the next financial meltdown and a new call for
U.S. taxpayer bailouts.63 Therefore, this is certainly not the
time to gamble with the world economy by creating massive
loopholes in the application of Dodd-Frank swaps regulation.
59 See, e.g., Martha C. White, Smaller Tax Refunds Compound Financial
Worries for the 30 Percent of Americans with More Debt Than Savings,
NBC NEWS (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/businessnews/smaller-tax-refunds-compound-financial-worries-30-percent-ameri
cans-more-n971756 (“29 percent of respondents who said their debts
outstripped their savings is the highest number recorded” which
“underscores the unevenness of the economic recovery.” This resulted in
“the hashtag #GOPTaxScam trending on Twitter as users detailed the
extent to which the new law changed their own taxes”).
60 See infra notes 277–307 and accompanying text.
61 Id. See also Steven Pearlstein, Beware the ‘Mother of all Credit
Bubbles’, WASH. POST (Jun. 8, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/economy/beware-the-mother-of-all-credit-bubbles/2018/06/08/
940f467c-69af-11e8-9e38-24e693b38637_story.html?noredirect=on&utm
_term=.a007d7c21fb3 (warning that 2018 is reminiscent of the run up to
the 2008 crash and that that next meltdown will concern corporate debt
now reaching “record levels” aggravated by “another round of financial
engineering that converts equity into debt.”).
62 See infra notes 277–307 and accompanying text.
63 Id.
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II. THE TROUBLED HISTORY OF THE SWAPS
MARKET AND ITS POOR REGULATION
Beginning in 1865, farmers and grain merchants organized
in Chicago to hedge price risk in corn, wheat, and other
grains in what are thought to be the earliest sustained
derivatives transactions in this country.64 These kinds of
derivatives have been historically referred to as “futures
contracts.”65
Since their creation, these futures contracts were
recognized as being subject to price distortion, i.e., rather
than providing the intended successful commercial hedging,
they can cause hedging entities and their consumers to pay
excessive or (in the case of producers) unduly low,
unnecessary and unexpected spot (or market) prices. This
price distortion happens through excessive speculation,
fraud, and/or manipulation within those markets.66 As one
disgruntled farmer told the House Agriculture Committee in
1892:
[T]he man who managed or sold or
owned those immense wheat fields
has not as much to say with the
regard to the price of the wheat than
some young fellow [i.e., futures
trader] who stands howling around
the Chicago wheat pit [i.e., futures
Jonathan Ira Levy, Contemplating Delivery: Futures Trading and the
Problem of Commodity Exchange in the United States, 1875-1905, 111
AM. HIST. REV. 307, 307–09 (2006).
65 NICK BATTLEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMMODITY FUTURES AND
OPTIONS 17–18 (2d ed. 1995).
66 See Levy, supra note 64, at 310.
64
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exchange] could actually sell in a
day.67

A. The Origins and Purposes of the Commodity
Exchange Act’s Regulation of Derivatives
Because excessively low farm prices wreaked financial havoc
on America’s agriculture sector shortly before and during the
Great Depression, President Franklin D. Roosevelt
recommended to Congress, as one of his earliest financial
market reform proposals, legislation that became the
Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (“CEA”).68 When
introducing this legislation in 1934, President Roosevelt
said: “[I]t should be our national policy to restrict, as far as
possible, the use of these [futures] exchanges for purely
speculative operations.”69 Accordingly, the 1935 Report of
House Agriculture Committee, which led to the 1936 Act,
stated:
The fundamental purpose of the
measure [i.e., the CEA] is to insure
fair practice and honest dealing on
the commodity exchanges and to
provide a measure of control over
those forms of speculative activity
which too often demoralize the
markets to the injury of producers
Id. at 307 (quoting Fictitious Dealings in Agricultural Products:
Hearing on H.R. 392, H.R. 2699, and H.R. 3870, Before H. Comm. on
Agric., 52d Cong. (1892)).
68 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D.
Roosevelt, 3 PUB. PAPERS 81 (1938); see also 7 U.S.C. §§ 6–27 (2006) (as
amended).
69 Roosevelt, supra note 68, at 91.
67
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and consumers and the exchanges
themselves.70

Thus, the CEA, as amended, required that all futures
contracts be traded on a regulated exchange providing full
transparency to regulators of trading behavior and to the
public of the formation of futures prices.71 The exchangetrading requirement of the CEA was so central to that
statute’s effectiveness that it is still a felony to knowingly
violate it, and substantial criminal penalties or civil fines
may be levied upon offending traders and their employees.72
B. The Nature of Futures Contracts
The most prominent treatise on derivatives defines a “futures
contract” as follows:
The traditional futures contract is an
agreement between a seller and a
buyer that the seller (called a short)
will deliver to the buyer (called a
long), at a price agreed to when the
contract is first entered, and the
buyer will accept and pay for, a
specified quantity and grade of an
identified commodity during a
defined time in the future.73

70 Donald A. Campbell, Trading in Futures Under the Commodity
Exchange Act, 26 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 215, 223 (1958).
71 7 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2009) (as amended).
72 Id. § 13(b).
73 PHILLIP M. JOHNSON & THOMAS L. HAZEN, 1 DERIVATIVES REGULATION,
§1.02[3] at 25 (2004) [hereinafter JOHNSON & HAZEN].
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While futures contracts were first developed for the
agricultural sector, they ultimately expanded into hedging
vehicles for metals and energy markets.74 “[T]here has been
a continual [further] expansion of the futures and derivatives
markets [to] [f]inancial futures—on government securities,
private debt issues, foreign currencies, and stock indices—an
increasingly important part of the commodities world.”75
Standardization of [the] terms is a
key feature of publicly traded futures
contracts. [Under] a futures contract,
[al]most [all] customers do not expect
to take delivery. There is an
opportunity to offset the delivery
[obligation], and the customer has a
right to liquidate rather than take [or
make] delivery.76

Indeed, it is very rare that delivery is executed under
a futures contract.77 (A full explanation of the hedging
mechanism provided by future contracts is beyond the scope
of this paper but is otherwise fully explained by sources cited
in the margin).78 Only through the use of highly standardized
Id. § 1.02[1] at 7–8.
Id. § 1.02[1] at 11.
76 Id. § 1.02[3] at 24–25 n.97 (internal citations omitted; emphasis added).
77 PRAKASH G. APTE, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: A BUSINESS PERSPECTIVE
149 (2009) (“[I]n most futures markets, actual delivery takes place in less
than one percent of the contracts traded.”). See also Andrew Hecht,
Taking Delivery of Commodities via the Futures Market, THE BALANCE
(Sept. 23, 2018), https://www.thebalance.com/taking-delivery-of-comm
odities-via-the-futures-market-4118366 (explaining that “less than 5
percent of futures with a delivery mechanism result in parties making or
taking delivery of a commodity”).
78 BATTLEY, supra note 65, at 7–11 (explaining that the basic purpose of
trading out of a futures contract “is to use the futures market to prevent
74
75
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futures contracts can the necessary liquidity be developed
that allows traders the much-needed ability to offset quick
delivery commitments in order to avoid unwanted (indeed,
often impossible) delivery obligations but still hedge market
spot prices.79
or minimize the effects of adverse price movements in the physical
commodity" by effectively, “seek[ing] an outright profit in future [trade]
to offset a potential loss in physicals”). Battley delineates this technique
into two categories: a “producer hedge,” which protects against the
market price falling and a “consumer hedge,” which protects against the
market price rising. Id. at 8. To illustrate a producer hedge, Battley sets
out the example of an oil refiner who, despite current physical market
costs at $145, expects those prices to drop, so the refiner sells oil futures
at $144. Id. at 8–9. As expected, the market price drops to $140, which
creates a $5 loss for the refiner on the physical market; however, the
futures price also drops to $139. Id. To offset the $5 loss in the physical
market, the refiner “squares out his [futures] position . . . by buying . . .
at $139.” Thus, because when the refiner sold the futures, he received
$144, and when he bought at the lower price, he only paid $139, in effect
the refiner nets $5 to completely offset the physical market loss. Id. at 9.
To illustrate the consumer hedge, Battley presents the oil market
example from an oil distributor's perspective, summarizing that, in this
context, the consumer's fear is a rise in the physical market price, and to
“minimize the effects of such a price movement, [consumers] may buy on
the futures market so that, should the physical price move up thereby
forcing them to pay more than they anticipated for their oil, the
[corresponding] increase in the futures price will provide . . . an offsetting
profit.” Id. at 10; see also JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 73, at § 1.03[2]
(addressing the “hedging function” and analogizing the “hedge” to an
insurance policy on investment).
79 APTE, supra note 77. See also CFTC, The Economic Purpose of Futures
Contracts, https://www.cftc.gov/ConsumerProtection/EducationCenter/ec
onomicpurpose.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2019) (stating “[futures
contract] standardization enhances liquidity . . . [which] makes the
contract more useful for hedging” but not as “a merchandising vehicle”
and that commodity providers typically “offset the contracts before the
delivery date” rather than make the delivery). One more recent accepted
method of “avoiding delivery” is to “cash settle” the futures transaction
based on the market price of the futures contract, a settlement process
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C. The Contours of the CEA’s Exchange Trading
Requirement
As would be expected of a market regulation bill that followed
in the wake of the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934, the
contours of the CEA’s futures exchange regulation mirrors
the regulation of the equities markets, i.e., futures contracts
were required to be traded on publicly-transparent and fullyregulated exchanges supported by clearing mechanisms to
ensure that contractual commitments would be backed by
adequate collateral and capital of the futures contract
counterparties and the clearinghouse.80
Under the CEA, regulated exchanges ensured that
futures contracts were subject to: (1) public and transparent
price formation based on market demand; (2) disclosure of
the real trading parties in interest to federal market
regulators; (3) regulation of intermediaries, i.e., brokers and
their employees; (4) stringent rules for customer protection;
(5) self-regulation by exchanges directly supervised by a
federal regulator to detect unlawful trading activity; (6)
prohibitions against fraud, market manipulation, and
excessive speculation; and (7) enforcement of all these
requirements by a federal regulator, private individuals, and
the states. The latter two remedies are afforded by private
rights of action for adversely-affected traders and customers;
and by state parens patriae suits to be brought by state
attorneys general and state financial regulators,
respectively.81
As an essential part of this regulatory format, futures
contracts have to be “cleared,” i.e., a well-capitalized and
that has been deemed by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(“CFTC”) to be wholly permissible under the CEA; JOHNSON & HAZEN,
supra note 73, at § 1.03[8], at 146–47.
80 See JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 73, at §§ 1.02[2][E], 1.02[8][F], 1.05.
81 7 U.S.C. § 6 (2006).
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regulated intermediary institution is required to stand
between the counterparties of a futures contract to ensure
that commitments undertaken pursuant to those contracts
are adequately collateralized through the collection of
margin to prevent counterparty harms from contractual
defaults.82 Any contractual default by a counterparty is
guaranteed by the clearing facility, a financial commitment
that serves to ensure that the clearing facility has a strong
incentive to enforce strictly the collateralization of each
trade, through highly disciplined daily assessments of the
market prices of futures positions, as well as the immediate
collection by the clearing facility of two types of margin from
the counterparties: (1) the payment of initial margin upon
executing and listing a futures contract; and (2) the payment
of variation margin when the contract price moves against a
counterparty to the trade.83
D. The Development and Characteristics of
Swaps
By the 1980s, a variant of futures contracts was developed,
commonly referred to as swaps.84 When first addressing
swaps contracts, the CFTC defined them as “an agreement
between two parties to exchange a series of cash flows
measured by different interest rates, exchanges rates, or
prices with payment calculated by reference to a principal
base (notional amount).”85
Similarly, ISDA, the major private, self-regulatory
body of swaps dealers which must be ISDA members to have
See JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 73, at § 1.05.
See id.
84 See id. at § 1.02[8][A].
85 Policy Statement Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,694,
30,695 (July 21, 1989).
82
83
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the right to trade swaps using ISDA’s widely-used,
copyrighted, contractual templates, defines a swap as “[a]
derivative where two counterparties exchange streams of
cash flows with each other. These streams of cash flows are
known as the ‘legs’ of the swap and are calculated by
reference to a notional amount.”86
The classic example of a swap is an interest rate swap
where one party to the agreement exchanges with the swaps
dealer a floating interest rate obligation on an existing loan
for a fixed rate obligation to the dealer.87 Usually, the person
swapping the floating rate for a fixed rate is expecting (or
hedging against the future possibility that) the fixed rate will
be lower than the floating rate.88
In other words, the underlying loan is almost never
negotiated or renegotiated under the swap.89 It is an assumed
amount written into the swap, most often (but not
necessarily, especially in cases of interest rate speculation)
reflecting an actual outstanding loan of one of the swap’s
counterparties from a creditor or lender upon which,
pursuant to a loan, the floating rate is to be paid.90 Under an
interest rate swap, the fixed interest rate payments paid (in
lieu of an adjustable rate specified in the loan document)
under the swap by the counterparty “the borrower” to the
swaps dealer would also be specified in the transaction, as
86 INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS’N, INC., DCG GLOSSARY,
https://www.isda.org/1970/01/01/glossary/#s (last visited Mar. 30, 2019).
87 Id.; see also SATYAJIT DAS, TRADERS, GUNS AND MONEY: KNOWNS AND
UNKNOWNS IN THE DAZZLING WORLD OF DERIVATIVES 37 (rev. ed. 2010).
88 The Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis: Hearing before the
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 111th Cong. 3–4 (2010) (testimony
of Prof. Michael Greenberger, Univ. of Md. Carey School of Law)
[hereinafter Greenberger Testimony]; see also BATTLEY, supra note 65, at
5–12.
89 Greenberger Testimony, supra note 88.
90 Id.
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would the manner in which the floating rate is to be
calculated.91 Thus, rather than buying/selling a single future
rate or price (as would be true in a traditional futures
contract), there is a “swapping” of commitments, with one
party buying the fixed rate and selling the floating rate
(usually the non-dealer), while the other party (usually the
dealer) is buying the floating rate and selling the fixed rate.92
In the interest rate swap scenario described above, the
counterparty with a loan is “hedging” against increased
interest rates to be paid as a floating rate obligation. The
bank swaps dealer counterparty may be deemed to be
speculating that interest rates will not increase, but it
usually hedges that risk both by the substantial fees paid by
the non-dealer counterparty to the swap dealer for the right
to enter into the interest rate swap; and by the swaps dealer
itself often hedging its swaps exposure through a mirror but
opposite interest rate swap.
Most important, there was (and is) no bar to either or
both counterparties speculating on the future price of
interest rates through such a swap. That is, the
counterparties are free not to hedge any existing credit
exposure but instead can be “betting” on the future direction
of interest rates. As a Wall Street Journal editor and author
recently observed, in a thorough analysis of manipulation in
the speculative use of interest rate swaps: “[Interest rate]
swaps [are] simply another vehicle with which banks could
bet on the future direction of interest rates . . . . By 2010,
some $1.28 trillion of these interest rate swaps changed
hands on a daily basis . . . .”93
Id.
Id.
93 DAVID ENRICH, THE SPIDER NETWORK: THE WILD STORY OF A MATH
GENIUS, A GANG OF BACKSTABBER BANKERS AND ONE OF THE GREATEST
SCAMS IN FINANCIAL HISTORY 35 (2017).
91
92
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As will be shown below, it is most often speculation in
the use of swaps, i.e., betting on the price direction of the
index on which the swap is based, that has caused serious
financial dislocations, e.g., in the 2008 financial meltdown,
where swaps naked “shorts” bet that mortgages which they
did not own would fail, thus entitling those shorts to recover
the complete amount of the actual loss on those mortgages
even though they did not own them. It was the indebtedness
of, inter alia, U.S. swaps dealers or their affiliates to pay off
those mortgage “losses” guaranteed to the shorts that
punched a major hole in the world economy because, inter
alia, the U.S. swaps dealers, or their affiliates, operating in
the pre-Dodd-Frank unregulated environment, had neither
sufficient capital nor collateral in reserve to fall back on to
pay off the successful, shorting counterparties; nor were
these transactions cleared, thereby insuring a third party
guarantee of the of the defaulting counterparties’ contractual
obligations.
Similarly, many of those U.S. bank holding company
swaps dealers themselves, upon recognizing mounting risk in
the mortgage markets, shorted the U.S. mortgage market
using naked CDS, with their counterparties, essentially
insuring full mortgage payments for mortgage defaults. In
turn, that led to the likelihood of non-payment to the bank
holding company swaps dealers of the “insurance” they had
purchased from their cash-strapped counterparties when the
mortgage market collapsed.
To avoid cascading massive defaults on the viability of
the failing U.S. mortgage market, it was the U.S. taxpayer
that shelled out trillions of dollars to bail out these, inter alia,
huge U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers both in their
inability to pay the “insurance” and in their threatened
inability to collect the insurance from their defaulting

Journal of Business & Technology Law



231

Too Big to Fail

counterparties when those swaps dealers were themselves
shorting the housing market.94
E. Swaps and the CEA’s Exchange Trading
Requirement
After swaps had been developed in the 1980s, with a
simultaneous recognition that swaps contained the features
of a futures contract, the question arose whether swaps
would be subject to the mandatory exchange-trading
requirement of the CEA.95 In a 1989 Policy Statement, the
CFTC set forth the criteria for the kind of swaps for “which
regulation under the CEA and Commission regulations [of
swaps would be] unnecessary.”96 The CFTC concluded that
swaps at that time required:
[t]ailoring . . . through private
negotiations between the parties and
may involve not only financial terms
but issues such as representations,
covenants, events of default, term to
maturity, and any requirement for
the posting of collateral or other
credit enhancement. Such tailoring
and counterparty credit assessment
distinguish swap transactions from
exchange transactions, where the
Cezary Podkul et al., 10 Years After the Crisis, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 27,
2018), http://graphics.wsj.com/how-the-world-has-changed-since-2008-fi
nancial-crisis/ (“The financial crisis cost the U.S. economy some $6 trillion
to $14 trillion in lost output, and ended only after the government
promised aid worth an estimated $12.6 trillion.”).
95 See supra note 85, at 30,694.
96 Id. at 39,037.
94
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contract terms are standardized and
the counterparty is unknown.97

Accordingly, the CFTC exempted swaps from the CEA
exchange-trading requirement, by stating that “swaps must
be negotiated by the parties as to their material terms, based
upon individualized credit determinations, and documented
by the parties in an agreement or series of agreements that
is not fully standardized.”98 Another condition of the
exchange trading exemption is that “[t]he swap transactions
must not be marketed to the public.”99
Because the CEA provided no explicit statutory
provision authorizing the CFTC to grant this kind of
exemption from the CEA’s exchange trading requirement,
the large U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers, inter
alia, complained to Congress that there was “uncertainty” as
to the legal effect of the CFTC’s 1989 policy statement.100
Thus, to accommodate these large swaps dealers, in 1992
Congress passed the Futures Trading Practices Act (“FTPA”),
which authorized the precise criteria for the CFTC to create
an exemption from the CEA’s mandatory exchange trading
requirement for, inter alia, “swap agreements” that “are not
part of a fungible class of agreements that are standardized
as to their material economic terms.”101
The Commission later explained this statutory bar to
standardization of swaps as follows:
This condition [that swaps be
individually negotiated] is designed
Id. at 39,038.
Id. (emphasis added).
99 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 73, at 53.
100 Greenberger Testimony, supra note 88, at 4.
101 Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-546, 106 Stat.
3631 (emphasis added).
97
98
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to assure that the exemption does not
encompass . . . swap agreements, the
terms of which are fixed and are not
subject to negotiation, that functions
essentially in the same manner as an
exchange but for the bilateral
execution of transactions.102

Pursuant to the CFTC’s then new-found ability to
grant exceptions to the CEA’s exchange-trading requirement,
the CFTC by rule in 1993 provided an exception from the
CEA’s exchange-trading for swaps that were, inter alia, “not
part of a fungible class of agreements that are standardized
as to their material economic terms[.]”103 Moreover, exempt
swaps agreements were not to be “traded on or through a
multilateral transaction execution facility[.]”104 In laymen’s
terms, “a multilateral transaction execution facility” consists
of one party offering electronically a swaps agreement to
many different other parties, rather than merely offering
agreements on a strictly bilateral or one-on-one basis.105

Exemption for Certain Swap Agreements, 58 Fed. Reg. 5587, 5590
(Jan. 22, 1993).
103 17 C.F.R. § 35.2(b) (2009) (emphasis added).
104 Id. § 35.2(d).
105 See A New Regulatory Framework for Multilateral Transaction
Execution Facilities, Intermediaries and Clearing Organizations, 65 Fed.
Reg. 38,986, 38,989 (June 22, 2000) (“The Commission is proposing to
define MTEF as ‘an electronic or non-electronic market or similar facility
through which persons, for their own accounts or for the accounts of
others, enter into, agree to enter into or execute binding transactions by
accepting bids or offers made by one person that are open to multiple
persons conducting business through such market or similar facility.’”);
Membership, ISDA, https://www.isda.org/membership/ (“ISDA has over
900 member institutions from 70 countries.”) (last visited Mar. 28, 2019).
102
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F. The Standardization of Swaps through the
ISDA Master Agreement
However, even before the 1993 CFTC exchange-trading
exemption had been finalized, calling for “tailored”
negotiation of each of the material economic terms of a swap
to be exempt from exchange trading, ISDA promulgated, in
1992, a standardized and copyrighted Master Agreement and
related standardized and copyrighted schedules to govern the
execution of a swap. ISDA “was chartered in 1985 and today
has over [875] member institutions.”106 Under ISDA’s rules,
one could not trade swaps unless trading with an ISDA
member that had the exclusive rights to use ISDA’s
standardized, copyright agreements. As will be seen, these
standardized ISDA-created contracts substantially undercut
the CFTC 1993 exchange trading exemption for the
“tailoring” of swaps, i.e., ISDA swaps contractual template
made swaps look exactly like standardized futures contracts
and thus, under the CEA, had to be traded on an exchange.107
In this regard, the 1992 ISDA Master Agreement was
24 pages long with standardized, boilerplate clauses, and
each page carried with it a copyright in ISDA’s name.108 The
Agreement included the fundamental provisions without
which the swaps transaction could not be understood.
Included among the many contractual points resolved by the
ISDA Master Agreement are “Interpretation” principles (¶1);
Michael Greenberger, Overwhelming a Financial Regulatory Black
Hole with Legislative Sunlight: Dodd-Frank’s Attack on Systemic
Economic Destabilization Caused by an Unregulated Multi-Trillion
Dollar Derivatives Market, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 127, 135 (2011) (quoting
News Release, ISDA, Eraj Shirvani New Chairman of ISDA (Apr. 16,
2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also MASTER AGREEMENT,
ISDA, 1992.
107 See supra notes 95–105 and accompanying text.
108 See ISDA, MASTER AGREEMENT (1992) at 1–24.
106
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“Obligations,” including “Liability” (¶2); “Representations”
(¶3); “Agreements” (¶4); “Events of Default and Termination
Events” (¶5); “Early Termination” (¶6); “Transfer” (¶7);
“Contractual Currency” (¶8); “Remedies” (¶9); “Expenses”
(¶11); “Notice” (¶12); “Governing Law and Jurisdiction”
(¶13); and forty-three “definitions” governing the swaps
transactions (¶14).109
Accompanying the ISDA Master Agreement is a
“Schedule,” six pages long, derived directly from a
standardized ISDA template, which, in turn, provides a
standardized menu of limited choices to further define terms
of the ISDA Master Agreement.110 The ISDA template for the
Schedule is itself copyrighted on every page in ISDA’s name.
The ISDA standardized template for the Schedule is
dependent upon, and references only, the ISDA Master
Agreement.111
Also, accompanying the ISDA Schedule is a
standardized ISDA Credit Support Annex, which is sixteen
pages long and includes copyrights in ISDA’s name on every
page except those relating to the last of thirteen paragraphs
of the annex.112 The Credit Support Annex is the mechanism
by which parties to the swap transaction would adjust the
credit arrangement underlying the swap. For example, and
critical for a discussion of the U.S. bank-created “deguarantee loopholes” below, this latter document
traditionally served as a downstream guarantee of a swaps
dealer subsidiary to a swaps non-dealer counterparty.

Id. at 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 11–14.
Id. at 19–24.
111 Id.
112 See ISDA, MASTER AGREEMENT, CREDIT SUPPORT ANNEX TO SCHEDULE
(1992).
109
110
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G. The CFTC’s May 1998 Concept Release
Suggesting the Regulation of Swaps
By 1998, swaps were growing at a rapid pace.113 As the CFTC
noted in May 1998:
Use of OTC derivatives has grown at
very substantial rates over the past
few years. According to the most
recent market survey by [ISDA], the
notional value of new transactions
reported by ISDA members in
interest rate swaps, currency swaps,
and interest rate options during the
first half of 1997 increased 46% over
the previous six-month period. The
notional value of outstanding
contracts in these instruments was
$28.733 trillion, up 12.9% from yearend 1996, 62.2% from year-end 1995,
and 154.2% from year-end 1994.
ISDA’s 1996 market survey noted
that there were 633,316 outstanding
contracts in these instruments as of
year-end 1996, up 47% from year-end
1995, which in turn represented a
40.7% increase over year-end 1994.114
Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,114, 26,114–15 (May
12, 1998) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts 34 and 35).
114 Id. at 26,115 (internal citations omitted). Throughout this paper, the
metric for the value of swaps is listed as the “notional value.” As the
concept release itself makes clear, the “actual value” of a swap may more
accurately reflect the amount at risk in the swaps trade. The concept
release shows that the “actual value” of a swap is about 3% of the notional
value. Id. Even so, 3% of the notional value of swaps (about $593 trillion)
at the time of the 2008 meltdown, still amounts to almost $18 trillion
dollars, a large enough number of value at risk to set off the 2008
113
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In addition, by the mid-to-late 90s, swaps, because of
the ISDA Master Agreement, were so standardized that they
could be traded electronically on a multilateral basis, thereby
exhibiting all of the trading characteristics of traditional
exchange-traded, standardized futures contracts.115 Because
swaps were increasingly standardized and traded
multilaterally, however, that market was not within the “safe
harbors” of the CFTC exemption from the CEA’s exchange
trading requirement provided by the 1989 Swaps Policy
Statement or the 1993 Swaps exemption, both of which
required bilateral “tailoring” of material terms by the swaps
counterparties and barred the trading of swaps
multilaterally.116
On May 7, 1998, the CFTC promulgated a “concept
release” concerning swaps, finding that these products were
so standardized and traded multilaterally that they were
almost certainly subject to the CEA’s mandatory exchange
trading requirement (and therefore were trading in violation
of the CEA). The concept release called for public comment
on the development of various proposed alternative
regulatory schemes that would create a workable exemption
financial panic. See also OTC Derivative Statistics at End-December 2017,
BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS (May 3, 2018), https://www.bis.org/
publ/otc_hy1805.htm (stating that Bank for International Settlements
finds the value at end-June 2017 of outstanding swaps to have a notional
value of $542 trillion, recognizing that the gross market value is $13
trillion or about 2.5% of notional value); James Rundle, The Risky
Business of Splitting Hairs, WATERS TECH. (Jun. 8, 2018), https://
www.waterstechnology.com/industry-issues-initiatives/3683551/the-risk
y-business-of-splitting-hairs (noting that regulatory efforts are in play,
inter alia, at the CFTC to move away from notional amount metric, and
that resistance to any change is premised on the fact that the EU,
Australia, Hong Kong, Singapore and Canada now use the notional
amount metric for market regulation).
115 See supra note 113 at 26,115–16.
116 See id. at 26,116–18.
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now authorized by the CEA from that statute’s mandatory
exchange trading requirement.117
The concept release made clear, however, that any new
regulatory system would only be applied “prospectively,” with
the then-existing swaps market retroactively permitted
under the relatively new exchange trading exemption
authority within the CEA.118
The concept release was published in the Federal
Register, and it asked commenters to give their opinions on
how and which traditional CEA regulatory requirements
should be applied to the swaps market, e.g., reporting and
disclosure, capital and collateral adequacy, clearing,
exchange trading, regulation of intermediaries, and selfregulation or application of anti-fraud and anti-manipulation
principles.119 The CFTC expressly stated that it had no
preconceived notion of the answer to these questions.120
H. The Serious Pre-May 1998 Swaps Market
Dysfunctions
The motivation for this May 1998 CFTC inquiry derived from
the fact that unregulated swaps had, by that time, caused
many troublesome financial calamities.121 The CFTC noted:
A number of large, well[-]publicized,
financial losses over the last few
years have focused the attention of
the financial services industry, its
regulators, derivatives end-users,
and the general public on potential
Id.
Id. at 26,114.
119 Id. at 26,119–22.
120 Id. at 26,114, 26,116.
121 Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,114, 26,115 (May 12,
1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts 34 and 35).
117
118
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problems and abuses in the OTC
derivatives market. Many of these
losses have come to light since the
last major regulatory actions by the
CFTC involving OTC derivatives, the
swaps and hybrid instruments
exemptions issued in January
1993.122

Among the most prominent scandals deriving from
unregulated swaps by May 7, 1998 included the 1994
bankruptcy of Orange County, the largest county default in
the Nation’s history at that time.123 Orange County was one
of the country’s wealthiest counties and the fifth most
populous.124 Having executed many poorly understood
interest rate swaps, the county suddenly found itself facing
massive debt under those swaps for which it had no
reserves.125 Orange County lost approximately $1.6 billion.126
Merrill Lynch agreed to pay $400 million to Orange County
to settle claims involving the fraudulent nature of the swaps
execution that caused Orange County’s bankruptcy.127
122 Id. See also id. at n.6 (the CFTC cited “Jerry A. Markham,
Commodities Regulation: Fraud, Manipulation & Other Claims, Section
27.05 nn. 2-22.1 (1997) (listing 22 examples of significant losses in
financial derivatives transactions) [and] a 1997 GAO Report 4 (stating
that the GAO identified 360 substantial end-user losses).”).
123 MARK BALDASSARE, WHEN GOVERNMENT FAILS: THE ORANGE COUNTY
BANKRUPTCY 1 (1998).
124 Id.
125 Id. at 2.
126 Id. at 3.
127 Andrew Pollack & Leslie Wayne, Ending Suit, Merrill Lynch to Pay
California County $ 400 Million, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 1998), http://
www.nytimes.com/1998/06/03/business/ending-suit-merrill-lynch-to-paycalifornia-county-400-million.html?pagewanted=all.
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Also beginning in 1994, two large corporate swaps
clients of Bankers Trust, Gibson Greetings, and Procter &
Gamble, successfully sued that bank for defrauding them in
the sale of complicated unregulated swaps, thereby causing
large losses by those two institutions.128 Central to that
litigation’s success were over 6,500 tape recordings of
Bankers Trust employees acknowledging to each other that
the bank’s clients did not understand the adverse impact the
executed swaps transactions would have on them.129
The SEC and CFTC took cooperative enforcement
actions against Bankers Trust for violating the antifraud
provisions of the federal securities and commodities laws in
connection with the swaps it marketed.130 The SEC found
that Bankers Trust violated various sections of the securities
laws, including making false statements or omissions in the
sale of securities, supplying materially inaccurate valuations
of derivatives transactions, and failing to supervise
See Bloomberg Business News, Former Bankers Trust Trader Settles
Charges in Derivatives Case, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 1996), http://www.
nytimes.com/1996/03/01/business/former-bankers-trust-trader-settlescharges-in-derivatives-case.html (“Gibson said it lost more than $6
million in derivatives trading and sued Bankers Trust. The companies
settled the suit in November 1994.”); Saul Hansell, Bankers Trust Settles
Suit with P.& G., N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 1996), http://www.nytimes.
com/1996/05/10/business/bankers-trust-settles-suit-with-p-g.html
(“Paying a steep price to end a bitter battle, the Bankers Trust New York
Corporation agreed yesterday to forgive most of the nearly $200 million
the bank contended it was owed by Procter & Gamble over two complex
transactions in 1993.”).
129 Kelley Holland & Linda Himelstein, The Bankers Trust Tapes,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 16, 1995, 12:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/1995-10-15/the-bankers-trust-tapes.
130 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/GGD-98-5, OTC DERIVATIVES:
ADDITIONAL OVERSIGHT COULD REDUCE COSTLY SALES PRACTICES
DISPUTES 8 (1997).
128
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marketing personnel.131 The CFTC asserted that Bankers
Trust, by its conduct, had, inter alia, violated the antifraud
provisions of the CEA.132
I. Opposition to the CFTC’s Suggestion That
Swaps Regulation Was Needed
The CFTC’s sister financial regulatory agencies (i.e., the
Department of the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and the
SEC) within the President’s Working Group on Financial
Markets (“PWG”) were strongly opposed to the CFTC’s
concept release inquiry.133 In response to a request from the
bank opponents of the concept release,134 on the day the
concept release was formally published, these agencies
pressured Congress to stop the CFTC from continuing with
the inquiry. Congress eventually enacted a six-month
statutory moratorium to the CFTC concept release.135
J. The Long-Term Capital Management Crisis
By the beginning of September 1998, Long-Term Capital
Management (“LTCM”) was the country’s largest and most
Id. at 44.
Id. at 46.
133 See generally Frontline: The Warning (PBS television broadcast Oct.
20, 2009), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/warning/etc/script.
html (discussing how members of the President’s Working Group on
Financial Markets opposed the CFTC’s concept release).
134 See generally SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL
STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN (2010).
135 See REP. OF THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., OVER-THECOUNTER DERIVATIVES MARKETS AND THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT 13,
15 (1999) [hereinafter WORKING GROUP, OTC (NOV. 1999)] (discussing
legislation limiting the CFTC’s rulemaking authority and the Working
Group’s conclusion that “Congressional action is necessary” to address
the CFTC concept release).
131
132
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successful hedge fund “with a massive derivatives
portfolio.”136 LTCM had assured its investors that it was so
skilled at hedging risk with swaps that the most it “could ever
lose in a day of trading was $35 million.”137 However, in
September 1998, it nearly collapsed from the loss, over a
period of weeks (beginning with a one day loss of $550
million)138 of $4.6 billion (or about 90% of its capital) on bad
speculative bets made almost completely with unregulated
swaps.139
The New York Federal Reserve feared that LTCM’s
collapse would create a cascading failure of many of the
nation’s biggest banks, which were both the hedge fund’s
creditors and swaps counterparties.140 So concerned were
those financial institutions about the systemic effect of an
LTCM collapse that, under the New York Federal Reserve’s
orchestration (in what has been called “a small dress
Alan Pyke, The Story Behind Clinton’s Jab at Sanders’ One Wall Street
Vote, THINKPROGRESS, (Feb. 5, 2016, 7:37 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/
the-story-behind-clintons-jab-at-sanders-one-wall-street-vote-86c87cffdb
a6/.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 See REP. OF THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE
FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT 12-16 (1999) [hereinafter WORKING GROUP, LTCM (Apr.
1999)] (discussing how LTCM’s market actions and a lack of oversight
contributed to its near collapse); see also WORKING GROUP, OTC (NOV.
1999), supra note 135 at 16, 33-34 (referencing the Working Group’s prior
recommendations for enhanced risk assessments resulting from the
LTCM events).
140 See WORKING GROUP, LTCM (Apr. 1999), supra note 139 at 15
(describing how LTCM’s counterparties’ exposures were “not adequately
assessed, priced, or collateralized relative to the potential price shocks
the markets were facing at the end of September 1998, and relative to the
creditworthiness of the LTCM Fund at that time”).
136
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rehearsal”141 for the 2008 collapse), on September 23, 1998
(with about 48 hours’ notice of the likely LTCM failure),
fourteen of those institutions contributed a total of $3.6
billion to buy out the fund to keep it from failing and from
creating worldwide economic havoc.142
K. The President’s Working Group’s (“PWG”)
April 1999 Report on LTCM Suggesting Some
Regulation of Swaps
After a full day of hearings before the House Financial
Services Committee on October 1, 1998 about the LTCM
crisis, the President’s Working Group was asked by that
committee to prepare a report on the LTCM near-failure and
recommend actions to prevent such a potentially- systemic
financial collapse in the future.143 In April 1999, the PWG
issued that report. It noted therein: “The near collapse of
[LTCM], a private sector investment firm, highlighted the
possibility that problems at one financial institution could be
transmitted to other institutions, and potentially pose risks
to the financial system.”144
One of the major recommendations of the April 1999
PWG report was that the SEC, the CFTC, and the Treasury
receive expanded authority to require swaps counterparties
141 Roger Lowenstein, Long-Term Capital: It’s a Short-Term Memory, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 7, 2008, at AR97. See also Tyler Cowen, Was Bailing Out
Long-Term Capital Management a Good Idea?, MARGINAL REVOLUTION
(Dec. 27, 2008, 10:14 AM), https://marginalrevolution.com/marginal
revolution/2008/12/was-bailing-out.html (stating, “[I]n so many ways
[LTCM] was a micro-dress rehearsal for our later problems”).
142 WORKING GROUP, LTCM, supra note 139 at 13–14.
143 See generally id. at 29–43 (summarizing the conclusions and
recommendations by the President’s Working Group on Financial
Markets).
144 Id. at viii.

244



Journal of Business & Technology Law

MICHAEL GREENBERGER

to provide: (1) swaps credit risk information; (2)
recordkeeping and reporting; and (3) data on concentrations,
trading strategies, and risk models, as well as providing an
as yet-to-be-designated federal regulator the ability to
inspect risk management models relating, inter alia, to
swaps exposures.145 Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan
declined to endorse this set of recommendations but deferred
to those PWG regulators with supervisory market regulation
authority.146 None of these April 1999 PWG recommendations were ever adopted.
L. The
November
1999
PWG
Report
Recommending the Deregulation of Swaps
By November 1999, LTCM had long since been saved and,
once saved, quickly closed by the new bank owners. At that
time, the PWG (in a complete reversal from its April 1999
Report) recommended to Congress that swaps expressly be
totally deregulated.147 The makeup of the PWG had changed
since its April 1999 Report. Lawrence Summers had replaced
Robert Rubin as Secretary of the Treasury and Chair of the
PWG; and William Rainer had replaced Brooksley Born as
Chair of the CFTC and as one of the four principals of the
PWG. Rubin (supported by Gary Gensler, then Under
Secretary of the Treasury for Domestic Finance and future
Obama Chairman of the CFTC) and Brooksley Born had been
the driving forces behind the April PWG report, recognizing
in varying degrees that swaps trading was not self-regulating
and was also systemically risky.148 The transition to
145 Id.

at 39–40.
Id. at 39 n.23.
147 See generally WORKING GROUP, OTC (Nov. 1999), supra note 135.
148 Brooksley Born is now widely recognized as the highest profile
regulator first to sound the warning alarms about the dangers of
146
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Summers and Rainer, notable opponents of swaps regulation,
led to the November 1999 change in the deregulatory swaps
policy direction of the PWG.149
In a cover letter for that November 1999 PWG report,
the PWG chairman, Treasury Secretary Summers, explained
the PWG’s new rationale for seeking the express statutory
deregulation of derivatives:
Over-the-counter derivatives have
transformed the world of finance,
increasing the range of financial
products available to corporations
and investors and fostering more
precise ways of understanding,
quantifying, and managing risk.
These important markets are large
unregulated OTC derivatives, a decade before the 2008 financial
meltdown occurred. See generally Frontline: The Warning, supra note
133. After the LTCM fiasco, Robert Rubin said that Treasury had its own
concerns about the risks of then unregulated derivatives. Typifying this
attitude is a conversation he retells in his memoirs with his then undersecretary Lawrence Summers; in response to Rubin’s suggestion that
comprehensive margin requirements would be a net positive swaps rule,
Summers responded that such rules would be like “playing tennis with
wooden rackets.” Jacob Weisberg, In Defense of Robert Rubin, SLATE (May
1, 2010, 7:24 AM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2010/05/robertrubin-is-the-wrong-guy-to-blame-for-the-financial-crisis.html.
149 For a concise review of Summers’s record on swaps during the Clinton
administration, see Michael Hirsh, The Comprehensive Case Against
Larry Summers, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 13, 2013), https://www.the
atlantic.com/business/archive/2013/09/the-comprehensive-case-againstlarry-summers/279651/. William Rainer’s advocacy for deregulation
began immediately upon taking office. See Michael Schroeder, CFTC
Chairman Seeks to Deregulate Trading, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 29, 1999),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB941126414489211010 (explaining that
William Rainer, as the new chairman of the CFTC, immediately planned
to “lighten the burden” of the CFTC’s “cumbersome hands-on
regulation”).
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and growing rapidly. At the end of
1998, the estimated notional value of
OTC derivative contracts was $80
trillion, according to the Bank for
International Settlements.
In
addition, these global markets have
been marked by innovation in
products and trading and settlement
mechanisms.
A cloud of legal uncertainty has hung
over the OTC derivatives markets in
the United States in recent years,
which, if not addressed, could
discourage innovation and growth of
these important markets and damage
U.S. leadership in these arenas by
driving transactions off-shore. . . .150

The central and key recommendation within the PWG
November 1999 Report with respect to swaps was that
Congress provide “[a]n exclusion from the CEA[’s regulatory
requirements]
for
bilateral
transactions
between
sophisticated counterparties (other than transactions that
involve non-financial commodities with finite supplies) . . .
.”151
M. The Commodity Futures Modernization Act
of 2000’s Complete Deregulation of Swaps
Accordingly, on the last day of the lame duck 106th Congress,
December 15, 2000 (“while the media was focused on the
[Presidential election’s] recounts”)152, Congress, with the
WORKING GROUP, OTC (Nov. 1999), supra note 135 (letter to Al Gore
from Summers and Greenspan) (emphasis added).
151 Id. at 2.
152 Paul Blumenthal, How Congress Rushed a Bill that Helped Bring the
Economy to Its Knees, HUFFPOST (May 11, 2009, 5:52 PM),
150
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hearty endorsement of then-Secretary Summers on behalf of
fellow PWG principals Levitt, Greenspan, and Rainer,153
passed (with only four dissenting votes in the House) a 262page rider to an 11,000-page omnibus appropriation
measure—with only that day’s consideration of the rider’s
legislative language154 (which was widely reported as having
been “unread by [most]” members of Congress).155 On
December 21, 2000, President Clinton signed into law the
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (“CFMA”).156
The CFMA removed swaps transactions from all
requirements of exchange trading and clearing under the
CEA, as well as from federal anti-fraud and antimanipulation provisions, so long as the counterparties to the
swap were “eligible contract participants.”157 Generally
speaking, a counterparty was an “eligible contract
participant” if it had in excess of $10 million in total assets
with some limited exceptions allowing lesser amounts in the
case of an individual using the swap for risk management
purposes.158
Thus, after passage of the CFMA, the swaps market
(at the time, according to Secretary Summers, amounting to
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-blumenthal/how-congress-rushed-abil_b_181926.html.
153 See 146 CONG. REC. S11,946-47 (daily ed. Jan. 2, 2001) (Statement of
Sen. Sarbanes) (introducing a letter from the President’s Working Group
on Financial Markets supporting the Commodity Futures Modernization
Act of 2000).
154 Blumenthal, supra note 152.
155 See Pyke, supra note 136.
156 Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554,
114 Stat. 2763 (2001). “Also, hidden within the bill was an exemption for
energy derivative trading, which would later become known as the ‘Enron
loophole’ – this loophole would provide the impetus for Enron’s nose dive
into full blown corporate corruption.” Blumenthal, supra note 152.
157 See Greenberger Testimony, supra note 88, at 9.
158 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 73, at 328–29.
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$80 trillion in notional value) was exempt from the CEA’s
capital adequacy requirements; reporting and disclosure;
regulation of intermediaries; self-regulation; bars on fraud,
manipulation,159 and excessive speculation; and requirements for exchange trading and clearing. The SEC was
similarly barred from “securities” swaps oversight except for
quite limited fraud jurisdiction.160
Recognizing that the deregulation of swaps would
remove the CEA’s bar to excessive speculation through
swaps, the CFMA, in order to expressly and to clearly afford
an unfettered statutory right to speculate with swaps,
preempted state gaming and state anti-bucket shop laws.
Thus, using swaps to place bets on the direction of virtually
every financial index was completely authorized without any
federal or state oversight.161
Finally, to ensure that not even violations of the
CFMA itself by swaps dealers could be used as a basis to
challenge the legality of a swap, the Act provided that:

Unlike financial swaps, which were “excluded” from the exchangetrading requirement, including fraud and manipulation prohibitions,
energy and metals swaps, while relieved of the exchange-trading
requirement, continued to be subject to fraud and manipulation
prohibitions; they were therefore labeled by the CFMA as “exempt”
transactions. Id. See also CHARLES W. EDWARDS ET AL., COMMODITY
FUTURES MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2000: LAW AND EXPLANATION 28 (2001)
(quoting remarks of Sen. Tom Harkin, 146 Cong. Rec. S11896 (Dec. 15,
2000) (“The Act continues in full effect the CFTC’s antifraud and
antimanipulation authority with regard to exempt transaction in energy
and metals derivative markets.”)). By exempting metals and energy
swaps from the exchange-trading requirement, Congress disagreed with
the unanimous recommendation of the PWG that swaps concerning
“finite” supplies not be removed from the exchange-trading mandate of
the CEA. Id.
160 See Greenberger Testimony, supra note 88.
161 Id.
159
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[n]o
agreement,
contract,
or
transaction between eligible contract
participants . . . shall be void,
voidable, or unenforceable . . . based
solely on the failure . . . to comply with
the terms or conditions of an
exemption or exclusion from any
provision of this chapter or
regulations of the Commission.162

Thus, a central premise of hundreds of years of the AngloAmerican common law governing contracts, i.e., that illegal
contracts are subject to a judicial declaration of
unenforceability, was abolished by the CFMA as a legal
remedy in the swaps market.163
In effect, after the passage of the CFMA, almost no law
of any kind applied to the swaps market.164 As would be
expected, it has since been widely observed that the rushed
passage of the CFMA “was a propellant of the 2008 [financial]
crises.”165
162 7

U.S.C. § 25(a)(4) (2006) (emphasis added).
See Greenberger Testimony, supra note 88.
164 Id.
165 See Paul Blumenthal, How Congress Rushed a Bill that Helped Bring
the Economy to Its Knees, HUFFPOST (May 11, 2009), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/paul-blumenthal/how-congress-rushed-a-bil_b_1819
26.html; Sophie Roell, The Causes of the Financial Crisis, SALON (Apr. 9,
2012), http://www.salon.com/2012/04/09/the_causes_of_the_financial_cr
isis/; David Corn, Foreclosure Phil, MOTHER JONES (July/August 2008),
http:// www.motherjones.com/politics/2008/05/foreclosure-phil; JENNIFER
TAUB, OTHER PEOPLE’S HOUSES: HOW DECADES OF BAILOUTS, CAPTIVE
REGULATORS AND TOXIC BANKERS MADE HOME MORTGAGES A THRILLING
BUSINESS 238 (2014); Interview: Joseph Stiglitz, FRONTLINE (July 28,
2009), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/warning/interviews/stigl
itz.html; David Min & Pat Garofalo, Regulating Derivatives Traffic, CTR.
FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 19, 2010), https://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/economy/news/2010/04/19/7597/regulating-derivatives-traffic/; see
163
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III. THE 2008 ECONOMIC MELTDOWN AS A
PRODUCT OF UNREGULATED SWAPS
Although many factors contributed to the financial meltdown
of 2008, it is now almost universally recognized that principal
among them was the collapse of the unregulated swaps
market. Credit default swaps (the buying and selling of
insurance on the viability of assets actually owned by an
insured counterparty), especially “naked” CDS (the buying
and selling of insurance of assets not owned by the insured),
provided the trigger that launched the mortgage crisis, credit
crisis, and systemic fiscal crisis that threatened to implode
the global financial system, save for the multi-trillion dollar
U.S. taxpayer bailout.166
A. CDSs’ and “Naked” CDSs’ Foremost Role in
the Meltdown
At the time of the crisis, the unregulated swaps market was
estimated to have a notional value of $596 trillion, including
generally PERMANENT SUBCOMM. INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON
HOMELAND SEC. AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, WALL STREET AND THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE (April 13, 2011),
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Financial_Crisis/FinancialC
risisReport.pdf?attempt=2.
166 See generally Vikas Bajaj, Surprises in a Closer Look at Credit-Default
Swaps, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at B5; Peter S. Goodman, Taking Hard
New Look at a Greenspan Legacy, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 9, 2008, at A1; Jon
Hilsenrath et al., Worst Crisis Since ‘30s, With No End Yet in Sight, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 18, 2008, at A1; The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal
Regulators: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform,
110th Cong. 15 (2008), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg55
764/pdf/CHRG110hhrg55764.pdf (prepared testimony of Dr. Alan
Greenspan); Doug Sword, Frank, of Dodd-Frank, is concerned over Trump
regulators, 2017 WL 3085011; 17 C.F.R. § 1.3; 156 Cong. Rec. S5870
(2010).
Journal of Business & Technology Law



251

Too Big to Fail

approximately $58 trillion in CDS and naked CDS,167 yet
federal and state regulators were almost completely barred
from swaps oversight and from any knowledge of that
market.168 Before explaining below the manner in which CDS
(especially “naked” CDS) fomented this crisis, it is worth
Naohiko Babo & Paola Gallardo, OTC MARKET ACTIVITY IN THE
SECOND HALF OF 2007, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS (May 2008),
http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy0805.pdf
168 Michael Greenberger, Is Our Economy Safe? A Proposal for Addressing
the Success of Swaps Regulation, (2010), http://www.michaelgreen
berger.com/files/greenberger-roosevelt-inst-paper-doddfrank.pdf.
167
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citing those many economists,169 regulators,170 investigating
commissions,171 market observers,172 and financial
columnists173
See Moshinsky, supra note 2; Blinder, supra note 2; Hu, supra note 2;
Krugman, supra note 2; Wall Street Fraud and Fiduciary Duties: Can
Jail Time Serve as an Adequate Deterrent for Willful Violations?: Hearing
Before the S. Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs, 111th Cong. 127 (2010),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg63555/pdf/CHRG-111shrg
63555.pdf (statement of James K. Galbraith, Lloyd Bentsen, Jr. Chair in
Government/Business Relations, Lyndon B. Johnson Sch. of Pub. Affairs,
The Univ. of Texas at Austin); Ravi Velloor, In Good Company: Ex-IMF
Chief Economist Raghuram Rajan, The Man Who Foresaw 2008
Financial Crisis, STRAITS TIMES (May 28, 2017), http://
www.straitstimes.com/opinion/man-who-foresaw-2008-financial-crisis
(“Among the speakers that year was Dr. Raghuram Rajan, the chief
economist of the International Monetary Fund who was given the job two
years earlier at age 40. It was meant to be a celebration of the Greenspan
era but what the audience, which included Mr. Greenspan, heard from
Dr. Rajan was a prognosis of dire tidings to come. Dr. Rajan warned
against credit-default swaps, which act as insurance against bond
defaults, going sour and said there was also immense systemic risk if
banks failed to meet their obligations.”); Jack Rasmus, Financial Asset
Bubbles: From Subprimes and Credit Default Swaps (CDS) in 2008 to
Bitcoin, Cryptocurrency and Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) in 2018,
GLOBAL RESEARCH (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.globalresearch.ca/
financial-asset-bubbles-from-subprimes-and-credit-default-swaps-cdsin-2008-to-bitcoin-cryptocurrency-and-exchange-traded-funds-etfs-in2018/5622737; Protecting Financial Stability and Enhancing
Competitiveness in the Derivatives Markets: Hearing on Legislative
Proposals Regarding Derivatives Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs. (Feb.
14, 2018) (statement by Andy Green), (transcript available at
https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/02.14.2018_andy_green
_testimony.pdf).
170 Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation, N.Y
TIMES (Oct. 24, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/business/
economy/24panel.html; Anthony Faiola et al., What Went Wrong, WASH.
POST
(Oct.
15,
2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2008/10/14/AR2008101403343.html; Peter S. Goodman,
Taking Hard New Look at the Greenspan Legacy, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9,
169
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2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/09/business/economy/09greensp
an.html; Hearing to Review the Role of Credit Derivatives in the U.S.
Economy: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Agriculture, 110th Cong. 79
(Nov. 20, 2008), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg51569/
pdf/CHRG-110hhrg51569.pdf (prepared testimony of Eric R. Dinallo,
Superintendent, N.Y. State Insurance Dep’t) [hereinafter Dinallo
Testimony]; Gary Gensler, Remarks at OTC Derivatives Reform,
Chatham House, London (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.cftc.gov/
PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-35 (stating that “OTC
derivatives were at the center of the 2008 financial crisis” and that
“[c]apital requirements should take into account the unique risks that
credit default swaps (CDS) pose”); Greg Robb, Roots of Credit Crisis Laid
at Fed’s Door, MARKET WATCH (Oct. 24, 2007), http://www.
marketwatch.com/story/roots-of-credit-crisis-found-at-the-feds-doorsays-expert; Chairman J. Christopher Giancarlo, Address before
Derivcon 2018, New York City, New York (Feb. 1, 2018) (transcript
available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/opagiancarl
o35); Cassandra Jones Havard, Too Conflicted to be Transparent: Giving
Affordable Financing its ‘Good Name’ Back, 30 LEGISLATION & PUB. POL’Y
45, (2017), available at http://scholar- works.law.ubalt.edu/ all_fac/1059;
CFTC Commissioner Rostin Behnam, Address at the Georgetown Center
for Financial Markets and Policy, The Dodd-Frank Inflection Point:
Building on Derivatives Reform (Nov. 14, 2017) (transcript available at
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/ opabehnam1) (“Over-thecounter swaps did not singularly cause the financial crisis, nor would
their direct regulation have prevented a crisis; but, unregulated, overthe-counter derivatives certainly played a key part in the crisis, and the
policy response was appropriately swift.”); Clyde McGrady, CFTC looks
to Rewrite Swap Data Reporting Standards, 2017 WL 2927943 (July 10,
2017).
171 See, e.g., MEMBERS OF THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS
(2011), http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_fin
al_report_full.pdf; Scott W. Bauguess, The Role of Big Data, Machine
Learning, and AI in Assessing Risks: A Regulatory Perspective,
Champagne Keynote Address: OpRisk North America 2017, New York,
New York (June 21, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/bauguessbig-data-ai; Scott W. Bauguess, Keynote Address: OpRisk North America
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2017 (June 21, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/bauguess-bigdata-ai.
172 See INVESTOR’S WORKING GROUP, U.S. FIN. REGULATORY REFORM: THE
INVESTORS’ PERSPECTIVE 1 (July 2009), http://www.cii.org/files/
issues_and_advocacy/dodd-frank_act/07_01_09_iwg_report.pdf (listing
the fundamental flaws of the U.S. financial services sector exposed by the
credit crisis: “. . . gaps in oversight that let purveyors of abusive
mortgages, complex over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives and convoluted
securitized products run amok; woefully underfunded regulatory
agencies; and super-sized financial institutions that are both ‘too big to
fail’ and too labyrinthine to regulate or manage effectively”); Jonathan
Berr, George Soros Wants to Outlaw Credit Default Swaps, AOL (June
12, 2009), https://www.aol.com/article/2009/06/12/george-soros-wants-tooutlaw-credit-default-swaps/19065423/ (“Credit default swaps, insurance
contracts on securities in the event of a default, are widely blamed as one
of the causes of the current financial crisis. The unregulated, $70 trillion
market became unhinged when the real estate market, particularly
houses funded through subprime mortgages, collapsed.”); Henny Sender,
Greenlight Capital Founder Calls for CDS Ban, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2009),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6b1945e6-caf9-11de-97e0-00144feabdc0.html
(quoting Greenlight Capital founder David Einhorn: “. . . trying to make
safer credit default swaps is like trying to make safer asbestos . . . [as
CDSs create] large, correlated and asymmetrical risks”); Janet Tavakoli,
Washington Must Ban U.S. Credit Derivatives as Traders Demand Gold
(Part One), HUFFPOST (May 8, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
janet-tavakoli/washington-must- ban-us-cr_b_489778.html (“Congress
should act immediately to abolish credit default swaps on the United
States, because these derivatives will foment distortions in global
currencies and gold.”); LEWIS, supra note 1 (providing a history of the
2008 financial collapse and demonstrating the central role of derivatives);
Matthew Henry, Blockchain and Credit Default Swaps – Part 1, An
Overview, FINTECHBLUE (Sept. 5, 2017), http://www.fintechblue.com/
2017/09/blockchain-and-credit-default-swaps-an-overview/.
173 LAWRENCE G. MCDONALD & PATRICK ROBINSON, A COLOSSAL FAILURE
OF COMMON SENSE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COLLAPSE OF LEHMAN
BROTHERS (2009); Robert Johnson, Credible Resolution – What It Takes to
End Too Big to Fail, in ROOSEVELT INST.: MAKE MARKETS BE
MARKETS 117–33 (2009), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/make-markets-bemarkets (“The recent crisis in the U.S. centered on the collapse of the
housing bubble and the role of leverage, off balance sheet exposures, and
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who have described the central role unregulated CDS and
naked CDS played in the crisis.174 In the margin below, a
complex OTC derivatives.”); Vikas Bajaj, Surprises in a Closer Look at
Credit-Default Swaps, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2008), http://www.
nytimes.com/2008/11/05/business/05swap.html (“Policy makers have
been unnerved by the rise of the [CDS] market because they are worried
that sellers of protection may not have enough reserves to pay future
claims and that default by one party could lead to a cascade of failures
throughout the financial system.”); Jon Hilsenrath et al., Worst Crisis
Since ’30s, With No End in Sight, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2008, at A1 (“The
latest trouble spot [in the financial crisis] is an area called credit-default
swaps . . . .”); Jeff Madrick, At the Heart of the Crash, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS
(June 10, 2010) (reviewing LEWIS, supra note 1), http://www.
nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/jun/10/heart-crash/?pagination=false
(“As we now know, derivatives were the instruments that enabled Wall
Street to stretch capital dangerously far—and were at the center of the
financial crisis that began that year.”); Gretchen Morgenson, Naked
Came the Speculators, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2008), http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/08/10/business/10gret.html (“As the sheriffs
begin to confront the C.D.S. cowboys, more losses are bound to show up
in this Wild West.”); Kimberly Amadeo, Credit Default Swap: Pros, Cons,
Crises, Examples: How a Boring Insurance Contract Almost Destroyed the
Global Economy, BALANCE (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.the
balance.com/credit-default-swaps-pros-cons-crises-examples-3305920;
Camilla Hodgson, The Risky Product Blamed for Worsening the Financial
Crisis is Back on the Rise, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 24, 2017),
http://www.businessinsider.com/credit-default-swaps-post-financialcrisis-product-popular-again-2017-8; Ekaterina Klenina & Cesario
Mateus, Global Financial Crisis and Price Discovery between Credit
Default Swaps Premia and Bond Yield Spreads, SSRN ELEC. J. (Aug.
2017), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/319260395_Global_Fin
ancial_Crisis_and_Price_Discovery_between_Credit_Default_Swaps_Pre
mia_and_Bond_Yield_Spreads.
174 See supra notes 169–73; Credit Default Swap: Insurance Against NonPayment, CORP. FIN. INST. (2018), https://corporatefinanceinstit
ute.com/resources/knowledge/finance/credit-default-swap-cds/; Kimberly
Amadeo, The 2008 Financial Crisis: A Look at the Causes, Costs and
Weighing the Chances of It Happening Again, BALANCE (Jan. 22, 2018),
https://www.thebalance.com/2008-financial- crisis-3305679.
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competing theory advanced as the meltdown’s causation, i.e.,
the so-called “run on repos,” is considered, and while
recognized as important, it is, nevertheless, deemed
derivative of the defaults or threatened defaults by
worldwide financial institutions in the hundreds or trillions
of dollars notional value in the swaps market.175
It has been suggested that the 2008 financial meltdown was
principally caused by a so-called “run on repos.” See the survey in Edward
J. Kane, Please Don’t Throw Me in the Briar Patch: the Flummery of
Capital-Requirement Repairs Undertaken in Response to the Great
Financial Crisis, in MONEY, REGULATION & GROWTH: FINANCING NEW
GROWTH IN EUROPE 93 (Marc Qintyn et al. eds., 2014); Gary B. Gorton &
Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, J. FIN.
ECONS. 425 (2011). The run on repos refers to the withdrawal of shortterm (often overnight) extensions of credit to banks needed to maintain
bank solvency. Repos, or repurchase agreements, are generally overnight
loans provided to banks by repo lenders (such as money market funds,
foreign financial institutions, mutual funds, and other unregulated cash
pools) that are, in turn, secured by a bank’s collateral, such as assetbacked securities, collateralized-debt obligations (“CDOs”), or creditdefault swaps. Gary B. Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Who Ran on Repo?, 1
n.1 (NBER, working paper 18455, 2012) (explaining that a repo contract
is “often over-night”). Prior to the 2008 meltdown, these repurchase
agreements were withdrawn because of repo lenders’ concerns about
bank insolvency, and as the repo market increasingly tightened, this
repo-dependent bank’s probability of insolvency increased. However, the
“run on repos” theory ignores the underlying and fundamental cause of
that run: i.e., the real or apparent inability of the bank to perform on
trillions of dollars of swaps obligations. Those real or pending swaps
defaults highlighted to their repo lenders the bank’s lack of credit
worthiness and thus the bank’s inability to finance debt by, inter alia,
using repos. In other words, when these bank counterparties could no
longer afford to pay off their swaps debts, no lender would risk extending
repo financing, the repayment of which similarly seemed unlikely. Thus,
while there can be no doubt that the failure of the repo market
contributed to the 2008 financial havoc, in the absence of threatened
defaults in the trillion-dollar swaps market, banks would almost certainly
have otherwise been deemed creditworthy in the repo market. As a result,
because of the obvious, impending trillion-dollar defaults in the swaps
175
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CDSs were the last step in a mortgage securitization
process that ultimately undermined the economy in 2008.176
A counterparty investing in a CDS paid a very small
insurance-like “premium” to another counterparty for the
latter to agree to “guarantee” in the entirety portions of
mortgage indebtedness owned by the insured counterparty.
However, investors soon developed a widely adopted method
of “shorting” the mortgage market by handpicking (but not
owning) multi-trillion parts of another financial instrument,
a collateralized debt obligation (“CDO”), to be insured against
failure: i.e., a “naked” CDS. Thus, CDS and naked CDS can
be seen as a form of insurance on specified tranches of a CDO,
which in the case of “naked” CDSs, were not owned by the
“insured.”177 CDOs, in turn, involved the “pulling together
and dissection into ‘tranches’ of huge numbers of [mortgagebacked securities (“MBSs”)],” based for their part on actual
mortgage loans and, in the years before the crisis, subprime
mortgages in particular.178
Importantly, by constantly “reframing the form of
risk” (e.g., moving mortgage loans to inclusion within
mortgage backed securities (“MBS”) to the inclusion of MBS
within CDOs, swaps dealers, providing the guarantees or
insurance of the underlying mortgages through CDS and
naked CDS, lost the thread on the safety of these
investments.179 This problem was compounded by “misleadingly high evaluations” (often investment grade ratings)
by credit rating agencies of the CDOs being insured by CDSs
markets, banks were largely cut off from one of their most needed sources
of borrowing: repos.
176 See U.S. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 171, at 134, 201, 267.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 155.
179 Id. at 142.
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and naked CDSs.180 In addition, issuers of these kinds of
CDSs relied upon the faulty assumption widely held pre-2008
that housing prices would never go down, so that the provider
of the “insurance” would never have to pay the guarantees of
continuous and uninterrupted mortgage payments made
through the swaps.181
Because of the widespread assumption by the issuers
of CDSs’ and naked CDSs’ guarantees that mortgages could
always be paid through refinancing at appreciated housing
values (and therefore could never fail), it was widely and
mistakenly understood to be risk-free to guarantee mortgage
payments.182 Those taking these guarantees, i.e., the
“shorts,” bet with relatively small insurance-type premiums
that their handpicked mortgage-based instruments (handselected tranches of CDOs), which they did not own, would
fail, and those shorting mortgages would then receive a hefty
payment of the full value of those failed mortgages reflected
in the CDOs upon collapse of those instruments.183
All of this came to a head when housing prices began
to plummet.184 Homeowners began to default first on
subprime mortgages (and then on prime mortgages), leading
to the failure of CDO tranches, thereby triggering trillions of
dollars of non-capitalized payments by the CDS and naked
CDS issuers.185 In addition, because these kinds of swap
instruments were not required to be, and were not, reported
180 Id.

at 170.
Id. at 132, 194–95, 202.
182 MEMBERS OF THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE
CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS 50, 195 (2011),
http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_rep
ort_full.pdf.
183 Id. at 213.
184 Id. at 57.
185 Id. at 195.
181
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to financial regulators, the federal financial regulators (and
investors as a whole) lacked knowledge of the crisis’ “bottom.”
They were thus shocked when they learned the huge size of
the swaps market, which, in turn, exacerbated the tightening
of credit throughout the economy because even apparently
financially viable institutions could be swaps counterparties
facing massive swaps defaults, thereby becoming a credit
risk.186 All of this resulted in the expedited downward cycle
of the economic meltdown, exacerbated by the fact that
CDOs, CDSs and naked CDSs existed not just in the
mortgage market, but in most debt markets.187
Informed estimates are that there were three to four
times as many “naked” CDS instruments insuring against
mortgage defaults at the time of the meltdown than those
CDSs guaranteeing actual lending risk by holders of CDOs
and MBSs.188 This meant that, to the extent the guarantor of
a naked CDS (e.g., AIG) had to be rescued by the U.S.
taxpayer, the chances were very high that that “bail out”
money ultimately went directly from AIG to those who
speculated that sets of handpicked mortgage loans would
fail.189 Prominent members of Congress have maintained
that the holders of the short bets of these swaps (i.e., those
that speculated that mortgages they did not own would fail)
formed a strong political constituency opposing the “rescue”
of distressed homeowners through the adjustment of
Id.
Id.
188 MEMBERS OF THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE
CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS 101 (2011), http://fcicstatic.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf.
Dinallo Testimony, supra note 170 at 80 (“[I]t appears that swaps on that
debt could total at least three times as much as the actual debt
outstanding.”); Krugman, supra note 2.
189 See Dinallo Testimony, supra note 170, at 79.
186
187
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mortgages in bankruptcy to keep homeowners from mortgage
defaults and in their homes.190
In this regard, a recent study by social scientists
Ferguson, Jorgensen, and Chen shows that campaign
contributions from financial houses significantly affected the
way in which Congressional representatives’ voted on a
series of bills seeking to aid consumers and/or otherwise
dismantle Dodd-Frank.191 Because the low number of
Senators made “reliable statistical analysis [of the Senate]
problematic,” their study analyzed the voting behavior
within the House of Representatives.192 The study found that
the finance and real estate sector contributed “over $90
million” to representatives in the House “for [a recent]
election cycle,” a large majority of which contributions they
found surprisingly went to Democratic candidates, given the
pro-regulatory bias of that party.193
In their first statistical analysis, which focused solely
on House Democrats’ voting behavior on Dodd-Frank
deregulation, the researchers found that “for every $100,000
that Democratic representatives received from finance, the
odds they would break with the party[‘s support for DoddFrank] increased by 13.9 percent.”194 Given the magnitude of
the $90 million contributions from financial interests and the
relatively low amount of money associated with changing
House Democrats’ voting behavior, these contributions led
See Thomas Ferguson et al., Fifty Shades of Green, ROOSEVELT INST.
12-25 (May 2, 2017), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/fifty-shades-green
(describing how bank contributions to Congress members impacts their
voting); Ryan Grim, Dick Durbin: Banks “Frankly Own the Place,”
HUFFPOST (Apr. 29, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/29/
dick-durbin-banks-frankly_n_193010.html.
191 See Ferguson et al., supra note 190.
192 See id. at 10.
193 See id. at 26.
194 See id. at 30.
190
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and will likely continue to lead a significant number of
Democrats voting to dismantle Dodd-Frank regulation.195
Elsewhere in this paper, there is discussion of further
support for the Ferguson, et al., thesis, i.e., the recent
bipartisan passage of a Senate Dodd-Frank deregulation bill
(S.2155), with 17 Democratic Senators joining a straight-line
Republican deregulatory vote to make this bill filibuster
proof. 196
Ferguson, et al.’s second statistical analysis included
both Republican and Democrat members in the House.197
That separate analysis found that for House members,
regardless of party affiliation, “for every $1,000 increase in
money from finance, the odds of a vote against the banks
decrease[d] by 0.21 percent.”198 Given that financial interests
contributed over $90 million in a single election cycle to
House members, banks could easily pay enough to improve
substantially the odds of a deregulatory vote in their favor.199
Also, the fact that “naked” CDSs were nothing more
than “bets” on the viability of the U.S. mortgage market also
demonstrates the importance of the CFMA having expressly
preempted state gaming and anti-bucket shop laws.200 Had
those laws not been preempted, it is almost certain that at
least some states would have banned these investments as
unlicensed gambling or illegal bucket shops.201 An action of
that sort by even a single state would have early on brought
a timely end to the “naked” CDS market throughout the
country.202
See id. at 26, 35.
See id. at 35.
197 See Ferguson et al., supra note 190, at 35.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 26.
200 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 73, at 975 (referencing 7 U.S.C. §
16(e)(2)).
201 See Dinallo Testimony, supra note 170, at 81.
202 Greenberger Testimony, supra note 88, at 17.
195
196
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B. Counterparty
Interconnectedness:
The
Systemic Risk Derived from All Types of
Swaps
The entirety of the unregulated swaps market (not just CDS
and “naked” CDS) was central to the 2008 crisis’s causation.
That is principally because the swaps markets as a whole are
so highly interconnected. Defaults in one segment of that
market necessarily would lead to defaults in the entire
market. As shown below, the prevention of a cascading
collapse of the financial system therefore required the
American taxpayer to bail out huge U.S. bank holding
company swaps dealers not only because of their CDS and
naked CDS commitments, but because of threatened defaults
across all their swaps lines.203
1. The Lehman Bankruptcy Evinces the Complete
Financial Interconnectedness through Swaps of
The World’s Large Financial Institutions
For example, the losses at Lehman—the only big U.S. bank
allowed to fail in the 2008 financial meltdown because
government intervention was at that time deemed a “moral
hazard”—were experienced through defaults in all of that
bank’s swaps trades. As explained in the Lehman bankruptcy
proceedings, that bank was a counterparty in over 930,000
swaps.204 “[A]bout 6,000 [of those swaps] claims—totaling
$60bn in losses—[i]nclude[d] claims from about 40 of the
See Johnson in ROOSEVELT INSTITUTE, supra note 173, at 117–33
(“America cannot end Too Big to Fail without derivatives reform.”).
204 Charles GuyLaine, OTC Derivative Contracts in Bankruptcy: The
Lehman Experience, 13 N.Y. BUS. L.J. 14, 16 (2009).
203
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largest U.S. banks.”205 Indeed, the swaps liabilities of many
of Lehman’s more than 3,000 subsidiaries in fifty foreign
countries were all involved in the bankruptcy of Lehman’s
parent holding company.206 To the extent that these contracts
did not involve CDS or naked CDS, they certainly did involve,
for example, interest rate, currency, foreign exchange, and
commodity swaps.207
Lehman’s inability to cover the indebtedness of the
entirety of its swaps portfolio demonstrated the fragility of
the swaps market as a whole—not just the weakness of the
CDS or naked CDS market. If Lehman could not perform due
to lack of reserves with regard to CDS or naked CDS, it could
not perform throughout its swaps portfolio. With 6,000
Lehman counterparties experiencing losses as a result of
Lehman’s failure, it is clear that large-scale swaps losses by
any large U.S. bank swaps dealer would cause financial
instability in all swaps obligations worldwide.
Moreover, the Lehman liquidators were required to
engage in a huge legal battle with Lehman’s many swaps
205 Id.; see also Patrick Fitzgerald, Lehman Brothers to Pay another $3.8
Billion to Creditors, WALL. ST. J. (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.
wsj.com/articles/lehman-brothers-to-pay-another-3-8-billion-to-creditors1475159586 (reporting on how the most recent distribution the
investment bank made—its eleventh since filing for bankruptcy—will
bring the total payout figure to more than $113.6 billion).
206 See Letter from Michael Greenberger, Prof., Univ. of Md. Carey Sch.
of L., and George Waddington, Analyst, CHHS, Univ. of Md., to David A.
Stawick, Sec’y, CFTC, RIN No. 3038-AD57 6 (Aug. 27, 2012) [Hereinafter
Greenberger & Waddington Letter], http://www.michaelgreenberger.
com/files/58709I-1.Greenberger.pdf.
207 See id.; Andrew Ackerman, Court to Decide Fate of Lehman Contracts,
BOND BUYER (Dec. 15, 2008), http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/117_238/297451-1.html (“Though . . . [Lehman Brothers Holdings] does not
provide specific numbers for each category of swap, derivatives market
participants believe that roughly 20% to 30% of the contracts are
municipal securities-based interest rate swaps.”).
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counterparties over those counterparties’ often heavily
inflated evaluations of their losses from failed swaps
transactions with Lehman—not just in CDS and naked
CDS.208 This exaggeration of amounts owed could only have
been advanced in the non-transparent swaps market where
swaps were not exchange-traded, and thus the value of swaps
could not be readily determined by reference to well
established exchange prices. The liquidators ultimately had
to file lawsuits against many of these counterparties to cause
them, once confronted with legal evidence of their puffing, to
lower their bankruptcy claims to reflect market reality.
Finally, the Lehman liquidation also demonstrated
that, even when the identical ISDA-mandated swaps
contract provisions were being looked at by two different
countries’ courts (in Lehman’s case, the U.S. courts and the
U.K. courts), diametrically conflicting rulings from those
countries could be reached.209 A major single provision within
the ISDA-inspired standardized swaps language critical to
resolution of Lehman “bankruptcy [i]ssues [were] decided in
[directly] conflicting fashion in London and New York . . . .”210

Megan Murphy & Anousha Sakoui, Lehman Sues Nomura Over
Derivatives Claims, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2010), https://www.ft.com/
content/258e1208-4ef8-11df-b8f4-00144feab49a.
209 Harry Wilson, Lehman Brothers Investors Rank Ahead of Creditors,
Rules Supreme Court, TELEGRAPH (July 27, 2011, 6:26 PM), http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/8666446/L
ehman-Brothers-investors-rank-ahead-of-creditors-rules-Supreme-Court
.html.
210 Stephen Luben, Lehman Shows Trans-Atlantic Divide on Derivatives,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2011, 10:14 AM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2011/01/07/lehman-shows-trans-atlantic-divide-on-derivatives/?_r=0.
208
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2. Bear Stearns Collapse Shows Financial
Institution Swaps Interconnectedness
As further evidence of the interconnectedness of swaps
counterparties within the full range of the worldwide swaps
market, on April 3, 2008, then New York Federal Reserve
President Timothy Geithner explained after the Bear
Stearns’ March 2008 collapse and corresponding Bear
Stearns’ rescue by JPMorgan Chase:211
The sudden discovery by Bear’s
derivative
counterparties
that
important financial positions they
had put in place to protect themselves
from financial risk were no longer
operative would have triggered
substantial further dislocation in
markets.
This
would
have
precipitated a rush by Bear’s
counterparties to liquidate the
collateral they held against those
positions and to attempt to replicate
those positions in already very fragile
markets.212

Citing this quote, Warren Buffet concluded: “This is
Fedspeak for [‘]We stepped in to avoid a financial chain
reaction of unpredictable magnitude.[’] In my opinion, the
Fed was right to do so.”213

See, e.g., Greg Farrell, JPMorgan, N.Y. Fed Step into Rescue Bear
Stearns, ABC NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=4454724.
212 Letter from Warren E. Buffett, Chairman of the Board, Berkshire
Hathaway Inc., to the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. (Feb. 27,
2009), http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2008ltr.pdf.
213 Id.
211
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3. AIG’s Threatened
Interconnectedness

Collapse

and

Systemic

Of course, it was the very failure of Lehman on September
15, 2008, and, inter alia, the foreseeable cascading adverse
and substantial adverse impacts its bankruptcy would cause
to thousands of its swaps counterparties worldwide, that led
the Federal Reserve and the Treasury to alter course one day
after Lehman failed, to prevent AIG’s bankruptcy by U.S.
government intervention and then to recommend to Congress
the bank bailouts.214 These actions revealed to the world the
correlation between and among unregulated swaps
transactions of every kind and the “too-big-to-fail”
phenomenon, i.e., there were so many large swaps
counterparties which would have failed because of swaps
defaults that traditional bankruptcy solutions would have
failed as well, thereby likely leading to the Second Great
Depression.215
Moreover, the U.S. taxpayer bailouts that went into
the front door of, for example, AIG to “save it” really went out
the back door as payments to “save,” inter alia, AIG’s big U.S.
bank holding swaps dealer counterparties.216 As the report of
214 CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JUNE OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE AIG RESCUE,
ITS IMPACTS ON MARKETS AND THE GOVT’S EXIT STRATEGY 44 (June 10,
2010), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-111JPRT56698/pdf/CPRT-1
11JPRT56698.pdf.
215 See Jill E. Sommers, Remarks Before the Capital Markets Consortium:
Clearinghouses as Mitigators of Systematic Risk, CFTC (Sept. 30, 2010),
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/CommissionerJillES
ommers/opasommers-10.html (“One of the lessons that emerged from the
recent financial crisis was that institutions were not just ‘too big to fail,’
but also too interconnected through non-transparent swaps that the
institutions did not effectively manage.”).
216 See Alexander Sellinger, Backdoor Bailout Disclosure: Must the
Federal Reserve Disclose the Identities of its Borrowers Under the Freedom
of Information Act?, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 259, 260–61 (2009)
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the Congressional Oversight Panel (“COP”) on the AIG
bailout made clear, billions of the taxpayer bailouts went 100
cents on the dollar to, inter alia, AIG’s big U.S. bank holding
company swaps dealers in their capacity as AIG’s
counterparties.217 In this regard, COP observed as to AIG’s
derivatives book:
In the ordinary course of business,
the costs of AIG’s inability to meet its
derivative obligations would have
been borne entirely by AIG’s
shareholders and creditors . . . . But
rather than sharing the pain among
AIG’s creditors[,] . . . the government
instead shifted those costs in full onto
taxpayers[.] The result was that the
government backed up the entire
derivatives market, as if these trades
deserved the same taxpayer backstop
as savings deposits and checking
accounts.
[E]very
counterparty
received exactly the same deal: a
complete
rescue
at
taxpayer
expense.218

(explaining the view that the billions used to bail out AIG was really a
back door bailout to other counterparties who continued to gamble with
the funds); Gretchen Morgenson, At A.I.G., Good Luck Following the
Money, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/
03/15/business/15gret.html (revealing the counterparties that taxpayers
bailed out with the funds allocated to A.I.G. “include Goldman Sachs,
Merrill Lynch and two French banks, Calyon[,] and Société Générale.”).
217 CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 214, at 197, 243–44, 252.
218 Id. at 3.
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C. Other Prominent Twenty-First Century
Financial Calamities Caused by Unregulated
Swaps
Because the central thesis of this paper is that U.S. swaps
dealers have created questionable loopholes to dodge the
Dodd-Frank regimen to regulate swaps soundly, it is
important to show that the 2008 financial crisis is not wholly
a “one-off” event, which Dodd-Frank opponents have
intimated to support relaxation of Dodd-Frank ten years
after the meltdown. Other serious financial crises in the early
21st century demonstrate the way in which devastating
economic instability and hardship can and will be caused
when swaps are traded under lax regulatory regimes.
1. The Greek Financial Crisis
While the Greek financial crisis has primarily focused on the
financial instability of Greece itself and the European Union
as a whole, the central cause of the Greek crisis has received
scant attention.219 In 2001, Greece found itself potentially in
conflict with the European Union, because that country had
a 2.8-billion-euro debt.220 The Maastricht Treaty’s deficit
rules require all EU member states to show steady
Gregg Levine, Did Wall Street enable the Greek Debt Crisis?
ALJAZEERA AM. (July 14, 2015), http://america.aljazeera.com/blogs/
scrutineer/2015/7/14/did-wall-street-enable-greek-debt-crisis.html. See
Robert Reich, How Goldman Sachs Profited from the Greek Debt Crisis,
HUFFPOST (July 17, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robertreich/how-goldman-sachs-profite_b_7820794.html.
220 Zhang Danhong, Maastricht Treaty—Not Yet Set in Stone, DEUTSCHE
WELLE (June 2, 2016), http://www.dw.com/en/maastricht-treaty-not-yetset-in-stone/a-37435390.
219
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improvement in their finances after entering the EU.221
However, the 2.8-billion-euro figure would have shown that
Greece’s national debt was, in fact, worsening.222
Wanting to mask that shortfall, Goldman Sachs was
consulted by Greece, and that bank’s “cure” involved it selling
Greece a “cross currency swap,” the first leg of which
appeared immediately to erase 2% of Greek debt, bringing
that country into seeming compliance with the EU’s deficit
rules.223 Goldman Sachs received in excess of $500 million in
fees for this swap arrangement.224
However, by 2005 the financial impact of the cross
currency swap swung against Greece, leaving it with 5.1
billion-euro deficit, which was double the indebtedness
André Sapir, Europe After the Crisis: Less or More Role for Nation
States in Money and Finance, 27 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 608, 614
(2011).
222 Beat Balzli, How Goldman Sachs Helped Greece to Mask its True Debt,
SPIEGEL ONLINE (Feb. 8, 2010, 6:55 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/
international/europe/greek-debt-crisis-how-goldman-sachs-helpedgreece-to-mask-its-true-debt-a-676634.html. See Robert Reich, How
Goldman Sachs Profited from the Greek Debt Crisis, NATION (July 16,
2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/goldmans-greek-gambit/.
223 See Jim Armitage & Ben Chu, Greek Debt Crisis: Goldman Sachs
Could be Sued for Helping Hide Debts When it Joined Euro, INDEPENDENT
(July 10, 2015, 12:15 AM), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/
europe/greek-debt-crisis-goldman-sachs-could-be-sued-for-helpingcountry-hide-debts-when-it-joined-euro-10381926.html; See Beat Balzli,
How Goldman Sachs Helped Greece to Mask its True Debt, SPIEGEL
ONLINE (Feb. 8, 2010, 6:55 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/internation
al/europe/greek-debt-crisis-how-goldman-sachs-helped-greece-to-maskits-true-debt-a-676634.htm; See Robert Reich, How Goldman Sachs
Profited from the Greek Debt Crisis, NATION (July 16, 2016),
https://www.thenation.com/article/goldmans-greek-gambit/.
224 See Armitage & Chu, supra note 223 (“Goldman Sachs is said to have
made as much as $500m”).
221
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Greece experienced before entering into the swap.225 (If
Goldman’s over $500 million fee is included, Greece’s
financial shortfall more than doubled.) Therefore, it is not
surprising that Greece rejected a new Goldman Sachs offer
to engage in further financial engineering to make the larger
2005 indebtedness “disappear.”
In what may have been a high irony, some important
observers have criticized Mario Draghi, later to become
President of the European Central Bank (“ECB”), for his
connection to the Goldman Sachs-Greece deal.226 Draghi, at
roughly that time, was a Goldman Sachs officer responsible
for developing business between Goldman Sachs and major
European governments.227 Draghi and the ECB later became
highly critical of Greece, citing concerns about the
sustainability of its debt, and they were proponents of the
harsh austerity conditions imposed upon Greece as part of
Nancy K. Humphreys, Goldman’s Greek and Malaysian Deals,
HUFFPOST (Jul. 19, 2016), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/nancy-k-hum
phreys/goldmans-greek-and-malays_b_7828700.html; Robert Reich, How
Goldman Sachs Profited from the Greek Debt Crisis, NATION (July 16,
2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/goldmans-greek-gambit/.
226 Cynthia Kroet & Ivo Oliveira, The Draghi Balance Sheet, POLITICO
(Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.politico.eu/article/mario-draghi-ecb-trichetbank-financial-crisis-economy/; Stephen Foley, What Price the New
Democracy? Goldman Sachs Conquers Europe, INDEPENDENT (Nov. 18,
2011, 01:00 AM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis
-and-features/what-price-the-new-democracy-goldman-sachs-conquerseurope-6264091.html.
227 Professor Mario Draghi Joins Goldman Sachs, GOLDMAN SACHS (Jan.
28, 2002), http://www.goldmansachs.com/media-relations/press-releases
/archived/2002/2002-01-28.html.
225

Journal of Business & Technology Law



271

Too Big to Fail

the bailouts.228 Draghi, however, has denied any involvement
in the deal between Greece and Goldman Sachs.229
The 2005 Greek debt imbalance, upon being made
public by the Greek government, caused respected analysts
to predict a 91% probability of a Greek default.230 And, thus,
three bailouts by the EU (the first two of which were joined
by the IMF) were needed to prevent the financial collapse of
Greece and possibly the EU itself. The EU bailouts were also
accompanied by harsh EU austerity dictates for Greece as a
condition of the bailouts, which has left Greece to this day a
seriously financially destabilized nation.231
Some analysts have suggested that Greece may have
turned a corner on its finances and is on the road to recovery.
While Greece has shown small signs of improvement,232 this
Alessandro Speciale, Draghi Signals Greek Debt Measures Not Enough
for QE Inclusions, BLOOMBERG (June 26, 2017, 11:19 AM), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-26/draghi-signals-greek-debt
-measures-not-enough-for-qe-inclusion.
229 See Kroet & Oliveira, supra note 226.
230 Katie Linsell & Sally Blakewell, Credit Risk Gauges in Europe Rise by
Most Since Lehman on Greece, BLOOMBERG (June 29, 2015 8:56 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-29/credit-risk-surgesby-most-since-lehman-on-greek-euro-exit-risk.
231 See Katie Allen, Greece Crisis Timeline—The Rocky Road to Another
Bailout, GUARDIAN (Aug. 20, 2015 4:36 AM), https://www.
theguardian.com/business/2015/aug/20/greece-crisis-timeline-rockyroad-another-bailout. See also COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
https://www.cfr.org/timeline/greeces-debt-crisis-timeline (last visited
Mar. 30, 2019) (stating that Greece received its first bailout on May 2,
2010 and others that followed included various cuts and reforms to Greek
financial policies.).
232 Griff Witte, Battered for a Decade, Greece Feels an Unexpected Whiff
of Revival as Europe Gains Strength, WASH. POST (Mar. 8, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/after-a-prolongedeconomic-crisis-a-greek-revival/2018/03/07/a9007ffe-1bcd-11e8-98f5ceecfa8741b6_story.html (the economy is forecasted to grow at a 2.5
percent rate in 2018, beating the forecast for the EU; and Greece is on the
228
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“sentiment” reflects a “false dawn.” Most observers still view
Greece as a deeply troubled economy. Greece still struggles
from, amongst other things, a weak private sector job market,
weak innovation and export activity, and a persistently high
consumption to GDP ratio.233 In that vein, on March 27, 2018,
June 14, 2018, and again on August 6, 2018, Greece was
supplied with yet further bailouts of almost 24 billion euros,
signaling that the EU, as well as many other creditors and
experts, do not believe that Greece has fully emerged from its
financial crisis.234
2. The City of Detroit Bankruptcy
One of the primary causes of Detroit’s declaration of
bankruptcy in July 2013 was that city’s massive financing
costs associated with a series of Wall Street-driven interest
rate swaps sold to Detroit in 2005 and 2006.235 UBS AG
(“UBS”) and Bank of America Corporation’s Merrill Lynch
Capital Services executed those deals with Detroit
supposedly to reduce Detroit’s pension fund obligations.236
verge of exiting the bailouts); Eshe Nelson, After €300 Billion in Aid,
Greece Will Exit its Bailout on Shaky Ground, QUARTZ (Jun. 21, 2018)
https://qz.com/1310447/greeces-economy-will-still-struggle-after-itsthird-bailout-ends/ (explaining that Greece finished 2017 with its highest
annual growth since the financial crisis).
233 Theodore Pelagidis & Michael Mitsopoulos, The Inconvenient Truths
About Greece, BROOKINGS INST. (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.brookings
.edu/blog/up-front/2018/03/01/the-inconvenient-truths-about-greece/.
234 Greece: The Third Economic Adjustment Program, COUNCIL OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/financialassistance-eurozone-members/greece-programme (last visited Apr. 28,
2019).
235 David Sirota, How Wall Street—Not Pensioners—Wrecked Detroit,
SALON (Nov. 20, 2013, 9:00 PM), http://www.salon.com/2013/11/20/how
_wall_street_not_pensioners_wrecked_detroit/.
236 Id.
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The variable interest rate exposure on those pension fund
obligations was exchanged under the swaps for fixed interest
rate loan payments based on a $1.4 billion pension debt
plan.237 In effect, Detroit was “hedging” against interest rate
increases.238 Of course, in the post-2006 era, interests
dropped dramatically, but Detroit was left paying the much
higher fixed swaps rate to its swaps dealer bank
counterparties, rather than, in the absence of the swaps,
paying the historically low variable rate it would have
otherwise paid on its pension indebtedness.239
Of course, in the pre-Dodd-Frank era, these kinds of
interest rate swaps were not exchange-traded. Detroit
therefore could not unilaterally sell its damaging swaps on
an exchange to minimize its foreseeable financial losses
resulting from the dramatic drop in interest rates. Under the
controlling ISDA Master Agreement, if Detroit terminated
the swap before its expiration, all payments owed by Detroit
under the term of the swap were immediately accelerated
and a huge liquidated damage penalty would be assessed.240
As is true of many ISDA-written swaps of that era for
municipalities, the contractual length of Detroit’s swaps was
Mary Williams Walsh, ‘Safe Harbor’ in Bankruptcy is Upended in
Detroit Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2013, 8:38 PM), https://
dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/12/23/safe-harbor-in-bankruptcy-is-upended
-in-detroit-case/.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Id. See also ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT AND SCHEDULE, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N (Sept. 26, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
1107694/000119312508091225/dex1032.htm (see, e.g., Section 5(a)(v));
Debtor’s Response to Motion Of Syncora Guarantee Inc. and Syncora
Capital Assurance Inc. for Leave to Conduct “Limited” Discovery
Regarding Motion of Debtor for Authorization and Approval of
Forbearance and Optional Termination Agreement at Ex. A. In Re City
of Detroit, Bankr. No. 13-53846 (E.D. Mich. Feb 24, 2017).
237
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30 years.241 As a result, the bank swaps dealers began
“demanding upwards of $250-300 million in swap
termination payments” of this major city in economic distress
in order to let Detroit out of the swaps scheme as it entered
bankruptcy.242
In a typical bankruptcy proceeding, the bankrupt city’s
creditors would “have to ‘take a haircut.’”243 However, ISDA
had successfully lobbied Congress for a supposed “safe
harbor” in the bankruptcy code that is even today quite
controversial.244 That bankruptcy provision, if enforced as
ISDA reads it, requires payment of “100 cents on the dollar“
for indebtedness under the swap before the bankruptcy code’s
traditional creditor “haircuts” are made.245
In the Detroit bankruptcy proceedings, however, the
bankruptcy judge rejected “termination” settlements made
between the bank swap dealers and Detroit — first for $230
million (i.e., 75 percent of the debt) and then for $165 million
(i.e., 57 cents on the dollar), respectively. The judge called
the underlying swaps obligation to the banks “legally
Joseph S. Fichera, Were Detroit’s Swaps Fair?, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 27,
2014 12:01 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2014-0127/were-detroit-s-swaps-unfair-. See generally Thomas Gaist, Wave of US
Municipal Bankruptcies Caused by Wall Street Predatory Interest Rates,
Not Pensions, GLOBALRESEARCH (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.global
research.ca/wave-of-us-municipal-bankruptcies-caused-by-wall-streetpredatory-interest-rates-not-pensions/5364268.
242 David Sirota, How Wall Street—Not Pensioners—Wrecked Detroit,
SALON (Nov. 20, 2013, 9:00 PM), http://www.salon.com/2013/11/20/
how_wall_street_not_pensioners_wrecked_detroit/.
243 Id.
244 AM. BANKR. INST., COMM’N TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CH. 11, 2012–
2014 FINAL REP. & RECOMMENDATIONS 94–110 (2015).
245 See Walsh, supra note 237; Hedges Against Risk May Complicate
Bankruptcy, LAW360 (Mar. 14, 2008, 12:00 AM), https://www.
law360.com/articles/50211/hedges-against-risk-may-complicatebankruptcy; see Sirota, supra note 242.
241
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dubious.”246 As to the proposed $165 million settlement, the
bankruptcy judge said: “It’s just too much money.”247 An $85
million settlement was finally approved.248 This result,
affirmed on appeal, undercut substantially ISDA’s “safe
harbor” bankruptcy contentions.249
3. Jefferson County,
Bankruptcy

Alabama

(Birmingham)

Like Detroit, many other cities suffered debilitating losses
from poorly understood interest rate swaps transactions. For
example, Jefferson County, Alabama, in which the city of
Birmingham is located, went bankrupt because of supposedly
sound interest rate swaps gone wrong. The county cited more
than $4.2 billion in debt when it filed for bankruptcy in
November 2011.250 Jefferson County’s debt skyrocketed
throughout the early 2000s when bond deals to upgrade its
sewer system were compromised by systemic corruption,
Addison Pierce, Why Detroit’s Good-Enough Swap Settlement Should
Be Good Enough for the Court, AM. U. BUS. L. REV. (Jan. 4, 2014),
http://www.aublr.org/2014/01/why-detroits-good-enough-swapsettlement-should-be-good-enough-for-the-court-2/.
247 Robert Snell, Bankruptcy Judge Denies Detroit’s Swaps Deal, ROLAND
MARTIN REPORTS, (Jan. 16, 2014), http://rolandmartinreports.com/
blog/2014/01/bankruptcy-judge-denies-detroits-swaps-deal/.
248 See Pierce, supra note 246; Ryan Felton, Judge Signs Off on Detroit's
$85 Million Swaps Settlement, DETROIT METRO TIMES (Apr. 11, 2014,
10:55 AM), https://www.metrotimes.com/news-hits/archives/2014/04/11/
judge-signs-off-on-detroits-85-million-swaps-settlement.
249 See generally In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
2014), appeal dismissed No. 14-cv-14872, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131174
(E.D. Mich. Sep. 20, 2015), aff’d, reh’g denied, en banc denied, Ochadleus
v. City of Detroit (In re City of Detroit), 838 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2016).
250 Associated Press, Jefferson County Emerges from Bankruptcy,
TUSCALOOSA NEWS (Dec. 4, 2013 12:01 AM), http://www.tuscaloosa
news.com/news/20131204/jefferson-county-emerges-from-bankruptcy.
246
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including bribery and fraud charges related to municipal
bond offerings and swap transactions, which led to twentytwo criminal convictions.251
Jefferson County began selling these sewer bonds in
1997 and within five years had raised $2.8 billion.252
JPMorgan Chase advised the county to “refinance” the bonds
using adjustable interest rate swaps, which hedged the
adjustable rate obligations by swapping them for fixed rate
interest payments to the bank swaps dealers.253
Jefferson County records show that
the bonds provided the banks with
$120 million in excessive fees with
JPMorgan selling the county $2.7
billion of interest-rate swaps, Bank of
America sold the county $373 million
in swaps and Lehman Brothers sold
the county another $190 million of
swaps.254
In 2008, the Jefferson Country
interest rate swaps scheme crumbled
as the fixed interest rate swaps
Melinda Dickinson, Alabama County Files Biggest Municipal
Bankruptcy, REUTERS (Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/ususa-alabama-jeffersoncounty-idUSTRE7A94CP20111110.
252 Renee Parsons, JP Morgan and the Largest Municipal Bankruptcy,
HUFFPOST (May 15, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/renee-pars
ons/jp-morgan-and-the-largest_b_1347324.html (note there was no
competitive bidding on these bonds).
253 Id. The bank persuaded Jefferson County to refinance despite the fact
that fixed rate financing offered the lowest municipal bond interest rates
in more than three decades.
254 Id. “In exchange for $25 million cash, the county by then held $5.8
billion of interest-rate swaps, more than other county in the U.S.” Id. In
2004, JPMorgan convinced the county that it could generate necessary
capital through additional swaps deals with Bear Stearns ($1.5 billion)
and Bank of America ($380 million).
251
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payments under the swaps increased
(while variable rates substantially
decreased). Jefferson County’s fixed
monthly debt payment rose from $10
to $23 million.255 The county was
unable to meet this obligation when
[p]ayments the county relied on
under its swap agreements to cover
the interest payments on its
adjustable-rate bonds hit the skids
when Moody’s and Standard and
Poor’s cut the sewer bonds rating to
just above “junk.”256

The downgrade would have permitted Wall Street
bank swap dealers to extricate themselves from these swap
deals, while at the same time the county faced an additional
billion dollars in swaps termination fees.257 As the county’s
liabilities climbed ever higher, eventually eclipsing $4 billion,
bankruptcy became its only viable option. At the time of its
filing (before Detroit’s 2013 bankruptcy), Jefferson County’s
bankruptcy was the largest municipal bankruptcy in United
States history.
Months of intense negotiations followed, and finally a
settlement of the county’s swaps obligations was approved.
Under the settlement, the county agreed to pay its largest
swaps creditors $1.84 billion, approximately 60% of what the
swaps creditors claimed they were owed under, inter alia,
swaps contract termination penalties.258
Id.
Id.
257 Id.
258 Steven Church, Margaret Newkirk & Kathleen Edwards, Jefferson
County, Creditors Reach Deal to End Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG (June 5,
2013), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-06-04/jefferson-co
unty-reaches-deal-with-creditors-on-bankruptcy-exit. It is worth nothing
255
256
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Further complicating this financial calamity, prior to
its settlement with Jefferson County, JPMorgan Chase
settled with the SEC over that regulator’s charges the bank
had made illegal payments to friends of public officials in
Jefferson County to acquire municipal bond business.259
Because of this, JPMorgan Chase was required by the SEC
to grant significant concessions to the county in the county’s
bankruptcy settlement.260 That accounted for JPMorgan
Chase giving Jefferson County a 60% decrease in the amount
the bank claimed the county owed in swaps termination
costs. After finalizing that settlement, the county was able
to emerge from bankruptcy in December 2013.
It is worth noting, however, that residents of the
county later complained of inequitable treatment because
“several of [the county’s] elected officials went to prison . . .
while no one from the banks was convicted of a crime.”261
Furthermore, the county was forced to lay off 1,000
employees, and many county residents watched their
water/sewer service bills climb to up to $250 per month, and
many were otherwise denied access to running water and
that the county will pay $5 billion in interest over the next 40 years as it
pays off the $1.8 billion settlement. Jefferson County Emerges from
Bankruptcy, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 4, 2013), http://www.tuscaloosa
news.com/news/20131204/jefferson-county-emerges-from-bankruptcy.
259 See, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh, A County in Alabama Strikes a
Bankruptcy Deal [hereinafter Walsh, Alabama Deal] N.Y. TIMES (June 4,
2013, 9:21 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/06/04/a-county-in-ala
bama-strikes-a-bankruptcy-deal/?_r=0; JPMorgan paying $700 Million to
Settle SEC Charges, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 4, 2009, 2:09 PM),
http://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2009/11/jpmorgan_paying_
700_million_to.html. This settlement required JPMorgan Chase & Co.to
a $25 million civil fine, $50 million payment to the county, and forfeit
$647 million in termination fees that it claimed the county owed on
interest-rate swaps.
260 See Walsh, Alabama Deal, supra note 259.
261 Id.
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forced to share portable toilets.262 JPMorgan Chase, for its
part, did not post a single “losing quarter throughout the
2008 economic crisis.”263
4. Other Problems with Unregulated Interest Rate
Swaps Faced by Local Governments and
University Systems
As one informed observer so aptly put it, these local
government interest rate swaps engineered by the big U.S.
bank holding company swaps dealers “[p]redictably, [were] a
jackpot for Wall Street and their bankrolled politicians, but
it was the opposite for [municipal] taxpayers.”264 For
example, many public school systems, such as the University
of California system, “lost tens of millions of dollars, and [are]
set to lose far more, after making risky bets on interest rates
on the advice of Wall Street bankers.”265 The Financial Times
recently reported that “a number of [other universities] are
caught up in dicey bond deals like the sort that sunk the city
of Detroit[.]”266
Parsons, supra note 252.
Id.
264 David Sirota, How Wall Street—Not Pensioners—Wrecked Detroit,
SALON (Nov. 20, 2013, 9:00 PM), http://www.salon.com/2013/11/20/
how_wall_street_not_pensioners_wrecked_detroit/.
265 Melody Petersen, UC Lost Millions on Interest-Rate Bets, ORANGE
COUNTY REGISTER (Dec. 17, 2014, 10:39 AM), http://www.ocregister.com/
articles/university-602769-interest-rate.html; Thomas Gaist, Wave of US
Municipal Bankruptcies Caused by Wall Street Predatory Interest Rates,
Not Pensions, GLOBAL RESEARCH (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.global
research.ca/wave-of-us-municipal-bankruptcies-caused-by-wall-streetpredatory-interest-rates-not-pensions/5364268.
266 Rana Foroohar, The US College Debt Bubble is Becoming Dangerous,
FIN. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2017, 4:08 PM), https://www.ft.com/content/1cdae6d81b90-11e7-bcac-6d03d067f81f.
262
263
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One does not have to look far to see how so many public
institutions were lulled into the belief by swaps dealers that
they did not need to understand how these swaps worked. As
the National Association for Pension Funds ( “NAPF”) so
aptly put it in its 2005 guidance (“Swaps Made Simple; What
a Trustee Needs to Know”):
[As to] [[l]ack of understanding[,]]
[pension t]rustees do not necessarily
need to understand all of the detailed
mechanics of how swaps work to use
them effectively – much in the same
way we do not need to understand the
internal mechanics of a car to drive it
. . . .267

If cars crashed as often as interest rate swaps do for
these municipal and public counterparties, drivers might be
inclined to learn more about their cars’ “internal mechanics.”
The NAPF’s “assurance”268 to swaps end users, however,
represents a key reason that swaps blow up on public entities
with harsh financial consequences for, inter alia, taxpayers
and pensioners.
5. The London Whale
After Dodd-Frank passed in July 2010, but before that law
went into effect,269 a JPMorgan Chase derivatives trader,
NAT’L ASS’N OF PENSION FUNDS, SWAPS MADE SIMPLE: WHAT A
TRUSTEE NEEDS TO KNOW 10 (2005), https://www.actuaries.org.uk/
documents/swaps-made-simple-what-trustee-needs-know.
268 Id.
269With Effective Date of Dodd-Frank Derivatives Provisions Looming,
SEC Gives Guidance on Title VII, JIM HAMILTON’S WORLD OF SEC. REG.
(June 18, 2011), http://jimhamiltonblog.blogspot.com/2011/06/with267
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Bruno Iksil, who was famously known as the “London
Whale,” working out of a JPMorgan Chase London branch,
unsuccessfully engaged in extremely risky unregulated CDS
swaps trades. Those trades resulted in that bank ultimately
booking a $6.2 billion loss – a sum that would have sunk
many other large financial institutions without JP Morgan
Chase’s capital reserves.
Investigations into the “London Whale’s” conduct
demonstrated that internal bank risk limits were exceeded
by Iksil more than 300 times; two sets of books were kept to
conceal the misconduct; and internal bank supervision and
U.K. financial regulatory oversight were nearly nonexistent.270 It is true that JPMorgan Chase was ultimately
subject to fines and damages under a number of settlements
arising from the London Whale episode,271 but it was
effective-date-of-dodd-frank.html. While Dodd-Frank was enacted on
July 21, 2010, its effective date was 60 days after a final rule was
published in cases where the statute required a rule. Almost all of Title
VII’s swaps provisions require a rule.
270 See generally JPMorgan Chase Whale Trades: A Case History of
Derivatives Risks and Abuses: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm.
on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov’t Affairs,
113th Cong. (2013), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg85162/
pdf/CHRG-113shrg85162.pdf; Patricia Hurtado, The London Whale,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 23, 2016, 5:04 PM), https://www.bloomberg.
com/quicktake/the-london-whale; Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Big Bank
Boards: The Case for Heightened Administrative Enforcement, 68 ALA. L.
REV. 1011, 1012 (2017).
271 Hurtado, supra note 270; Jonathan Stempel, U.S. to Drop Criminal
Charges in 'London Whale' Case, REUTERS (July 21, 2017, 4:30 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us- jpmorgan-londonwhale/u-s-to-dropcriminal-charges-in-london-whale-case-idUSKBN1A62M9; Jane Croft &
Caroline Binham, Ex- JPMorgan Trader Loses FCA Fight Linked to
‘London Whale’ Case, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2018), https://
www.ft.com/content/766e70d6-067a-11e8-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5; Suzi Ring,
London Whale's ‘Minnow’ Is Last Hurdle in FCA Identity Fights,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
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fortunate that the damage done by this single rogue trader
was not more extensive or conducted more extensively (with
resulting even larger losses) by a group of rogue traders
within the bank.
IV. WORRISOME FINANCIAL CALAMITIES ON
THE HORIZON CAUSED BY GROWING MASSIVE
CONSUMER DEBT DEFAULTS


A. Growing New Defaults on Trillions of Dollars
of Consumer Debt
As of this writing, there is a general popular consensus that
the American economy is booming because of low
unemployment272 and the touted stimulus impact of the Tax
Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017.273 In this regard, testifying before
the House Financial Services Committee, Jerome Powell, the
2018-01-16/london-whale-s-minnow-is-last-hurdle-in-fca-identity-fights
(“The regulator returned to court Tuesday to challenge a previous
decision won by former JPMorgan trader Julien Grout, who said he was
identifiable in the bank’s London Whale penalty notice, which
accompanied a 138 million-pound ($189 million) settlement with the bank
in 2013. JPMorgan was fined more than $1 billion by U.S. and U.K.
regulators after Grout’s boss Bruno Iksil, nicknamed the London Whale
for his large bets, incurred $6.2 billion in losses at the lender.”).
272 But see Podkul et al., supra note 94 (“[While] employment has risen . .
. about a fifth of the U.S. jobs are in occupations where the median income
is below the federal poverty line. And median household income is barely
above its 2008 level adjusting for inflation.”).
273 See, e.g., Ben Casselman, Up, Up, Up Goes the Economy. Here’s What
Could Knock It Down., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/03/20/business/economy/economy-recovery.html
(“Unemployment is low, job creation is strong[,] and the overall economy
seems to be gaining momentum, not losing it. Most economists expect the
expansion to continue well into next year, which would make it the
longest ever.”).
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then new Chair of the Federal Reserve, stated: “The next
couple of years look quite strong. I would expect the next two
years to be good years for the economy.”274 On March 1, 2018,
Powell again maintained that the country’s economic outlook
remained positive in remarks submitted to the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.275
However, despite Chairman Powell’s recent remarks
and a favorable GDP growth in the first quarter of 2019,276
there are sophisticated assessments by respected observers
that the present-day economy has many of the characteristics
of the seemingly thriving economy prior to the 2008
meltdown, when economic optimism reigned.277 A March
Heather Long, New Fed Chair Jerome Powell Sees Little Risk of a
Recession, WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/wonk/wp/2018/02/27/fed-chairman-in-public-debut-vows-toprevent-overheated-u-s-economy/?utm_term=.c3ba7f4c7ce8.
275 Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress: Hearing Before
S. Comm. On Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 115th Cong. (2018)
(statement of Jerome H. Powell, Chairman of the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System).
276 Fred Imbert, US Economy Grows by 3.2% in the First Quarter, Topping
Expectations, CNBC (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/26/
gdp-q1-2019-first-read.html.
277 See Steven Pressman & Robert H. Scott, Recent Stock Market Sell-Off
Foreshadows a New Great Recession, SALON (Mar. 25, 2018, 1:30 PM),
https://www.salon.com/2018/03/25/recent-stock-market-sell-off-foreshad
ows-a-new-great-recession_partner/ (discussing parallels between the
conditions that led to 2008’s recession and characteristics of the presentday economy). See also Pearlstein, supra note 61; Gillian Tett, The
Corporate Debt Problem Refuses to Recede; Non-financial Leverage is
Higher Today than it was Before the Crisis, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/ceb8d8ee-0b57-11e8-8eb7-42f857ea9f09;
Heejm Kim, Jim Rogers Says Next Bear Market Will Be Worst in His Life,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2018-02-09/jim-rogers-says-next-bear-market-will-be-worst-in-hislifetime; John Authers, The Market Parallels With 2007, FIN. TIMES (Feb.
6, 2018, 4:13 AM), http://www.moneywatch.us/authers-note-the-marketparallels-with-2007/ (“I hate to admit this, but I think I have found a good
274
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2018
widely-cited
Wall
Street
Journal
analysis
commemorating the tenth anniversary of the Bear Sterns
collapse convincingly shows that “the same problems that led
to the biggest financial market meltdown since the Great
Depression are alive and well today.”278 Specifically, that
analysis demonstrates that the Trump-era “rosy-looking
stats” of lower unemployment and an increase in median
household income conceal the same serious issues that
precipitated the 2008 recession, namely: “excessive consumer
debt (relative to income) and unaffordable housing.”279 As one
widely respected commentator recently demonstrated,
“Americans net worth fell at the highest level since the
financial crisis in the fourth quarter of 2018, [dropping] to
104.3 trillion as [2018] came to an end, a decrease of $3.73
trillion from the third quarter [amounting] to a drop of 3.4
percent.”280 Another well respected economic analyst’s review
of the readily available data demonstrates that “U.S. private
historical parallel for what is happening in the markets [today]. And, it
is with the spring and summer of 2007, on the eve of the [2008] credit
crisis.”); Nishant Kumar & Suzy White, Greenlight’s Einhorn Says Issues
That Caused the Crisis Are Not Solved, BLOOMBERG (November 15, 2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-15/greenlight-seinhorn-says-issues-that-caused-crisis-not-solved-ja1cw3ws. Even Carl
Icahn has said that today derivatives are “risky, often completely
misunderstood” financial instruments. Cezary Podkul, Ten Years After
the Crisis, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 27, 2018), http://graphics.wsj.com/how-theworld-has-changed-since-2008-financial-crisis/.
278 Pressman & Scott, supra note 277.
279 Id.; see also Podkul et al., supra note 94.
280 Jeff Cox, US Households See Biggest Decline in Net Worth Since the
Financial Crisis, CNBC (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/
07/us-households-see-biggest-decline-in-net-worth-since-the-financialcrisis.html
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debt to GDP ratio is now higher than it was at its 2007 peak
before the Great Financial Crisis.”281
The troubling implications of this research have been
repeatedly corroborated by the reports of other respected
economic commentators. Fortune notes that outstanding nonmortgage consumer credit is currently nearing $4 trillion – a
45% increase from 2008.282 At over a trillion dollars, credit
card debt in the U.S. “has reached a seven-year high . . . .”
Internationally, “nonfinancial corporate debt increased to
96% of global GDP between 2011 and 2017, with some 37%
of global companies now deemed to be “highly leveraged,”
(meaning they have a debt-to-earnings ratio above five-toone) up from 32% in 2007 . . . .”283 In the U.K., concern over
the rapid growth of consumer debt has prompted the leading
U.K. financial regulator to waive or reduce credit card fees
and interest for certain consumers caught in persistent
debt.284 Designed to help consumers, the rule will have the
corresponding impact of limiting funds to lenders who are
experiencing
these
worrisome
defaults,
including
FRANK VENEROSO, WHERE DOES OUR U.S. INDEBTEDNESS NOW STAND?
RECORD HIGH 1 (2019) (on file with author).
282 Daniel J. Arbess, The Economy Looks Good Today, But the Next Debt
Crisis is on the Horizon, FORTUNE (Feb. 28, 2018), http://www.
fortune.com/2018/02/28/debt-crisis-jerome-powell-federal-reserve-testi
mony/.
283 Id.; see, e.g., Pearlstein, supra note 61. Pearlstein says there: “Now, 12
years [after the 2008 crisis], it’s happening again. This time, however, it’s
not households using cheap debt to take cash out of overvalued homes.
Rather, it is giant corporations using cheap debt—corporate debt—to
record levels. . . . And, once again, they are diverting capital from
productive long-term investment to further inflate a financial bubble—
this one in corporate stocks and bonds—that, when it bursts, will send the
economy into another recession.” (emphasis added).
284 Caroline Binham, FCA Overhauls Rules on Credit Card Charges for
Struggling Debtors, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.ft.com/
content/f290ac8e-1baa-11e8-aaca-4574d7dabfb6.
281
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demonstrated “negative repercussions for sub-prime . . .
credit card securitizations.”285
Ultimately, the same financial architecture that
surrounded the housing mortgage crisis (almost certainly
including “naked” credit default swaps) has been replicated
in the three key areas where debt is growing at a troubling
rate: defaults in student loans, auto loans, and credit card
debt. There are even recent reports that subprime mortgage
backed securities “have roughly doubled in the first [2018]
quarter from a year earlier, as investors lapped up assets
blamed for bringing the global financial system to the brink
of collapse a decade ago.”286 As was reported in the Wall
Street Journal on the tenth anniversary of Bear Stearns
crisis: “A decade after risks associated with financial
engineering nearly brought the economy to its knees, sales of
similar products are ticking higher.”287
B. Rising Defaults on Student Debt
As of this writing, there is hardly a day that goes by without
a chilling warning that defaults on student loans provides
Bob Thornhill, New FCA Rules May Hit Credit Card Profitability,
GLOBAL CAP. (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.globalcapital.com/article/
b173ptjpclz6v5/new-fca-rules-may-hit-credit-card-profitability; see also
Adam Samson, US Midwest Factory Sector Gauge Skids to Lowest Level
in a Year, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2018, 2:22 PM), https://www.
ft.com/content/c1dbb92a-3357-11e8-ac48-10c6fdc22f03 (showing that
manufacturing in the Midwest grew at the slowest rate in over a year and
the American economy grew “at a roughly 1.8 percent annualized rate,
down sharply from an initial forecast of 4.2 percent, and a peak of 5.4
percent.”).
286 Ben McLannahan & Joe Rennison, US Subprime Mortgage Bonds
Back in Fashion, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2018, 4:09 AM), https://www.
ft.com/content/6478a8d6-32c3-11e8-b5bf-23cb17fd1498.
287 See Podkul et al., supra note 94.
285
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“an eerie echo of the housing crisis.”288 As the Wall Street
Journal observed: “Some worry student debt, rising for years,
could figure in the next credit crisis.”289 Moreover, “[o]ver the
past [ten] years the amount of student loan debt in the US
has grown by 170%, to a whopping $1.4 [trillion]—more than
car loans, or credit card debt.”290 As one financial regulator
Rana Foroohar, The US College Debt Bubble is Becoming Dangerous,
FIN. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2017, 4:08 PM), https://www.ft.com/content/a272ee4c1b83-11e7-bcac-6d03d067f81f; Judith Scott-Clayton, The Looming
Student Loan Default Crisis is Worse than We Thought, BROOKINGS (Jan.
11, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-looming-student-loandefault-crisis-is-worse-than-we-thought/; Matthew Michaels, More People
than Ever are Defaulting on Student Loans – and it Could Put the US
Economy at Risk, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 14, 2017, 3:39 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/student-loan-default-puts-economy-atrisk-2017-12; John Authers, Authers’ Note: The Market Parallels with
2007, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2018, 4:13 AM), https://www.ft.com/
content/beaa0c4a-0af1-11e8-8eb7-42f857ea9f09.
289 See Podkul et al., supra note 94.
290 Foroohar, supra note 288; Nishant Kumar & Suzy Waite, Greenlight’s
Einhorn Says Issues That Caused the Crisis Are Not Solved, BLOOMBERG
MKT. (Nov. 15, 2017, 1:04 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2017-11-15/greenlight-s-einhorn-says-issues-that-caused-crisis-not-solve
d-ja1cw3ws; Bloomberg Daybreak: Americas, How America’s Consumer
Debt Threatens Credit Markets, (television broadcast Dec. 20, 2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2017-12-20/how-u-s-cons umerdebt-threatens-credit-markets-video; Victor Dergunov, America’s
Impending Debt Crisis, SEEKING ALPHA (Nov. 3, 2017, 2:54 AM),
https://seekingalpha.com/article/4120000-americas-impending-debtcrisis; Chris Markowski, America’s $1 Trillion in Credit Card Debt is
Terrible News for Our Future, THE HILL (Aug. 25, 2017, 1:00 PM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/finance/347973-americas-1-trillionin-credit-card-debt-is-terrible-news; Wolf Richter, America’s Debt is
Surging, and Some of the Riskiest Borrowers are Struggling to Pay Back,
BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 15, 2017, 7:33 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
consumer-debt-surges-and-subprime-auto-delinquencies-rise-2017-11;
Tyler Durden, US Consumers Tap Out: Credit Card Defaults Surge To 4
Year High And It’s Getting Worse, ZEROHEDGE (Apr. 26, 2017, 9:31 PM),
https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-04-26/us-consumers-tap-out-cred
288
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has warned that “since 2008 we have basically swapped a
housing debt bubble for a student loan bubble.”291
William Dudley, “[then-]president of the New York
Federal Reserve Bank [has] sounded the alarm [about] the
student debt crisis,” stating that:
[S]tudents now leave school owing on
average $34,000[,] up 70 percent from
a decade ago . . . . [L]oan delinquency
climbed to 11.2 per cent in the last
quarter of 2016, the highest rate for
all types of household debt . . . . More
than one in ten borrowers are at least
it-card-defaults-surge-4-year-high-and-its-getting-worse; Jessica Dickler,
Credit Card Debt Hits a Record High, CNBC (Jan. 23, 2018, 9:54 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/23/credit-card-debt-hits-record-high.html;
Michelle Singletary, Consumer Debt is at a Record High. Haven’t We
Learned?, WASH. POST (Aug. 12, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/business/us-consumer-debt-is-at-a-record-high-havent-we-lear
ned/2017/08/11/5c7bee6e-7e13-11e7-a669-b400c5c7e1cc_story.html?utm
_term=.0242cf78f1db; John A. Byrne, Americas’ Household Debt has
Surged by $605B this Year, N.Y. POST (Nov. 26, 2017, 12:12 AM),
https://nypost.com/2017/11/26/new-yorkers-household-debt-has-surgedby-605b-this-year/; Nick Clements, Consumer Debt Reaches New Peak:
Will Losses Follow?, FORBES (Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/nickclements/2017/08/18/consumer-debt-reaches-new-peak-willlosses-follow/#6f4cd4a41849; Alistair Gray, U.S. Banks Suffer 20% Jump
in Credit Card Losses, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2018, 2:54 PM),
https://www.ft.com/content/bafdd504-fd2c-11e7-a492-2c9be7f3120a; Ben
McLannahan, Debt Pile-Up in US Car Market Sparks Subprime Fear,
FIN. TIMES (May 30, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.ft.com/content/
bab49198-3f98-11e7-9d56-25f963e998b2; Ben McLannahan, US Bank
Derivatives Books Larger Since Rescue of Bear Sterns, FIN. TIMES (Mar.
16, 2018, 9:42 AM), https://www.ft.com/content/201bce0c-289b-11e8b27e-cc62a39d57a0.
291 Froohar, supra note 266 (citing an expert at the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau).
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90 days behind in repaying their
student debt[.]292

Many commentators have concluded that the weight of
student loan debt on millennials alone is “a drag on the
economy as a whole.”293
Again, inhering in the student loan debt crisis are the
same financial engineering instruments present during the
2008 crisis, e.g., student loan asset-backed securities,
collateralized debt obligations, and naked credit default
swaps.294 Many of these instruments were executed before
Eric Pianin, America’s Student-Loan Debt Reaches $1.3 Trillion (and
It’s Still Climbing), FISCAL TIMES (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.inc.com/thefiscal-times/student-loan-debt-1-trillion.html.
293 Dante Chinni & Sally Bronston, The Real College Crisis: Student Debt
Drags Down Economy, NBC NEWS (Mar. 17, 2019), https://www.
nbcnews.com/politics/meet-the-press/real-college-crisis-student-debtdrags-down-economy-n984131 (Stating “the biggest source of debt for
millennials? Personal education loans at 21 percent” and “the net impact
is . . . a drag on the economy as a whole”).
294 Attended A Public College? Don’t Pay Your Federal Loans, DAILY KOS
(June 3, 2015, 8:38 AM), https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2015/6/3/
1390122/-Attended-A-Public-College-Don-t-Pay-Your-Federal-Loans;
Raúl Carrillo, How Wall Street Profits Form Student Debt, ROLLING
STONE (Apr. 14, 2016, 2:37 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/
news/how-wall-street-profits-from-student-debt-20160414; Rachel L.
Ensing, SecondMarket to Launch Student-Loan Securities Platform,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 1, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241
27887323978104578334342724776724; Larry Doyle, Are Student Loans
an Impending Bubble? Is Higher Education a Scam?, BUS. INSIDER (Apr.
26, 2011, 9:05 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/are-student-loansan-impending-bubble-is-higher-education-a-scam-2011-5; Joe Rennison,
Investors Pour Back into Crisis-Era Credit Product, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 23,
2017, 4:44 PM), https://www.ft.com/content/c4d815b2-86bc-11e7-bf50e1c239b45787; Brad Rosen, A New Direction Forward at the CFTC in
2017, WOLTERS KLUWER (“[E]stimated notional value of the U.S. swaps
markets was $243 trillion in 2017, a 211 percent increase over the prior
year”), http://www.dailyreportingsuite.com/securities/news/a_new_direc
292
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the effective date of Dodd-Frank so that that statute’s swaps
requirements did not apply.295 However, even if executed
after the effective date of Dodd-Frank, the U.S. bank swap
dealers have created the new loopholes identified in this
paper that now can remove these instruments from DoddFrank’s swaps protections at those swaps dealers
discretion.296
C. Rising Defaults on Auto Loans
What is true of the student loan market is also now true with
auto loans, especially subprime auto loans. As was reported
in Forbes:
Research from Experian, a credit
firm, shows that the average
duration of new car loans is at an alltime high of 5.5 years—with 25% of
loans extending for 6-7 years, and
some lasting 8 years or longer. The
number of auto loans outstanding
with subprime borrowers was 23% of
the total in 3Q 2014. Increasingly
those subprime borrowers are falling
behind on their payments. More than
2.6% of borrowers who took out loans
in the first quarter of 2014 had
missed at least one monthly payment
by November—the highest level of
tion_forward_at_the_cftc_in_2017 (citing COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING
COMM’N, FY 2017 Agency Financial Report, available at http://
business.cch.com/srd/2017afr.pdf).
295 See infra note 297 and accompanying text.
296 See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, TABLE C: EFFECTIVE DATES OF
PRINCIPAL DODD-FRANK PROVISIONS, https://www.sullcrom.com/files/up
load/Effective-Dates-of-the-Principal-Provisions-of-Dodd-Frank.pdf.
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early trouble since 2008, when
delinquencies rose above 3.0%. For
borrowers with weak credit scores the
delinquency rate was 8.4%.297

Similarly, a report on auto loans broadcast on CNBC showed:
[A]n increasing portion of those loans
is of the subprime—or, based on the
borrower’s credit history, more likely
to default—variety. Through the
middle of 2014, about 29 percent of all
the securities based on auto loans to
individuals were classified subprime,
a level 15 percent higher than during
the same period last year, according
to figures from Standard & Poor’s.298

Forbes therefore reported:

Michael Lingenheld, The Next Subprime Crisis, Auto Loans, Won’t End
Well, Forbes (Jan. 28, 2015, 3:05 PM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/michaellingenheld/2015/01/28/the-next-subprime-crisis-auto-loans/;
Cooper Levey-Baker, Do Rising Car Loan Defaults Signal a Precarious
Economy?, SARASOTA (Feb. 2, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.sarasota
magazine.com/articles/2018/2/2/precarious-economy (“Is the rise in
delinquencies a sign of the debt bubble about to pop, like the housing
market 10 years ago? Halliburton notes that delinquency rates are
‘creeping up,’ not ‘exploding,’ and warns against doomsday predictions,
and the Federal Reserve suggests that the expansion of the subprime
auto loan market may have a ‘muted’ effect on the overall financial sector.
But auto loans do make up a significant chunk of American debt. Total
household debt rose to almost $13 trillion last year; $1.2 trillion of that
was in auto loans, trailing only mortgage debt and student loan debt.”).
298 Kate Kelly, New Debt Crisis Fear: Subprime Auto Loans, CNBC (Oct.
1, 2014, 12:18 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2014/10/01/new-debt-crisisfear-subprime-auto-loans.html.
297
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[S]ales of US subprime auto ABS
[Asset-Backed Securities] totaled
more than $17.4 billion in 2014, after
a record $22 billion were sold in 2013.
Auto lenders have even started
offering [auto loan asset backed
securities] with a “prefunding”
feature that effectively packages
securitized bundles of auto loans
before they’ve even been made. While
that might sound crazy and
reminiscent of 2008, easier lending
standards have been a big driver of
vehicle sales that continue to beat
expectations. The head of Honda’s US
sales
recently
warned
that
competitors are doing “stupid things”
to gain an advantage.299

Taking all these factors of the auto loan debt infrastructure
into account, a recent Bloomberg report concluded:
[Recently], it appeared the chickens
had come home to roost for some
subprime auto lenders and investors,
with Fitch Ratings warning that
delinquencies in subprime car loans
had reached a high not seen since
October 1996. The number of
borrowers who were more than 60
days late on their car bills in
February rose 11.6 percent from the
same period a year ago, bringing the
Michael Lingenheld, The Next Subprime Crisis, Auto Loans, Won’t End
Well, FORBES (Jan. 28, 2015, 3:05 PM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/michaellingenheld/2015/01/28/the-next-subprime-crisis-auto-loans/.
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delinquency rate to a total 5.16
percent, according to the credit rating
company.300

By the fourth quarter of 2018, the car loan delinquency rate
exceeded 8 percent.301
Again, as the above quotes demonstrate and as is true of
student loan and credit card indebtedness, the auto loans
financial infrastructure mimics the failed financial
engineering created in the mortgage markets leading up to
the 2008 financial crash.
D. Rising Defaults on Credit Card Debt
On August 7, 2017, Bloomberg reported that “U.S. consumer
credit-card debt just passed an ominous milestone, beating a
record set just before the global financial system almost
collapsed in 2008.”302 Credit card debt reached an all-time
high in June 2017 as the Federal Reserve valued outstanding
credit card loans at $1.02 trillion.303 Accompanying this
record high of outstanding debt has been substantial losses
sustained by banks. In 2017, “[t]he big four US retail banks
[Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells
Tracy Alloway, This is What’s Going on Beneath the Subprime AutoLoan Turmoil, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 21, 2016, 10:23 AM), https://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-21/this-is-what-s-going-onbeneath-the-subprime-auto-loan-turmoil.
301 Gillian Tett, Driven to Default: What’s Causing the Rise in Subprime
Auto Loans?, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/
1ce6d32e-4520-11e9-b168-96a37d002cd3 (showing updated numbers of
delinquency rates).
302 Jennifer Surane, U.S. Credit-Card Debt Surpasses Record Set at Brink
of Crisis, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 7, 2017, 6:09 PM), https://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2017-08-07/u-s-credit-card-debt-surpasses-record-setat-brink-of-crisis.
303 Id.
300
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Fargo] sustained a near 20 per cent jump in losses from credit
cards . . . , raising doubts about the ability of consumers to
fuel economic expansion.”304 Together, Citigroup, JPMorgan
Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo lost $12.5 billion
from credit card loans in 2017.305 Relaxing approval
standards, credit card issuers have aggressively attempted to
attract customers and promote spending through monetary
incentives such as bonuses and cashback.306 Data indicates
that card issuers have been largely successful as,
“[c]ustomers opened about 110 million new credit card
accounts in 2016. That’s roughly 50 percent higher than 2010
and higher than any single year since 2007.”307 Together, the
rapid increase of new credit card lines and the record high of
defaults on credit card loans indicate a troubling trend that
consumers are vastly spending beyond their means.
E. Future Economic Chaos
It bears repeating that defaults now occurring across the
consumer spending economy mirror the defaults on debt
preceding the mortgage meltdown. However, it is not just the
defaults that are worrisome. It is the fact that the financial
infrastructure that magnified the 2008 financial meltdown
has been built up around these three forms of debt as well.
Alistair Gray, US Banks Suffer 20% Jump in Credit Card Losses, FIN.
TIMES (Jan. 21, 2018, 2:54 PM), https://www.ft.com/content/bafdd504fd2c-11e7-a492-2c9be7f3120a.
305 Id.
306 Robert Harrow, What Consumers Can Expect From Credit Card
Issuers in 2018, FORBES (Jan. 29, 2018, 11:34 AM), https://www.
forbes.com/sites/robertharrow/2018/01/29/what-consumers-can-expectfrom-credit-card-issuers-in-2018/#39bc16f4672d.
307 Herb Weisbaum, Americans Have More Credit Cards – and More Debt,
Says CFPB, NBC NEWS (Dec. 28, 2017, 7:35 AM), https://www.
nbcnews.com/business/consumer/americans-have-more-credit-cardsmore-debt-says-cfpb-n833086.
304
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Through the new loopholes to Dodd-Frank swaps regulation
identified in this paper, the major U.S. bank holding
company swaps dealers have engineered a way to evade
Dodd-Frank’s regulations at will. Consequently, if a systemic
break were to occur because of cascading and increasing
student, auto, and/or credit card loan defaults and in swaps
associated thereto, the economic chaos and harm of the 2008
financial meltdown may very well be repeated, as will the fact
that the largest U.S. bank holding companies will then once
again seek a multi-trillion dollar taxpayer bailout to avoid a
Second Great Depression.
V. DODD-FRANK’S SOLUTIONS FOR STABILIZING THE SWAPS MARKET
On July 21, 2010, President Barack Obama signed DoddFrank into law.308 Dodd-Frank transformed the regulation of
swaps by requiring generally that swaps be subject to
clearing and, if cleared, by transparency through exchangelike trading, including capital, collateral or margin
requirements, and checks on swaps dealers anti-competitive
and ethical behavior. 309
The Act first requires that all “swap dealers” (“SD” or
“SDs”) and “major swap participants” (“MSP” or “MSPs”)
register with the appropriate banking prudential regulators,
The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); Brady Dennis, Obama Ushers
in New Financial Era; Landmark Law is Signed President Says Work
Still Lies Ahead for Regulators, WASH. POST, July 22, 2010, at A13.
309 BAIRD WEBEL ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40975, FIN.
REGULATORY REFORM AND THE 111TH CONG. at 8 (2010),
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40975_20100601.pdf (“H.R. 4173 . . .
mandate[s] reporting, centralized clearing, and exchange-trading of OTC
derivatives . . . . The bill[] require[s] regulators to impose capital
requirements on swap dealers and “major swap participants.”).
308
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the CFTC, and/or, if equity swaps are involved, the SEC.310
A swap dealer is an entity that (1) holds itself out as such; (2)
makes a market in swaps; (3) regularly enters into swaps for
its own account in the ordinary course of business; or (4)
engages in activity generally recognized in the trade as
dealing in swaps.311 Major swap participants are entities that
are not swap dealers and (1) maintain a substantial position
in swaps, excluding transactions used to hedge commercial
risk; (2) create substantial counterparty exposure that could
undermine the banking system or financial markets; or (3)
are highly leveraged, but not subject to federal prudential
bank regulators’ capital requirements; and (4) maintain a
substantial position in swaps.312 For purposes of this paper,
all relevant U.S. financial entities focused on herein are
swaps dealers.
At present, the threshold for SD registration with the
CFTC is the conducting of many billions of dollars in swaps
310 Id.; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 731(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1703 (2010). In the case of
U.S. bank holding companies, Dodd-Frank gives the appropriate
prudential regulators jurisdiction for capital and margin requirements if
the bank is a swaps dealer or a major swap participant. Douglas Landy,
Melissa Ferraro & James King, United States: “Are You My Mother?”:
Which Agency Governs What Swap Entity Under the Margin Rules for
Non-Cleared Swaps?, MONDAQ (May 9, 2016), http://www.mondaq.com/
unitedstates/x/489242/Commodities+Derivatives+Stock+Exchanges/Are
+You+My+Mother+Which+Agency+Governs+What+Swap+Entity+Unde
r+The+Margin+Rules+For+NonCleared+Swaps. Non-bank subsidiaries
of U.S. bank holding companies are governed entirely by the CFTC or
SEC, depending on the nature of the swap for all swaps regulation,
including capital and margin.
311 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, § 721(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1658 (2010).
312 Id.
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trades per year.313 Registered SDs must disclose any material
risks of swaps and any material incentives or conflicts of
interests.314 In addition, they must meet capital and margin
(or collateral) requirements and conform to business conduct
rules, including those related to fraud and market
manipulation, that are set by the regulators (while clearing
organizations and exchanges can supplement these federal
regulator requirements).315 Dodd-Frank also requires that
swaps transactions be reported to federal regulators.316
The CFTC conceptually separates its regulation of
SDs into “Entity-Level” Requirements and “TransactionLevel” Requirements, totaling thirteen applicable types of
swaps requirements.317 Entity-Level Requirements are
swaps rules that “apply to a swap dealer . . . as a whole,” and
Transaction-Level Requirements are regulations that “apply
on a transaction-by-transaction basis.”318
Swap Dealer (SD) Registration, NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, https://www.
nfa.futures.org/registration-membership/who-has-to-register/sd-msp.
html (last visited Mar. 27, 2018).
314 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, §§ 731(h)(3)(B), 764(g)(3)(B)(i)-(ii).
315 Id. §§ 731(e), 764(e)–(h).
316 Id. § 727(C). Business conduct standards were the subject of a January
11, 2012 final CFTC rule and applied to SDs and MSDs. Business
Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with
Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. 9734 (Feb. 17, 2012). These standards
enhance protections to swaps counterparties of SDs and MSPs through,
inter alia, due diligence, disclosure, fair dealing and anti-fraud
protections. Id. As is shown below, it appears that the CFTC never made
clear that these business conduct standards were to apply
extraterritorially where Dodd-Frank was to apply abroad until it issued
a proposed rule on October 11, 2016. That rule was never finalized. See
infra notes 461–46 and accompanying text.
317 COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS,
INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE & POLICY STATEMENT REGARDING COMPLIANCE
WITH CERTAIN SWAPS REGULATIONS (2013).
318 Id.
313
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The CFTC identifies six main categories of EntityLevel Requirements: capital adequacy, chief compliance
officer, risk management, swap data recordkeeping, swap
data repository reporting, business conduct standards, and
physical commodity large swaps trader reporting.319 The
seven Transaction-Level Requirements are categorized as:
required clearing and swap processing, margining (and
segregation) for uncleared swaps, mandatory trade
execution, swap trade relationship documentation, real-time
public reporting, trade confirmation, and daily trading
records.320
It is important to note here, however, that U.S. bank
holding company swap dealers—as opposed to their nonbank subsidiaries—are “prudentially” regulated by the
appropriate federal banking agencies,321 and those banking
institutions must comply with the swaps capital and margin
requirements imposed by those bank regulators and not
those established by the CFTC.322
Id.
Id.
321 See Margin and Capital Requirements for Covered Swap Entities, 80
Fed. Reg. 74,840, 74,841 n.4 (Nov. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
pt. 45) (“The [Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System] is the
prudential regulator for any swap entity that is (i) a State-chartered bank
that is a member of the Federal Reserve System[;] (ii) a State-chartered
branch or agency of a foreign bank[;] . . . and (v) a bank holding company
. . . .”).
322 The U.S. prudential regulators are the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Farm Credit Administration,
and the Federal Housing Finance Agency. Margin and Capital
Requirements for Covered Swap Entities, 80 Fed. Reg. 74,840, 74,840
(Nov. 30, 2015) (to be codified 12 C.F.R. pt. 45) (“For swap entities that
are prudentially regulated by one of the Agencies, sections 731 and 764
of the Dodd-Frank Act require the Agencies to adopt rules jointly for swap
entities under their respective jurisdictions imposing (i) capital
319
320
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However, while the rules set by prudential bank
regulators exist as a separate body of margin and capital
mandates from the CFTC’s capital and margin rules, the
differences between the two sets of regulations are
considered minimal.323
Pertinent for the purposes of this paper, which focuses
on whether the CFTC should apply its Dodd-Frank swaps
rules to all swaps trades of foreign non-bank subsidiaries of
U.S. bank holding companies, those non-bank subsidiaries of
SDs are fully subject to CFTC capital and margin rules (and
not those of the banking regulators) to the extent that DoddFrank reaches those foreign subsidiaries through sensible
extraterritorial rules.324
requirements and (ii) initial and variation margin requirements on all
swaps not cleared by a registered derivatives clearing organization or a
registered clearing agency.”); see also 12 C.F.R. § 45 (2017); 12 C.F.R. §
237 (2016); 12 C.F.R. § 349 (2016); 12 C.F.R. § 624 (1989); 12 C.F.R. §
1221 (2016).
323 U.S. Uncleared swap Margin, Capital and Segregation Rules, DAVIS
POLK & WARDWELL LLP (Jan. 22, 2016), https://www.davispolk.com/
publications/us-uncleared-swap-margin-capital-and-segregation-rules/;
Prudential Regulators and CFTC Adopt Margin Rules for Non-Cleared
Swaps, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP (Jan. 20, 2016), https://www.sidley.com/
en/insights/newsupdates/2016/01/prudential-regulators-and-cftc-adoptmargin-rules (noting that substantive differences between the Prudential
Regulators Final Rule and CFTC Final Rule are not particularly
significant).
324 Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and
Major Swap Participants, 81 Fed. Reg. 91,253, (Dec. 16, 2016) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1, 23, 140) (“SDs and MSPs that are not banking
entities, including nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding companies
regulated by the Federal Reserve Board, are subject to the Commission’s
capital requirements.”); see also Prudential Regulators and CFTC Adopt
Margin Rules for Non-Cleared Swaps, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP (Jan. 20,
2016), https://www.sidley.com/en/insights/newsupdates/2016/01/prudent
ial-regulators-and-cftc-adopt-margin-rules (“[A] nonbank subsidiary of a
bank holding company — such as a non-bank swap dealer registered with
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Dodd-Frank often imposes the clearing and exchange
trading swaps requirements on standardized swap
transactions.325 Under clearing, a clearing facility stands
between the buyer and seller of a contract to guarantee each
against default by a counterparty.326 To avoid their own
liability, clearing facilities must therefore establish and
strictly enforce the capital adequacy of swaps counterparties,
and collect margins from swaps counterparties, i.e., deposits
on the amount at risk in a swaps trade.327 Under DoddFrank, the regulatory agencies decide whether specific types
of swaps must be cleared, and designated clearing
organizations (“DCOs”) must inform regulators about which
types of swaps they plan to clear.328 DCOs must allow “nondiscriminatory” access by counterparties to clearing.329
Swaps that are required to be cleared must also be traded on
a designated contract market or a swaps execution facility
(“SEF”).330
the CFTC — would be . . . subject to the CFTC Final Rule rather than to
the PR Final Rule.”).
325 See Ownership Limitations and Governance Requirements for
Security-Based Swap Clearing Agencies, Security-Based Swap Execution
Facilities, and National Security Exchanges with Respect to SecurityBased Swaps Under Regulation MC, 75 Fed. Reg. 65882 (Oct. 26, 2010)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242) (explaining some of the regulations
the Dodd-Frank Act imposes on swap transactions).
326 See generally Jorge A. Cruz et al., Clearing House, Margin
Requirements, and Systemic Risk, 19 REV. OF FUTURES MARKETS 39 (Aug.
31, 2010), https://www.theifm.org/sites/default/files/inline-files/Clearing
house%20-%20Margin%20Requirements%20-Risk-pub2011_0.pdf.
327 Id.
328 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, §§ 723(h)(2)(A), 763(a)(1) (2010).
329 Id. § 763(a)(2)(B).
330 Id. §§ 723(e), 763(a)(2)(B). Dodd-Frank contains a narrow “end-user”
exception designed to ease the burden on businesses using swaps to
mitigate risk associated with their commercial activities. The exception
applies to parties that are not financial entities that are using swaps to
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Dodd-Frank requires the reporting to federal
regulators of all swaps, whether or not they are exempt from
clearing and/or exchange trading.331 All swaps must be
reported to a registered swap data repository (SDR), the
CFTC, or the SEC (where appropriate), and this reporting
must occur as soon as technologically possible after swap
execution.332
VI. DODD-FRANK WAS CLEARLY INTENDED TO
APPLY TO SWAPS EXECUTED OUTSIDE THE U.S.
IF THEY POSE A “DIRECT AND SIGNIFICANT”
IMPACT ON U.S. COMMERCE OR IF THEY ARE
DESIGNED TO EVADE DODD-FRANK


A. Dodd-Frank’s Extraterritorial Language
As explained below,333 it was widely recognized by the time
of Dodd-Frank’s passage that swaps traded abroad by, inter
alia, U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers, or their
affiliates, contributed greatly to U.S. and worldwide
economic destabilization in 2008, which in turn, required the
massive multi-trillion-dollar U.S. taxpayer bank bailouts.
Just prior to Senate passage of Dodd-Frank on July 16,
2010, Senate Banking Committee Chairman, Chris Dodd,
and Senator Jeff Merkley (a staunch supporter of Doddhedge or mitigate commercial risk and have notified the CFTC and/or
SEC (where appropriate) how they meet financial obligations of noncleared swaps. An example of an eligible end user exemption would be
airlines buying fuel using uncleared swaps to hedge against price
increases. This end-user exemption does not include swaps in which both
parties are major swap participants, swap dealers, or other large
financial entities.
331 Id. §§ 727, 731, 764.
332 Id. §§ 727, 729, 763, 764.
333 See infra notes 334–39 and accompanying text.
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Frank and a member of the Senate Banking Committee) both
commented about the risks associated with the U.S. financial
institutions’ domination of the global swap market334 and
how a U.S. bank’s foreign subsidiaries could easily imperil
that subsidiary itself, other affiliated subsidiaries, and the
U.S. parent bank holding company as well.335
In those July 16, 2010 floor statements, it was made
clear that Dodd-Frank would contain the tools to ensure that
U.S. financial regulatory agencies would have the authority
to identify swaps trading problems that emerge both
domestically and around the world.336 Indeed, it was then
widely recognized that a London-based foreign subsidiary of
AIG—AIG Financial Products—sold huge numbers of CDSs
and naked CDSs guaranteeing the viability of trillions of
dollars of U.S. residential mortgages. The threatened AIG
default on those swaps caused AIG to face economic ruin in
the absence of an immediate $85 billion U.S. taxpayer bailout
(and ultimately an approximately $180 billion bailout).337
That bailout was to benefit, inter alia, many big U.S. bank
156 CONG. REC. S5828-53 (daily ed. July 14, 2010) (statement of
Senator Dodd), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2010-07-14/html/
CREC-2010-07-14-pt1-PgS5828.htm (explaining that Dodd-Frank
contains “the tools to see to it that our regulatory agencies and others will
have the capacity and the ability to identify and to spot early on problems
that emerge both in the [U.S.] and around the world.”).
335 156 CONG. REC. S5870-902 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of
Senator Merkley), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2010-07-15/html/
CREC-2010-07-15-pt1-PgS5870-2.htm.
336 156 CONG. REC. S5828-53 (daily ed. July 14, 2010) (statement of
Senator Dodd), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2010-07-14/html/
CREC-2010-07-14-pt1-PgS5828.htm.
337 Edmund L. Andres & Peter Baker, A.I.G. Planning Huge Bonuses After
$170 Billion Bailout, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2009), https://
mobile.nytimes.com/2009/03/15/business/15AIG.html.
334
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holding company swaps dealers in their capacity as AIG
counterparties on these CDS-based swaps.338
The clear concern by legislators was that reckless and
poorly regulated swaps activity of foreign affiliates of U.S.
financial institutions had already led (and could lead again)
to cascading swaps defaults that quickly washed back to
systemically risky U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers
and would therefore require bailouts by U.S. taxpayers of
those parent U.S. institutions.
Therefore Dodd-Frank expressly applied its swaps
rules to swaps transactions executed outside of the U.S. in
two important cases: (1) when those activities, “have a direct
and significant connection with activities in, or effect on,
commerce of the United States”; or (2) when activities,
“contravene such rules or regulations as the Commission
may prescribe or promulgate as are necessary or appropriate
to prevent the evasion of any provision [of Dodd-Frank].”339
With respect to the former, the CFTC has interpreted
the language of the extraterritorial provision to mean that
swaps rules apply, “to activities outside the United States
that have either: (1) [a] direct and significant effect on U.S.
commerce; or, in the alternative[; or] (2) a direct and
significant connection with activities in U.S. commerce, and
through such connection present the type of risks to the U.S.
financial system and markets that [the swaps provisions]
directed the Commission to address.”340
Shahien Nasiripour, Goldman Sachs got Billions from AIG for Its Own
Account, Crisis Panel Finds, HUFFPOST (Jan. 26, 2011, 9:32 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/26/goldman-sachs-aig-backdoorbailout_n_814589.html.
339 7 U.S.C. § 2(i) (2012).
340 Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance
with Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,292, 45,300 (July 26,
2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1).
338
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Just days before Dodd-Frank’s Senate passage, the
United States Supreme Court ruled in Morrison v. National
Australia Bank LTD341 that a U.S. SEC financial regulatory
statute would apply extraterritorially, only if that statute
contained explicit language to that effect. The Court noted
that, “it is a longstanding principle of American law ‘that
legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is
meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States,’”342 reaching the conclusion that, “[u]nless
there is ‘the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly
expressed,’ we must presume it ‘is primarily concerned with
domestic conditions.’”343
Congress, therefore, specifically and directly
responded to Morrison, when three days later, on June 24,
2010, it added the extraterritorial language quoted above to
Dodd-Frank in Section 722 (i).344 The intent of Congress was
561 U.S. 247 (2010).
Id. at 255 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248
(1991)) (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
343 Id. at 255 (citing EEOC, 499 U.S. at 248).
344 156 CONG. REC. H5205, H5237 (daily ed. June 30, 2010) (statement of
Rep. Bachus) (“In the case of Morrison v. National Australia Bank, the
Supreme Court last week held that section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
applies only to transactions in securities listed on United States
exchanges and transactions in other securities that occur in the United
States. In this case, the Court also said that it was applying a
presumption against extraterritoriality. This bill’s provisions concerning
extraterritoriality, however, are intended to rebut that presumption by
clearly indicating that Congress intends extraterritorial application in
cases brought by the SEC or the Justice Department.”). It should be noted
that these statements address claims brought by the SEC and DOJ,
because they are responsive to the facts of Morrison (a case of an
Australian bank, being sued for securities fraud, by Australians, for
activities in Australia, on Australian exchanges), however the actual
amendment language makes it clear that the amendment language
extends jurisdiction to all swaps regulators. Congress’s intent has been
accepted as a reversal of Morrison in notable cases already. See,
341
342
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clear: it wanted to ensure that, inter alia, the CFTC had the
power to regulate extraterritorial activities with “direct and
significant” effects on U.S. commerce and activities
transacted outside the U.S. with the intent to “evad[e] DoddFrank.”345
B. The CFTC’s July 2013 Extraterritorial
Guidance: Swaps Executed by Guaranteed
U.S. Bank Holding Company Foreign
Subsidiaries Are Covered by Dodd-Franks
Swaps Regulation
In the roughly three years after the passage of Dodd-Frank,
the CFTC mostly completed what has been recognized as the
arduous, unprecedented, “Herculean feat”346 of finalizing
over sixty substantive rules, exemptive orders, and guidance
actions.347 When the CFTC met on July 12, 2013 to
e.g., S.E.C. v. Tourre, No. 10 Civ. 3229 (KBF), 2013 WL 2407172, at *1
n.4 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2013) (“Because the Dodd–Frank Act effectively
reversed Morrison”); In re Optimal U.S. Litig., 865 F. Supp. 2d 451, 456
n.28 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); S.E.C. v. Compania Int’l Financiera S.A., No. 11
Civ. 4904(DLC), 2011 WL 3251813, at *6 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2011).
345 Richard Painter et al., When Courts and Congress Don’t Say What They
Mean: Initial Reactions to Morrison v. National Australia Bank and to the
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 20 MINN.
J. INT’L L. 1, 2–3, 7 (2011).
346 Annette L. Nazareth & Gabriel D. Rosenberg, Eight US Regulatory
Predictions for 2017, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.ft.com/
content/79955066-d81f-11e6-944b-e7eb37a6aa8e.
347 For a complete list of rules, exemptive orders and guidance actions see
Final Rules, Guidance, Exemptive Orders, and Other Actions, U.S. CFTC,
http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/Dodd-FrankFinal
Rules/index.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2019). As of January 2017, seventyfour total rules have been created to implement Dodd-Frank. Fourteen of
those rules were created and implemented after the July 2013 Guidance
was released. During the period that the CFTC was busy establishing the
framework of regulations pertaining to Dodd-Frank, many market
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implement the statute’s extraterritoriality provision, the
then-CFTC Chairman, Gary Gensler, made it clear that it
had been impossible to determine the extraterritorial reach
of the swaps rules until the substance of those rules were in
place. He said:
We're well over 90 percent through
the various rule and guidance
writing.
And the markets are
probably well towards half way
implementing these reforms . . . so
now . . . it is time for reforms to
properly apply to and cover those
activities that, as identified by
Congress in section 722 . . . of the
Dodd-Frank Act, have “a direct and
significant connection with activities
in, or effect on, commerce of the
United States.”348
participants, including U.S. and non-U.S. persons that would be subject
to eventual registration and other swaps rules under the July 2013
Guidance were exempted from compliance under a tapestry of CFTC noaction letters and exemptive orders. A list of expired no-action letters can
be found at Expired Staff No-Action Letters, U.S. CFTC, http://www.
cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/ExpiredNoAction/index.htm (last
visited Mar. 30, 2017). See Exemptive Order Regarding Compliance with
Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed Reg. 43,785 (July 22, 2013) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1). Despite the huge amount of work that went
into implementing Dodd-Frank, those sixty regulations, orders, and
guidance statements did not address their application extraterritorially.
See also Sec. Indus. and Fin. Mkts. Ass’n v. CFTC, 67 F. Supp. 3d 373,
384 (D.D.C. 2014).
348 Opening Statement of Chairman Gary Gensler at the Open Meeting
to Consider Cross-Border Guidance and Exemptive Order, U.S.
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION (July 12, 2013),
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/genslerstatement07
1213; see also Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding

Journal of Business & Technology Law



307

Too Big to Fail

It was at that meeting that the CFTC issued its “final
guidance” on the extraterritorial effect of its swap rules,
determining when the Dodd-Frank swaps rules would be
applied to swaps transactions executed outside the United
States (the “July 2013 guidance”).349
It is at this point that a common-sense analysis of the
extraterritorial application of Dodd-Frank must be
addressed. The worldwide swaps market is valued at
hundreds of trillions of dollars in notional value. Among the
biggest players in that market are four U.S. bank holding
company swaps dealers which: (1) comprise 90% of the U.S.
swaps market trading volume; (2) are headquartered and
have their principal place of business in the U.S.; (3) have
been deemed under Dodd-Frank by the U.S. Financial
Stability Oversight Council to be systemically important
(and thus likely to call upon U.S. taxpayer bailouts upon
their threatened failure); and (4) were aided by the U.S.
taxpayer in the 2008 meltdown to the tune of trillions of
dollars.350 Those banks are: Citibank, JPMorgan Chase,
Goldman Sachs, and Bank of America.
Moreover, as one expert analyst of the world’s
financial stability explained only two years ago:
Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,292 (July 26,
2013).
349 Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance
with Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,292 (July 26, 2013).
350 The Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”) lists these big four
institutions as the top of the 2016 list of globally systemically important
banks (“G-SIBs”). The FSOC adopts the list of G-SIBs from the Financial
Stability Board (“FSB”), and makes recommendations based on that
maintained list. See 2016 List of Global Systemically Important Banks
STABILITY
BOARD
(Nov.
21,
2016),
(G-SIBs),
FINANCIAL
http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/2016-list-of-global-systemicallyimportant-banks-G-SIBs.pdf.
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[as recently as] April 2016, the US
[financial] regulators issued a failing
grade to five big [U.S.] banks
(including Bank of America . . . and
JPMorgan Chase [the two largest
U.S. swaps dealers]) on their
emergency wind down plans in a
crisis-like situation.351 Put simply, if
another financial crisis [had] hit [the]
US [in April 2016 or soon thereafter],
these banks would [have] certainly
need[ed] a bailout from the US
government to prevent a major
financial crisis from happening
again.352
Although both Bank of America and JPMorgan Chase passed the
Federal Reserve’s annual stress test for the first time in 2017, the 2016
failures still demonstrate solvency volatility in this regard. See Liz
Hoffman & Ryan Tracy, Fed ‘Stress Tests’ Clear All Banks to Issue
Payouts to Shareholders, WALL ST. J. (June 28, 2017, 7:45 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/feds-stress-tests-all-banks-cleared-onpayouts-to-shareholders-1498681800.
352 WORLD ECONOMY, ECOLOGY & DEVELOPMENT (“WEED”), INT’L FIN. &
G20 VOICES FROM THE GLOBAL SOUTH 12 (Feb. 2017) (Markus Henn, Lisa
Metzinger, & Todd Dennie, eds.), https://www2.weed-online.org/uploads/
international_finance_g20_voices_from_the_global_south.pdf; See 2017
List of Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs), FINANCIAL
STABILITY BOARD (Nov. 21, 2017), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/
uploads/P211117-1.pdf; see also Office of the COMPTROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY, QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES
ACTIVITIES, 37 (Dec. 2017), https:// www.occ.treas.gov/topics/capitalmarkets/financial-markets/derivatives/ dq317.pdf; Ryan Tracy, Big U.S.
Banks Get Satisfactory Grades on ‘Living Wills’, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 19,
2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/big-u-s-banks-get-satisfactory-grade
s-on-living-wills-1513719024; see also John Heltman. Regulators Approve
Big Banks’ Living Wills —With a Warning, AM. BANKER (Dec. 19, 2017),
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/ regulators-approve-big-banksliving-wills-with-a-warning.
351
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When one looks at the substantial swaps trading of
these four banks and then examines Dodd-Frank’s clear
mandate that extraterritorial U.S. bank activities that “have
a direct and significant connection with activities in, or effect
on, commerce of the United States,” are subject to all DoddFrank swaps regulations wherever those trades are executed
world-wide, it is self-evident that that statute applies to all
of those four banks’ swaps transactions wherever and by
whomever executed. And, if that straightforward analysis
were, in fact, the way in which Dodd-Frank was applied
extraterritorially, the question of whether U.S. swaps law or
foreign swaps law (or lack of foreign law) applied to all other
swaps trades would be a matter of much smaller
consequence. Defaults on foreign swaps trades by all other
U.S. institutions would be relatively small, and they very
likely could be handled effectively either by traditional
bankruptcy law or by the “wind down” provisions required by
Dodd-Frank itself.353
However, rather than apply that simple and
straightforward approach of the Dodd-Frank extraterritorial
plain language test quickly and directly to these four huge
U.S. bank holding companies, the CFTC, beginning with its
July 2013 guidance, embarked upon a Rube Goldberg-like354
“one size fits all,” overly complex extraterritorial set of rules
without any specific reference to these four huge U.S. bank
holding companies that dominate U.S. swaps trading. The
needless complexity of the CFTC cross-border guidance has
David Skeele, Single Point of Entry and the Bankruptcy Alternative,
PENN LAW: LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY (Feb. 26, 2014),
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1949&cont
ext=faculty_scholarship.
354 A comic exemplar “of [someone] doing something simple in a very
complicated way that is not necessary.” Rube Goldberg, MERRIAMWEBSTER DICTIONARY (last visited Mar. 30, 2019), https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/Rube%20Goldberg.
353
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drawn harsh criticism from all sides of the regulatory
spectrum (e.g., from pro-regulatory market reformers to the
swaps industry itself) as having: “created a regulatory maze”;
“textual twists and turns [leading to] dead ends”; “overly fine
. . . distinctions”; and “mak[ing] practical applications [of the
July 2013 guidance] difficult”; “created significant
uncertainty”; “inconsistencies and ambiguities”; and
“analytic inconsistencies.”355 This uncertainty and confusion
was further enabled by the CFTC’s observation that its July
2013 extraterritorial guidance was “a statement of general
policy” intended to “allow for flexibility in application to
various situation, including consideration of all relevant facts
and circumstances.”356
As heroic was the CFTC’s valiant three-year effort to
meet tough statutory deadlines to implement, for example,
over 50 final substantive Dodd-Frank swaps rules mandated
William Shirley, Guarantees, Conduits, and Confusion Under the
CFTC’s Cross-Border Guidance, 34 J. L. INV. & RISK MGMT. PRODS. 1
(2014) (“In adopting its cross-border guidance for Dodd-Frank swap
regulation, the CFTC created a regulatory maze . . . . The CFTC’s
guidance on this subject not only created distinctions that arguably are
overly-fine, but introduced textual twists and turns and analytic
inconsistencies and dead ends that make practical application difficult.”);
JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 73, at 288; Max Stendahl, Murky
Guidance Undermines CFTC’s Derivatives Plans, LAW360, July 12, 2013,
https://www.law360.com/articles/456853/murky-guidance-underminescftc-s-derivatives-plans (“Wall Street attorneys warned of a backlash and
even potential litigation as clients struggle to untangle the guidance to
determine which deals fall under which jurisdictions.”); Micah Green et
al., Five Key Facts About the SEC’s and CFTC’s Cross-Border Regulatory
Approaches, 6 ALTERNATIVE INV. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 50 (Dec. 25, 2013)
(“The CFTC Final Guidance also fails to fully reflect years of global
regulatory coordination and risks becoming the outlier . . . .”).
356 Interpretive Guidance and Policy Regarding Compliance with Swap
Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 45292, 45297 (Jul. 26, 2013).
355
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by that statute,357 its effort to deal with extraterritoriality
has fostered virtual regulatory chaos. It is difficult (if not
impossible) to state with complete certainty or clarity the
manner in which the entirety of the CFTC’s Dodd-Frank
extraterritorial rules apply.
However, as discussed immediately below, there are
two sets of circumstances that make crystal clear that the
CFTC’s extraterritorial rulings have opened gaping loopholes
in Dodd-Frank swaps regulation by enabling, for example,
the four big systemically-risky U.S. bank holding companies
to shift, at their own discretion, U.S. swaps trading within
their corporate family abroad and, as the regulatory law now
stands, out from under Dodd-Frank.
VII. SWAPS ARE MOVED BY U.S. SWAPS
DEALERS FROM THE U.S. TO THEIR OWN
“DEGUARANTEED” SUBSIDIARIES ABROAD
The first circumstance showing that the July 2013 guidance
created a massive loophole from Dodd-Frank swaps
regulation is that there is every indication that swaps trading
has had a substantial movement from the U.S. to abroad. For
example, in a widely cited study, Reuters found that “by
December of 2014, certain U.S. important swaps markets had
seen 95 percent of their trading volume disappear in less
than two years.”358 The term “disappear” is not quite
DAVIS POLK, DODD-FRANK PROGRESS REPORT 4 (2016) (As of July 19,
2016, the CFTC has issued a total of 51 rules to implement Title VII
regulation of Dodd-Frank).
358 Id. (describing the time period between creation of the deguarantee
loophole, and the writing of the article); Banks and end-users told GAO
that moving the swaps can increase their risks and, in turn, costs. Such
risks and costs likely would have been greater under the original version
because of its broader scope, GAO said.; Andrew Ackerman, Fed
Considers Easing Capital Rule Seen as Hampering Swaps Market Critics
357
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Including Treasury and CFTC Urge Relaxing Regulation, Saying it has
Undermined Key Part of Dodd-Frank, WALL ST. J. (June 14, 2017),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-considers-easing-capital-rule-seen-ashampering-swaps-market-1497432602; The Treasury Report’s Recommendations for Derivatives Regulation, MORRISON FOERSTER at 4 (Oct. 26,
2017), https://media2.mofo.com/documents/171026-treasury-report-deriv
atives.pdf (“With respect to so-called ‘ANE’ transactions, trades between
non-U.S. entities but ‘arranged, negotiated or executed’ by personnel
located in the United States, Treasury recommends that the CFTC and
SEC reconsider any U.S. personnel test as a basis to apply transactionbased requirements and, in particular: . . . the CFTC and the SEC should
reconsider the implications of applying their Title VII rules to
transactions between non-U.S. firms or between a non-U.S. firm and a
foreign branch or affiliate of a U.S. firm merely on the basis that U.S.located personnel arrange, negotiate or execute the swap, especially for
entities in comparably regulated jurisdictions.”); Iñaki Aldasoro and
Torsten Ehlers, Risk Transfers in International Banking, BANK FOR INT’L
SETTLEMENTS (Dec. 3, 2017), https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt
1712b.htm; FIA & sifma, Promoting U.S. Access to Non-U.S. Swaps
Markets: A Roadmap to Reverse Fragmentation, 3–7 (Dec. 14, 2017),
https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Non-US-TradingPlatform-and-CCP-White-Paper-12-14-2017.pdf (“The increase in
multilateral trading and central clearing of swaps markets since
Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Act increases the need for U.S. firms
to have effective access to non-U.S. swaps trading venues and central
counterparties (‘CCPs’) . . . U.S. firms were forced off swaps trading
venues in numerous jurisdictions stretching across the European Union
(‘EU’) and Asia. U.S. banks were forced to subsidize their operations in
order to access certain local CCPs . . . . The implementation of the DoddFrank Act’s SEF registration requirement in October 2013 and its
mandatory trading requirement in February 2014 drove fragmentation of
the global swaps markets by forcing non-U.S. swaps trading venues to
deny participation by U.S. firms”); Andrew Ackerman, CFTC Aims to
Close Swaps Loophole for Large U.S. Banks, WALL ST. J. (June 9, 2015),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/cftc-aims-to-close-swaps-loophole-for-largeu-s-banks-1433856763; Dennis M. Kelleher, Must-Read Investigative
Report Highlights Wall Street’s Latest Lobbying to Avoid Key Financial
Reforms, HUFFPOST (Aug. 28, 2015), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/
mustread-investigative-re_b_8050920; Douwe Miedema, U.S. Regulator
Plans to Close Swaps Trading Loophole, REUTERS (June 9, 2015),
Journal of Business & Technology Law
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accurate, because it is not that U.S. bank holding company
swaps dealers, for example, no longer engage in these trades;
rather, those institutions have moved many of their trades359
“off shore” to their newly deguaranteed “foreign” affiliates
which are otherwise wholly consolidated on the U.S. bank
holding companies’ balance sheets, but deemed by those
parent U.S. banks to be outside of Dodd-Frank for the sale of
swaps to non-U.S. persons.360
https://www.reuters.com/article/banking-rules-derivatives/u-s-regulatorplans-to-close-swaps-trading-loophole-idUSL1N0YV1H520150609;
Kimberly Amadeo, Credit Default Swap: Pros, Cons, Crises, Examples,
THE BALANCE (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.thebalance.com/credit-default
-swaps-pros-cons-crises-examples-3305920; Christopher Kirkpatrick,
Comment on the Proposed Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for
Swaps Dealers and Major Swaps Participants, INST. FOR AGRICULTURE
TRADE AND POL’Y (Sept. 14, 2015), https://www.iatp.org/documents/
comment-on-the-proposed-margin-requirements-for-uncleared-swapsfor-swaps-dealers-and-majo; Silla Brush, CFTC Proposes Narrowing
Wall Street’s Foreign Swaps Loophole, BLOOMBERG (June 29, 2015),
https://www.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/cftc-proposes-narrowingwall-streets-foreign-swaps-loophole/.
359 COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, EXEMPTIVE ORDER
REGARDING COMPLIANCE WITH CERTAIN SWAP REGULATIONS, https://
www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/documents
/file/exemptiveorder_factsheet_final.pdf (noting that trades are executed
through de-guaranteed affiliates of the large parent U.S. bank swap
dealer)
360 Charles Levinson, U.S. Banks Moved Billions of Dollars in Trades
Beyond Washington’s Reach, REUTERS (Aug. 21, 2015), http://www.
reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-swaps/. Levinson provides
the example that:
The global inter-dealer market for interest rate swaps in
Euros is one of the largest derivatives markets in the
world. U.S. banks’ monthly share of the market had
plunged nearly 90 percent since January 2013, from over
$1 trillion to $125 billion, according to ISDA. The data
were misleading. U.S. banks were still trading as
vigorously as ever. But their trades, booked through
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Also, an examination of interest rate swaps trading
alone shows that beginning in 2014 the volume of trades
between European and U.S. swaps dealers declined 77%.361
CFTC Chairman (then Commissioner) Giancarlo attributes
London affiliates, without any credit guarantees linking
them back to the U.S., were now showing up in the data
as the work of European banks.
While some have questioned Levinson’s figures, as his study indicates,
there are many expert swaps market observers and participants, who by
their own calculations have seen a major swaps movement out of the U.S.
to foreign deguaranteed subsidiaries. Id. Whatever the exact percent of
that foreign movement (which is obscured by a lack of transparency) there
is a widespread consensus that it is substantial, i.e., large enough that
cascading defaults of those swaps trades could cause a systemic break in
the world economy. Precise analysis also becomes more complicated by
the fact, as footnote 563 of the CFTC guidance makes clear, the
deguaranteed subsidiary registered with the CFTC as a swaps dealer can
only evade Dodd-Frank under the loophole if its counterparty is not a
“U.S. person.” CFTC Issues Cross-Border Substituted Compliance
Determinations, Provides Limited Phase in for Some Swap Requirements,
DAVIS POLK (Jan. 7, 2014), https://www.davispolk.com/files/01.07.14.
CFTC_.Issues.CrossBorder.Substituted.pdf. If the counterparty is a “U.S.
person,” those trades are covered by Dodd-Frank. Again, informed
market observers suspect that just as U.S. banks shed their “U.S. person”
status when deguaranteeing their foreign subsidiaries, a similar
approach could be adopted by what would otherwise be a “U.S. person”
bank counterparty, becoming itself a deguaranteed foreign subsidiary
(and thus becoming a “non-U.S. person”). There is a doubtless near
universal sense that the deguarantee loophole is taking a substantial
portion of swaps out from under Dodd-Frank. Indeed, it is also likely, as
Levinson suggests, that some of these market observers tipped off the
CFTC staff about the ISDA loophole, because the CFTC was otherwise
never informed by swaps traders or anyone else of the “creation” of that
loophole in August 2013. See Levinson, supra. Levinson reports that the
CFTC did not learn of the loophole until many months into 2014. Id.
361 Audrey Costabile Blater, Revisiting Cross-Border Fragmentation of
Global OTC Derivatives: Midyear 2014 Update, ISDA RESEARCH NOTE
(Jul. 24, 2014) at 1–5, http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/research/
research-notes.
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this decline directly to: “[n]on-U.S. persons avoiding financial
firms bearing the scarlet letters of ‘U.S. person’ in certain
swaps products to steer clear of the CFTC’s problematic
regulations.”362 Chairman Giancarlo is right in thinking that
business is being channeled to “non-U.S.” persons to avoid
the
Dodd-Frank
swaps
regulations.
Where
his
characterization falters is that truly foreign bank competitors
are not winning the bulk of this swaps business; instead that
business is largely being shifted within the U.S. bank holding
company swaps dealers to their own newly “deguaranteed”
foreign affiliates that are nevertheless fully consolidated on
the parent U.S. banks’ balance sheets, but deemed by the
CFTC to be “non-U.S. persons.”
Even before the CFTC issued its final guidance on
extraterritorially in July 2013, Goldman Sachs successfully
anticipated the future on the foreign subsidiary
extraterritorial loophole in 2012 by demanding that its
clients wishing to use Goldman Sachs as its preferred swaps
counterparty give the bank standing permission to move
swaps trades to different Goldman Sachs foreign subsidiaries
around the world, whenever and wherever Goldman Sachs
saw fit.363 In this regard:
[I]t meant that a client might strike a
derivatives deal with Goldman in
New York in the morning, and that
afternoon, with no disclosure, a
Goldman office in London or
Singapore or Hong Kong could take
over the deal. With each shift, the
trade could fall under different
Keynote Address of CFTC Commissioner J. Christopher Giancarlo
before the ISDA’s Trade Execution Legal Forum, CFTC (Dec. 9, 2016),
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagiancarlo-18.
363 Levinson, supra note 360.
362
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[foreign] regulators - but not under
the CFTC’s purview and the DoddFrank rules.364

The purpose of this tactic was clearly designed to
evade, at the U.S. banks’ will the U.S. Dodd-Frank swaps
jurisdiction.365
As will be described in detail below, two further tactics
were unilaterally adopted by, inter alia, the big U.S. bank
holding swaps dealers and their representatives beginning in
August 2013 to “escape” Dodd-Frank swaps rule application
to their purported “foreign” trades. Suffice it to say for
present purposes, these swaps dealers, inter alia:
x

“Deguaranteed” their previously
“guaranteed” foreign subsidiaries
through a box-checking exercise in
the standardized industry swaps
contract documentation, thereby
claiming the ability to evade the
CFTC’s July 2013 guidance that only
foreign “guaranteed” subsidiaries
would fully be subject to DoddFrank.366

Id.
See id. (“An industry executive familiar with Goldman’s thinking said
the agreement was meant to help clients by giving them flexibility to
move trades outside U.S. jurisdiction if they wished. ‘It was an option for
those who wanted that flexibility,’ this person said.”).
366 See infra Part IX.B. It may be that the deguaranteed bank subsidiary
can only trade swaps outside of Dodd-Frank swaps regulation if its
counterparty is a “non-U.S. person.” See supra note 349. However, the
ease with which the U.S. swaps dealers have converted themselves from
“U.S. persons” to “non-U.S. persons” makes clear that it would be
similarly easy to convert by corporate engineering a “U.S. person” foreign
subsidiaries’ counterparty into a “non-U.S. person,” thereby clearly
364
365
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x

Followed a practice of having swaps
arranged, negotiated and executed
(“ANE”) in the United States by U.S.
personal and then “assigning” the
already executed swap to a recently
deguaranteed
foreign
affiliate,
claiming that Dodd-Frank does not
apply.367



VIII.
THE
CFTC
BELATEDLY
INEFFECTIVELY
TRIES
TO
END
DEGUARANTEE AND ANE LOOPHOLES

AND
THE

The second factor that clarifies any possible confusion over
the U.S. swaps dealers’ readings of the July 2013 guidance as
described immediately above is that the CFTC, in an October
18, 2016 proposed rule and accompanying interpretations,
expressly recognized and then proposed to close fully both the
“deguarantee” and “ANE” loopholes.368 In that October 2016
proposal, the CFTC made clear that if U.S. personnel in the
U.S. arranged, negotiated and executed a swap, Dodd-Frank
would apply even if the swaps were later “assigned” to a
recently deguaranteed foreign subsidiary.369 Additionally,
any foreign affiliates included within a U.S. bank holding
company swaps dealer’s consolidated balance sheet would be
required to comply with Dodd-Frank, thereby eliminating the
significance of the recent deguarantees.
However, the CFTC’s October 2016 proposed rule and
interpretations were not finalized before the inauguration of
President Donald Trump, and there is virtually a unanimous
exempting the transaction from Dodd-Frank swaps regulation in that
event as well.
367 See infra notes 459–60 and accompanying text.
368 See infra Part IX.G.
369 Id.
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consensus that a Trump-controlled CFTC (or a Republican
Congress) will never finalize those rulings.370 Accordingly,
U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers’ “foreign”
assignment of swaps to newly deguaranteed subsidiaries,
even if the swaps are arranged, negotiated and executed in
the U.S. by U.S. personnel, can at the U.S. bank swaps
dealer’s discretion evade Dodd-Frank. (Even if the
Republicans lost control of one or both Houses in the 2018
mid-term, legislation eliminating these loopholes would
almost certainly be vetoed). As a result, certain failing and
systemically risky swaps trades threatening another
meltdown will almost certainly lead to a call for U.S.
taxpayers to once again bail out these big U.S. banks to avoid
the calamity of a Second Great Depression.371
At this juncture, it may be fair to ask that if President
Trump, his CFTC, and the Republican-controlled Congress
are “speak[ing] of dismantling the Dodd-Frank Act,”372 why
should one worry about the administrative loopholes to that
statute’s application to “foreign” swaps if the statute itself
will disappear?373
Indeed, all supporters of the diverse regulatory
approaches to swaps regulation (from supporters of the DoddFrank swaps regime to the large U.S. bank holding company
swaps dealers) are forecasting that there will be little
statutory change to that part of Dodd-Frank that specifically
addresses the regulation of the swaps market; for example,
“[b]anking executives . . . now are moving too quickly head off
See infra Part IX.I.
Glenn Thrush, Trump Vows to Dismantle Dodd-Frank ‘Disaster’, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/us/politics/
trump-dodd-frank-regulations.html?_r=0.
372 Annette L. Nazareth & Gabriel D. Rosenberg, Eight US Regulatory
Predictions for 2017, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.ft.com/
content/79955066-d81f-11e6-944b-e7eb37a6aa8e.
373 Id.
370
371
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President . . . Trump and other [Dodd-Frank] critics who are
talking about dismantling [the] statute entirely according to
the Wall Street Journal. . . .‘We’re not for wholesale throwing
out Dodd-Frank, said JP Morgan Chase . . . CEO Jamie
Dimon.’”374
Big bank reticence about the need for statutory change
to Dodd-Frank’s swaps regulatory regime is almost certainly
the result of three factors. First, legislation proposed by the
Nation’s biggest banks seeking relief from Dodd Frank’s
critically important swaps regulation would surely be viewed
as highly unpopular. While the mainstream economy has still
not fully recovered from the Great Recession,375 Americans
well know that these big banks have all been bailed out to the
tune of trillions of dollars by the U.S. taxpayer, and those
banks have remained financially strong (if not stronger) since
Mark Kolakowski, Dodd-Frank How Bank CEOs Want It Changed,
INVESTOPEDIA (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.investopedia.com/news/dodd
frank-how-bank-ceos-want-it-changed-jpm-pnc/; see also Ben White &
Victoria Guida, Trump Expected to Pick Treasury Veteran as Top Bank
Cop, POLITICO (Apr. 16, 2017), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/
04/banking-regulations-trump-treasury-237271 (“The selection [of
former Treasury undersecretary, Randy Quarles, as the Federal
Reserve’s top regulator sends] a clear signal that the [Trump]
administration is looking to take a pragmatic approach to paring back
bank regulation, rather than choosing an ideologue who would seek to
eviscerate the rules enacted since the financial crisis.”); Gabriel T. Rubin,
Swaps Rules Due for Overhaul in Bid to Boost Liquidity, WALL ST. J.
(April 26, 2018, 12:01 a.m. ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/swapsrules-due-for-overhaul-in-bid-to-boost-liquidity-1524715260 (explaining
that “[CFTC Chairman Giancarlo] promised near term action only on
swap-execution rules,” i.e., how a swaps trade is made, as opposed to
revising the full panoply of rules reporting, transparency, collateral and
capital rules governing the regulation of swaps) (emphasis added).
375 See Podkul et al., supra note 94. (“[M]any people across the political
spectrum complain that the recovery is uneven and the . . . grains are not
fairly distributed.”).
374
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the Great Recession ended, if not before that.376 These banks
are now considered by key U.S. financial regulators to be
“systemically important,” i.e., if they collapse in future
economic disasters, there will likely be a corresponding call
upon U.S. taxpayers for further trillion-dollar bailouts. The
passage of a bill to undo Dodd-Frank’s swaps regulation for
these big banks, even in the Republican controlled House and
Senate, would almost certainly be politically unfeasible.
This lack of feasibility can be seen in the recent
Congressional effort to provide “modest”377 relief from DoddFrank’s capital requirements imposed by prudential banking
regulators to community and mid-size banks, the former with
assets no greater than $10 billion and the latter with assets
no greater than $250 billion.378
See Ben McLannahan, Wall Street Bonuses Rise 17% to Pre-Crisis
Levels, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/3b18dc523112-11e8-b5bf-23cb17fd1498 (noting that the amount of Wall Street
bonuses have risen 17%, nearly reaching the “the peak levels of $33bn$34bn recorded in 2006 and 2007 . . . .”); see also Ben McLannahan, Dimon
Pay Day Means a Year’s Wages for Typical JPMorgan Staff, FIN. TIMES
(Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/aac3a27a-2de4-11e8-9b4bbc4b9f08f381 (“JPMorgan Chase chief executive Jamie Dimon earned as
much in a day as the typical employee at his bank took home in the whole
of last year . . . .”); see also Podkul et al., supra note 94 (explaining that
“[a]verage bonuses and salaries on Wall Street have climbed back from
the post crisis lows…[b]ut 10 years [after the financial crisis] the trend of
large [financial] firms is still intact,” while “[t]he financial sector is again
becoming a bigger piece of the economy. That could translate to future
risks for borrowers and consumers in another crisis.”).
377 Andrew Ackerman, Senate to House: Don’t Risk Upending Deal on
Dodd-Frank Rollback, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 20, 2018, 5:16 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/senate-to-house-dont-risk-upending-dealon-dodd-frank-rollback-1521568094.
378 See Burgess Everett et al, Schumer Struggles to Contain Warren-Led
Rebellion, POLITICO (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/
2018/03/14/schumer-warren-democrats-dodd-frank-460563; Bob Bryan &
Joe Perticone, The Biggest Wall Street Bill in Years is Tearing Democrats
376
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On March 14, 2018, the Senate, by a vote of 67-31,
passed the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief and
Consumer Protection Act (S. 2155).379 The bill was originally
intended to provide capital requirement relief only for
community banks, i.e., those banks with less than $10 billion
in assets.380 Yet, in the process of crafting this legislation,
provisions were added that could benefit banks that are
larger than community banks. Section 401 of S. 2155 raises
the threshold for possibly avoiding certain enhanced
prudential regulations, i.e., liquidity standards, capital
requirements, risk management standards, and other forms
of supervision, to banks with up to $250 billion in assets,
which was raised for those banks from Dodd-Frank’s current
$50 billion threshold.381 However, under Section 401,
prudential banking regulators are not required to afford
relief to mid-size banks (as they are required to do for
community banks). They are only given the discretion to do
so.382 If prudential banking regulators exercise the discretion
Apart, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 14, 2018), http://www.businessinsider.com/
democrats-divide-elizabeth-warren-on-wall-street-bank-deregulation2018-3.
379 Alan Rappeport, Senate Passes Bill Loosening Banking Rules, but
Hurdles Remain in the House, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/03/14/business/senate-banking-rules.html.
380 Tracy Ryan, The Fine Print: What’s in the Financial-Regulation Bill,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-fine-printwhats-in-the-senate-financial-regulation-bill-1520354942.
381 S. 2155, 115th Cong. § 401 (2018).
382 Id. (striking the word “shall” from how regulators are to impose
requirements on large banks and replacing it with “may”); See Jeff Stein,
Senate Banking Bill Likely to Boost Chance of Bank Bailout, CBO Says,
WASH. POST (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/
wp/2018/03/05/senate-banking-bill-would-boost-the-chances-of-morebank-bailouts-cbo-report-says/?utm_term=.ec0cca24a2d6 (noting that
the change in Section 401 grants regulators far more discretion in how to
impose regulations on large banks).
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afforded),383 relief could only be provided only to BB&T Corp.
($221 billion in assets), SunTrust Banks Inc. ($205 billion in
assets), Charles Schwab Corp. ($243 billion in assets), and
American Express ($181 billion in assets),384 but
expressly not to the 13 largest U.S. financial institutions,
many of which have assets in amounts that are multiples of
these mid-size bank assets.385
While affording even discretionary relief to these midsize banks was itself very controversial,386 the purposeful
limitation of this deregulatory effort only to mid-size banks,
and the fact that Section 401 expressly did not provide relief
to the Nation’s very largest banks, was constantly
emphasized by even the very deregulatory-oriented
See, e.g., Jesse Hamilton, Wall Street Faces Higher Capital Demands
Under Fed Proposal, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 10, 2018, 5:01 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-10/fed-seeks-significa
nt-overhaul-of-post-crisis-bank-capital-rules (“Wall Street banks could
face higher capital hurdles under a Federal Reserve proposal that would
mark the most significant rewrite of requirements put in place after the
2002 financial crisis”); See also Rachel Witkowski, A Parting Warning
from FDIC’s Hoenig on Big-Bank Rules, AM. BANKER (Mar. 28, 2018,
12:16 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/a-parting-warningfrom-fdics-hoenig-on-big-bank-rules (“In his last policy speech as the
FDIC’s vice chairman, Thomas Hoenig said it would be ‘a serious policy
mistake’ to ease capital standards such as the ‘supplementary leverage
ratio’ for megabanks.”).
384 The Largest Banks in the United States, RELBANKS.COM, https://www.
relbanks.com/top-us-banks/assets (last visited Mar. 29, 2019).
385 See Jim Puzzanghera, Despite Stumbling Before the Financial Crisis,
Federal Reserve Would Get New Discretion in Senate Banking Bill, L.A.
TIMES (Mar. 13, 2018), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-fedbanking-deregulation-20180313-story.html.
386 See Stein, supra note 382; see also Ackerman, supra note 377 (“Centrist
Democrats have already weathered attacks from their more liberal
colleagues for supporting [S.2155] and are loath to vote on it a second
time.”).
383
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Republican drafters and chief proponents of S. 2155.387
Therefore, even the staunchest advocates for Dodd-Frank
regulatory relief in this regard did not extend S. 2155 relief
to the thirteen largest U.S. financial institutions; and
therefore not to the biggest swaps dealer banks: Citibank
(with $1.843 trillion in assets), JPMorgan ($2.534 trillion in
assets), Bank of America ($2.281 trillion in assets), and
Goldman Sachs ($916 billion in assets).388
Additionally, Section 402 of S. 2155 reduces the
supplementary leverage ratio established by the prudential
banking regulators, i.e., the amount of capital that a bank
must keep on hand as a buffer for financial collapse, for
“custodial banks.”389 Custodial banks are defined in the bill
as
“any
depository
institution
holding
company
predominantly engaged in custody, safekeeping, and asset
servicing companies, including any insured depository
institution subsidiary of such a holding company.”390
Currently, only three mid-size banks would be eligible for
relief under Section 402—Bank of New York Mellon, State
Street, and the Northern Trust Corporation.391
However, two of the four largest U.S. bank holding
company swaps dealers that are the subject of this paper
See Stein, supra note 382.
The Largest Banks in the United States, RELBANKS.COM, https://
www.relbanks.com/top-us-banks/assets (last visited Mar. 29, 2019).
389 S. 2155, 115th Cong. § 402 (2018).
390 Id. (emphasis added).
391 See Aaron Back, The Surprisingly Large Winners in a Bill to Help
Small Banks, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 14, 2018, 5:30 AM), https://www.
wsj.com/articles/the-surprisingly-large-winners-in-a-bill-to-help-smallbanks-1521019801. On December 21, 2018, the Federal Register
published a proposed rule by the Federal Reserve that would exercise
discretion afforded under, inter alia, S. 2155 for mid-sized banks
mentioned above, but did not afford relief to any of the four big U.S. bank
holding companies that are at the heart of the discussion herein. 83 Fed.
Reg. 66,024 (Dec. 21, 2018).
387
388
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were at first reported as desiring this type of regulatory
relief: Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase. However, clearly to
quell increasing public anger that the very biggest
systemically important banks might receive deregulatory
relief under S. 2155, both Federal Reserve regulatory chief
Randal Quarles and JPMorgan Chase CEO, Jamie Dimon,
said separately at different public fora after S. 2155’s passage
in the Senate that JPM “will not benefit” from the bill
because that bill “only really affects[s] smaller banks, so it
doesn’t really have anything to do with us [.]”392 Indeed, even
according to S. 2155’s Republican deregulatory supporters,
megabanks are not and will not be afforded relief under the
terms of S. 2155.393
That S. 2155, which was initially only intended to
bring relief to community banks (those under $10 billion in
assets), then benefitted some of America’s mid-size banks (up
to $250 billion in assets), has, in and of itself, been very
controversial. That Section 402 might ultimately have
benefitted Citigroup ($1.834 trillion in assets) and JP
Morgan Chase ($2.534 trillion in assets) was emphatically
opposed by S. 2155’s principal drafters, who have
continuously stressed that the act does not afford and was
not intended to afford, deregulatory relief to any of the
Nation’s thirteen largest banks, including Citibank and JP
Morgan Chase, the latter of which, through its CEO, has now
See David Dayen, JPMorgan CEO: Banking Bill “Doesn’t Really Have
Anything to do With Us”, INTERCEPT (Mar. 28, 2018, 1:43 PM),
https://theintercept.com/2018/03/28/jpmorgan-crapo-banking-bill/.
393 Id. A CBO estimate that Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase currently
have a 50 percent chance of being included under Section 402 of S. 2155,
has been rebutted by JPM’s CEO, the Federal Reserve regulatory chief,
and the Republican Senate sponsors of the bill. For the CBO estimate, see
CONG. BUDGET OFF., COST ESTIMATE S. 2155 ECONOMIC GROWTH,
REGULATORY RELIEF, AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (2018).
392
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denied any claim that the act’s deregulatory impact would
apply to it.394
While S. 2155 enjoyed enough bipartisan support in
the Senate to overcome a filibuster there, that bill, after
Senate passage, required the passage of complementary
legislation in the House to become a law. But, in the House,
leading Republicans were not happy with S. 2155 as passed
by the Senate. For example, Jeb Hensarling, Chairman of the
House Financial Services Committee originally did not
support S. 2155 as passed by the Senate, because it did not
afford enough deregulation.395 He therefore sought negotiations with those seventeen Senate Democrats (including one
independent who votes with Democrats) who voted for S.
2155 to see if an agreement could be reached on Hensarling’s
further regulatory relief proposals.396 However, those Senate
Democrats, already facing a severe backlash for supporting a
bill that many have criticized as already providing too much
regulatory relief, were unwilling to negotiate further.397
Erica Werner & Renae Merle, Senate Passes Rollback of Banking Rules
Enacted After Financial Crisis, WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/senate-passesrollback-of-post-financial-crisis-banking-rules/2018/03/14/43837aae27bd-11e8-b79d-f3d931db7f68_story.html?utm_term=.a496822e9f5f; see
also Ackerman, supra note 377 (“The relatively modest Senate bill,
[Republican Senator Tillis] added, reflects the political reality of what can
be accomplished in the Senate, where Republicans hold 51 seats and
generally need support from nine Democrats to pass legislation.”).
395 See Zachary Warmbrodt, Hensarling’s Last Stand; Blocking Banking
Bill, POLITICO (Mar. 15, 2018, 7:30 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/
2018/03/15/jeb-hensarling-bank-deregulation-bill-418536.
396 See id.
397 See Victoria Finkle & Rob Blackwell, Is This Jeb Hensarling’s Last
Stand? AM. BANKER (Mar. 19, 2018, 5:13 PM), https://www.amer
icanbanker.com/news/is-this-jeb-hensarlings-last-stand (noting that
Democrats “insist there’s no more room for negotiation” on the bill).
394
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Indeed, after Senate passage of S. 2155, the big U.S.
bank holding companies themselves faced increasing
criticism from their own shareholders for trying to weaken
Dodd-Frank.398 And, leading Senate Republicans therefore
advised House Republicans, including Hensarling, that
“there is little political appetite in the Senate to vote on a
revised version of [S.2155],” and, as a result, Hensarling
“accept[ed] [the] deregulatory package that passed the
Senate . . . without changes,” hereby allowing the Senate bill
pass the House and thus be enacted into law on May 24,
2018.399
See Ben McLannahan, Citigroup and Goldman Face Shareholder
Pressure on Lobbying, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.ft.com/
content/33285f2e-3471-11e8-ae84-494103e73f7f.
399 As the Washington Post Editorial Board observed: “The big story about
[S. 2155], in fact, is not how much damage the Wall Street lobby has
managed to do to Dodd-Frank, but, how little.” Editorial Board, The Story
Isn’t How Much Dodd-Frank Has Been Changed. It’s How Little, WASH.
POST (May 26, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/thestory-isnt-how-much-dodd-frank-has-been-changed-its-how-little/2018/
05/26/19018406-5eb8-11e8-a4a4-c070ef53f315_story.html?utm_term=.84
e51bba28c8a4a4c070ef53f315_story.html?utm_term=.97a16679d014;
See, e.g., Trump, at Bill Signing Scaling Back Dodd-Frank, Says U.S.
Prepared for Anything on N.K., CBS NEWS (May 24, 2018, 12:53 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-signs-bill-dodd-frank-bankingregulation-roll-back-dodd-frank-act-today-live-stream-updates/ (signing
ceremony of S. 2155); See also Tory Newmyer, The Finance 202:
Hensarling Compromise Clears a Path for Bank Deregulation, WASH.
POST (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/power
post/paloma/the-finance-202/2018/04/27/the-finance-202-hensarlingcompromise-clears-a-path-for-bank-deregulation/5ae24cad30fb0437119
268d2/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.739560140b25; Ackerman, supra note
377; Sylvan Lane, Frustration Mounts as Dodd-Frank Rollback Stalls,
THE HILL (Mar. 25, 2018, 8:00 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/
380027-frustration-mounts-as-dodd-frank-rollback-stalls (“The financial
industry is trying to break the jam. They now fear the bill could die with
little time for Congress to act before attention shifts to the midterm
elections.”).
398
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In short, any proposed legislation for the principal
benefit of four huge systemically problematic U.S. bank
holding company swap dealers that would go much further
than S. 2155 to not only afford capital reserves relief, but also
diminish the entirety of the thirteen types of swaps regulation
now required by Dodd-Frank is far from likely to pass even
in a Republican controlled Senate. These huge banks know
this, and it almost certainly explains their reticence in
affirmatively seeking to undermine directly Dodd-Frank’s
statutory provisions.400
The recent proposal by the U.S. Federal Reserve to change
administratively the Volcker Rule regulations – as opposed to seeking a
statutory change to that Rule – is not to the contrary. See, e.g., Benjamin
Bain & Robert Schmidt, Wall Street Gets Win as Fed Set to Ease Volcker
Trade Limits, BLOOMBERG (May 30, 2018, 4:17 PM), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-30/fed-releases-proposal-foreasing-volcker-rule-trading-limits. The statutory requirement for that
Rule is found in section 619 of Dodd-Frank. 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012).
Generally speaking, “[t]he Volcker rule . . . restricts U.S. banks from
making certain kinds of speculative transactions on their own account
and from investing in hedge funds.” Michelle Price, House Passes Bill to
Streamline ‘Volcker Rule’, REUTERS (Apr. 13, 2018, 4:07 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-congress-volcker/house-passesbill-to-streamline-volcker-rule-idUSKBN1HK2QY. It was enacted to
prevent the kinds of huge bank losses in 2008 arising directly from banks’
proprietary and reckless speculative trades for their own accounts,
thereby threatening the federally insured deposits within those banks.
Id. The Fed’s recent proposal does not try to alter Dodd-Frank’s § 619.
While the Fed’s recent proposal has been criticized by market reformers
as being too friendly to big U.S. banks, Mr. “Volcker himself weighed in,
saying he welcomed efforts to simplify compliance with the rule he’s
credited with championing.” Bain & Schmidt, supra. In this regard, Mr.
Volcker has repeatedly emphasized that his original 2010 proposal was
quite simple and was originally proposed in a 2010 three-page letter to
President Obama. James B. Stewart, Volcker Rule, Once Simple, Now
Boggles, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/
10/22/business/volcker-rule-grows-from-simple-to-complex.html. He has
elsewhere said: “I’d write a much simpler [rule.] I’d love to see a four-page
400
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Second, powerful influences within the Trump
Administration and prominent Congressional Republicans
and Democrats have touted the reinstatement of a so-called
“modern day” Glass-Steagall as a major policy initiative,
including President Trump himself; former National
Economic Council Director (and former Goldman Sachs
COO), Gary Cohn; Secretary of the Treasury, Steve Mnuchin;
outgoing Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Vice
Chairman, Thomas Hoenig; and Steve Bannon, President
Trump’s former chief strategist.401 Glass-Steagall, which was
[rule] that bans proprietary trading and makes the board and the chief
executive responsible for compliance.” Id. However, the final Volcker
Rule, as written separately by 5 different banking and market regulators,
was about 1000 pages in length. Michelle Price, Fed Unveils Rewrite of
‘Volcker Rule’ Limits on Bank Trading, REUTERS (May 31, 2018, 12:07
AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fed-volcker/fed-unveils-rew
rite-of-volcker-rule-limits-on-bank-trading-idUSKCN1IV09Y?feedType=
RSS&feedName=topNews. As one Member of Congress noted: “I support
the concept of the Volcker Rule, but these rules [as drafted by the 5
different regulatory agencies are not] going to be effective. We have taken
something simple and made it complex. The fact that it’s [1000] pages
shows the banks pushing back and having it both ways.” Stewart, supra
(comments of Rep. Welch (D-VT)). Finally, while it is true that legislation
to amend the Volcker Rule passed the House of Representatives in April
2018, it was that very legislation that a bi-partisan group of Senators
refused to consider as part of the legislative effort to enact S.2155. See
Price, supra; See also notes 383–87 and accompanying text.
401 Sylvan Lane, Cohn Backs Modern Version of Glass–Steagall: Report,
THE HILL (Apr. 6, 2017, 2:42 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/
overnights/327698-overnight-finance-cohn-backs-modern-glass-steagallpelosi-no-deal; Elizabeth Dexheimer, Cohn Backs Wall Street Split of
Lending, Investment Banks, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 5, 2017, 11:09 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-04-06/cohn-said-to-backwall-street-split-of-lending-investment-banks; Bess Levin, Gary Cohn,
Trump’s Top Goldman Hire, Wants to Bring Back Glass-Steagall, VANITY
FAIR (Apr. 6, 2017), http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/04/gary-cohnglass-stegall; Michael Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Trump and
Warren Agree? Maybe, on Plan to Shrink Big Banks, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6,
Journal of Business & Technology Law
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fully repealed in 1999,402 was a New Deal response to the
Great Depression that ring-fenced commercial banking with
insured customer deposits from investment banks dealing in
speculative investments.403 Under a new Glass-Steagall-like
scenario, U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers almost
certainly would not be fully able to engage in swaps trading
as they do today. Much of that trading, even under the most
lenient pending Glass-Steagall proposals, would mostly be
removed from a commercial bank with federally insured
deposits, and the bulk of that trading would be left, inter alia,
to investment banks and hedge funds ring-fenced from
commercial banking. 404 The size of the latter banks would
not be systemically important and their failure would likely
be handled by, inter alia, the wind-down provisions within
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/business/dealbook/donald-tr
ump-elizabeth-warren-big-banks.html?_r=0; Patrick Jenkins, The
Tangled Web of Gary Cohn, Goldman Sachs and Glass-Steagall, FIN.
TIMES (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/1cdae6d8-1b90-11e7bcac-6d03d067f81f.
402 See Jenkins, supra note 401 (The result of the complete repeal of GlassSteagall in 1999 sanctioned the rise “of so-called universal banking,
which allows mainstream deposit-taking activities and riskier
investment banking to take place under one roof.”).
403 Jordan Weissmann, Trump’s Top Adviser, the Former President of
Goldman Sachs, Supports Bringing Back Glass–Steagall, SLATE (Apr. 6,
2017, 10:57 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2017/04/06/don
ald_trump_s_top_economic_advisor_supports_bringing_back_glass_stea
gall.html.
404 See Jenkins, supra note 401. Of course, it has been pointed out that
because Goldman Sachs is not a “universal banker,” the reinstatement of
Glass-Steagall “would be a relative non-event for Goldman Sachs itself.
In competitive terms, it would be a huge boost.” Id. As Dennis Kelleher of
Better Markets, a pro-regulation group put it: “Most troubling about Mr.
Cohn’s possible embrace of Glass-Steagall are the potential benefits that
would be uniquely enjoyed by his former firm, Goldman Sachs.” “Goldman
Sachs, he says, “would be kings of the financial work where [universal
bank holding companies] couldn’t compete.” Id. (brackets in original).
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Dodd-Frank or by traditional bankruptcy proceedings.405 The
failure of these ring-fenced banks self-evidently would also
not threaten customer deposits, because they would have so
little or even none.
To be sure, there are varying perspectives on what
such a “modern day” Glass-Steagall measure would look like.
On April 6, 2017, Senator Elizabeth Warren, Democrat of
Massachusetts, and then-Senator John McCain, Republican
of Arizona, introduced the “21st Century Glass-Steagall Act
of 2017,” which would, among other things, separate
commercial and investment banks.406 In May 2017, Treasury
Secretary Mnuchin, in testimony to a Senate committee
regarding the Warren and McCain bill, said he and the
President are in favor of a “21st Century Glass-Steagall” (not
referring to any Congressional bills) that contains “aspects of
[the original Glass-Steagall] that may make sense,” but they
See also Barney Jopson, US ‘Too Big to Fail’ Regime Set for Trump
Overhaul, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/
d08bc3ca-1705-11e8-9e9c-25c814761640 (describing Treasury Secretary
Mnuchin’s recent proposal to create, inter alia, a new category of Chapter
14 bankruptcy designed to make it easier to wind down collapsing
megabanks outside of more traditional bankruptcy provisions as a
recognition that existing Dodd-Frank wind down provisions will not work
and will lead to calls for U.S. taxpayer bailouts of megabanks).
406 See S. 881, 115th Cong. (2017). There is also a bipartisan “21st Century
Glass-Steagall Act of 2017” effort in the House, led notably by Rep.
Capuano (D-MA) and Rep. Jones (R-NC), H.R. 2585, 115th Cong. (2017),
as well as a related “Return to Prudent Banking Act of 2017” sponsored
by fifty-eight representatives, including Reps. Kaptur (D-OH), Jones (RNC), and Coffman (R-CO). H.R. 790, 115th Cong. (2017). Additionally,
Sen. Kennedy (R-LA) has also stated the need for policymakers to discuss
the return of Glass-Steagall. Ian McKendry, GOP Lawmaker Wants to
Hear More About Glass-Steagall Return, AM. BANKER (Jun. 7, 2017),
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/gop-lawmaker-wants-to-hearmore-about-glass-steagall-return.
405
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would not support a complete separation of commercial and
investment banks.407
One prominent “third way compromise” gaining
currency (and which sounds as if it may fall within Secretary
Mnuchin’s stated preference), is a law modelled on [the
U.K.’s] “ring-fencing rules [that] will erect a barrier between
retail and investment banking activities[.]”408 One leading
suggestion of this kind from Thomas Hoenig, former Vice
Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
“would be a 20 percent limit on the funding that an
investment bank could source from the holding company.”409
However, Wall Street certainly would not cheer even a
modest “third-way” compromise of this sort; nor would the
risk of any kind of Glass-Steagall legislative rider be borne
by these big swaps dealers to try to obtain complete DoddFrank swaps regulation relief.
Thus, for this reason as well, there is understandably
considerable hesitancy on the part of the four huge,
“systemically” risky U.S. bank holding company swaps
dealers in advancing proposals to substantially unravel
Dodd-Frank swaps regulations. Debate over that kind of
legislation would almost certainly invite vigorous debate
both in and out of Congress about the extent to which these
large commercial banks should otherwise be separated from
their investment arms, i.e., reinstatement of a “modern day”
Glass-Steagall to prevent future U.S. taxpayer bailouts.
Treasury Secretary Clarifies Position on Glass-Steagall, C–SPAN (May
18, 2017), https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4670278/treasury-secret aryclarifies-postion-glass-steagall.
408 See Patrick Jenkins & Barney Jopson, Support Builds for WateredDown Version of Glass-Steagall Law, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/4ca1c210-227f-11e7-8691-d5f7e0cd0a16.
409 Id.
407
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Third, and probably most important, the big banks are
reticent about seeking legislative relief from Dodd-Frank
swaps regulation is because of the ease with which the four
big U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers can now evade
at their will Dodd-Frank swaps regulation through the
deguarantee and ANE loopholes.410 The de facto (and largely
unrecognized) discretionary repeal of U.S. swaps regulation
by these bank-created extraterritorial loopholes has the
complete effect of a substantial de jure statutory repeal
without the accompanying dangers of, for example, a GlassSteagall-like debate.
IX. THE ISDA “DEGUARANTEE” LOOPHOLE
As will be shown in detail below, a single footnote (footnote
563) within the 662 footnotes included in the CFTC’s July
2013 guidance was unilaterally seized upon in August 2013
by ISDA and its swaps dealer members to carve a pathway
to evade Dodd-Frank swaps regulation at their will. To
understand how substantial this loophole is, one must first
untangle the basic elements of the July 2013 Guidance,
starting with the creation of an important distinction
between swaps activities involving a “U.S. person”411 and
those involving only non-U.S. persons.
See infra Part IX.
See Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,291, 45,301–
45,302 (July. 26, 2013) (“. . . [t]he Commission's interpretation of the term
‘‘U.S. person’’ would generally encompass: (1) persons (or classes of
persons) located within the United States; and (2) persons that may be
domiciled or operate outside the United States but whose swap activities
nonetheless have a ‘‘direct and significant connection with activities in,
or effect on, commerce of the United States’’ within the meaning of CEA
section 2(i)”).

410
411
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The 83-page, triple-columned, single-spaced July 2013
Guidance makes “U.S. persons” in swaps trades subject to all
of Dodd-Frank’s swaps rules, regardless of the physical
location of the swap execution.412 The term “U.S. persons”
includes the usual defining traits of such a term: the presence
of natural U.S citizenship; corporate and other entities
organized or with principal places of business in the U.S.;
foreign entities owned by U.S. persons; and branch offices of
See Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding
Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,292, 45,317
(July 26, 2013). Further, a securities industry group, unhappy with the
July 2013 Guidance sued the CTFC to prevent the new rules from
applying extraterritorially in the absence of a properly promulgated
regulation addressing the rules' extraterritorial applications. The judge
was unconvinced, holding that:
The majority of plaintiffs' claims fail because Congress
has clearly indicated that the swaps provisions within
Title VII of the Dodd–Frank Act—including any rules or
regulations
prescribed
by
the
CFTC—apply
extraterritorially whenever the jurisdictional nexus in 7
U.S.C. § 2(i) is satisfied. In this regard, plaintiffs'
challenges to the extraterritorial application of the Title
VII Rules merely seek to delay the inevitable. The Court
will not question the CFTC's decision to proceed in
interpreting and applying Section 2(i) on a case-by-case
basis through adjudication; nor will it set aside the
CFTC's decision to promulgate the Cross–Border Action
to announce its non-binding policies regarding the Title
VII Rules' extraterritorial applications. Instead, the
Court will only remand to the CFTC those Title VII Rules
that are supported by inadequate cost-benefit analyses.
Sec. Indus. & Fin. Markets Ass’n v. U.S. C.F.T.C., 67 F. Supp. 3d 373, 436
(D.C. Cir. 2014). In August 2016, the CFTC published the cost-benefit
analysis for the proposed rules in the Federal Register, allowing the eight
rules to take effect. See Final Response to District Court Remand Order
in Sec. Indus. & Fin. Markets Ass’n v. U.S. C.F.T.C., 81 Fed. Reg. 54,478
(Aug. 16, 2016).
412
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U.S. persons.413 There can be no doubt that the four largest
U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers are themselves
U.S. persons.
The single most important concept within the
guidance relates to whether Dodd-Frank applies to swaps
executed outside the U.S. by a “foreign affiliate” of a U.S.
Person. Under the guidance, if a foreign affiliate is
“guaranteed” by a U.S. person parent, as had been the case
in standard ISDA swaps contract language for about two
decades, the foreign affiliate is subject to Dodd-Frank’s
swaps rules even if the trade is executed abroad.
A. The Deguarantee Footnote within the July
2013 Guidance
However, at first unbeknownst to the CFTC, that agency’s
decision to focus exclusively on a foreign affiliate guarantee
unexpectedly let ISDA open the door for, inter alia, the four
largest U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers to
“deguarantee “ their foreign “affiliates.”414 The July 2013
guidance was interpreted by ISDA to enable this loophole
with a single and otherwise seemingly immaterial footnote
(footnote 563 of the 662 footnotes within the guidance), which
provides that U.S. swaps dealers can avoid Dodd-Frank’s
swaps rules, “if a non-U.S. swap dealer . . . relies on a written
declaration from the [foreign] subsidiaries’ parent that,
Stephen Hall & Victoria Daka, Better Markets Comment Letter on
Cross-Border Application of Registration Thresholds and External
Business Conduct Standards Applicable to Swap Dealers and Major
Swap Participants, BETTER MARKETS (Dec. 19, 2016), https://
bettermarkets.com/rulemaking/better-markets-comment-letter-cftccross-border-application-registration-thresholds-and.
414 Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance
With Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,292, 45,324–25 (July 26,
2013).
413
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under the swap, the subsidiary is not guaranteed with
recourse by a U.S. person.”415 Footnote 563 is the only source
cited for the “deguarantee loophole.”416
B. ISDA Provides the “Deguarantee
Guide” to Evade Dodd-Frank

User’s

On August 19, 2013, footnote 563 of the July 2013 Guidance
was relied upon by ISDA to become a clear instruction to its
members on how to deguarantee presently guaranteed
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. bank holding company swap
dealers to avoid Dodd-Frank’s swaps rules.417 In fact, after
ISDA’s August 2013 instruction, according to one leading
expert, “the [four] biggest U.S. banks [had] changed
‘hundreds of thousands’ of such swaps contracts” to provide
for this deguarantee.418
The centerpiece of implementing this “loophole” can be
found by referencing the original copyrighted, boilerplate of
ISDA swaps contract documentation produced for its member
swaps dealers. That boilerplate is referred to in detail
above.419 Since 1992, when a ISDA swaps customer
Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance
With Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,292, 45,355 n.563 (July
26, 2013). See supra note 352, explaining that for the deguarantee
loophole to be perfected, the deguaranteed foreign bank subsidiary must
be trading with a non-U.S. person counterparty. It is explained therein
the ease with which a “U.S. person” counterparty can itself through its
own intra-corporate maneuvering, deguarantee (or create a
deguaranteed) foreign subsidiary to convert itself to a “non-U.S. person,”
thereby taking the swaps trade out of Dodd-Frank as the deguarantee
loophole law is now conceived by the CFTC.
416 See Levinson, supra note 360.
417 Id.
418 Id.
419 See supra notes 107–113 and accompanying text; Master Agreement,
INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS’N (1996) (Original publication and
415
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contemplated executing a swap with a subsidiary of a parent
U.S. bank holding company, it was commonplace for the
parent to guarantee that subsidiary within the ISDA
standardized and copyrighted “credit support annex.”420
A key change to the ISDA documentation came on
August 19, 2013, about a month after the CFTC July 2013
Guidance was finalized. At that time, unbeknownst to the
CFTC, ISDA published, and made available to its swaps
dealer membership, a standardized “Cross-border Swaps
Representation Letter” (the “ISDA Cross-Border Letter”).421
The ISDA Cross-Border Letter relies on ISDA’s
interpretation of footnote 563 as having sanctioned the
deguaranteeing of foreign subsidiaries by a simple prewritten standardized declaration.422 In the prior twenty-one
years that ISDA provided these copyrighted boilerplate
documents to its members, it had never before contemplated
form language deguaranteeing a U.S. swaps dealer’s foreign
subsidiary.
Lest there be any confusion regarding the intent of the
ISDA Cross-Border Letter, the preamble language on its first
page reads:

copyright 1992), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1332815/00011
9312509105708/dex1024.htm.
420 INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS’N, CREDIT SUPPORT ANNEX (1994).
See, e.g., INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS’N, 2011 BEST PRACTICES FOR
THE OTC DERIVATIVES COLLATERAL PROCESS 6 (2011); Christian Johnson,
Rehypothecation Risk, GLOBAL CAPITAL (Apr. 16, 2001); Christian
Johnson, Seven Deadly Sins of ISDA Negotiations, GLOBAL CAPITAL (Mar.
25, 2002); Denis M. Forster, Standard Swaps Agreements Don’t Insulate
Users from Risk, AM. BANKER (June 13, 1994), https://www.american
banker.com/news/standard-swaps-agreements-dont-insulate-users-fromrisk.
421 Cross-Border Swaps Representation Letter, INT’L SWAPS AND
DERIVATIVES ASS’N, (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www2.isda.org/attachment/
NTgyNA==/Cross_Border_Rep_Letter_Final.doc.
422 Id.
Journal of Business & Technology Law
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On July 26, 2013, the CFTC
published an “Interpretive Guidance
and Policy Statement Regarding
Compliance with Certain Swap
Regulations” providing guidance as
to when the CFTC will assert
jurisdiction over swap transactions
that have a non-U.S. element. This
representation letter allows market
participants to provide counterparties with status representations
needed to determine whether
compliance with various CFTC swap
regulations is required by the
Interpretive Guidance. The representations in this letter are solely for
the purposes of making such
determinations.423

ISDA then reduced the process of deguaranteeing
foreign subsidiaries to a box-checking exercise, i.e., where a
party would literally put a checkmark in a box next to the
question titled “II (B) Guarantee Representations”:
No U.S. Person Guarantees[:]
We hereby represent to you as of each
time we enter into a Swap
Transaction with you that, unless we
have notified you to the contrary in a
timely manner in writing prior to
entering into such Swap Transaction,
our obligations to you in connection
with the relevant Swap are not,
supported by any Guarantee (of
which we are aware) other than any
Guarantee provided by a person who
423

Id.
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we reasonably believe does not fall
within any of the U.S. Person
Categories and who we believe in
good faith would not otherwise be
deemed a “U.S. person” under the
Interpretive Guidance.424

The ease with which the four big U.S. bank holding
company swaps dealers could now reverse over two decades
of past practice of guaranteeing subsidiaries to a new
deguarantee contextualizes the flight of swaps trading from
U.S. markets. It has been reported, for example, that the
movement of the U.S. swaps market abroad is as high as 95%
within certain kinds of swaps trading volume.425 The
problem, however, is that, in escaping Dodd-Frank’s swaps
rules by trading through newly deguaranteed foreign
subsidiaries, the systemic risk to the U.S. economy slingshots
back to the U.S. bank holding company lender of last resort:
the U.S. taxpayer.
C. Deguaranteeing Does Not Eliminate Systemic
Risk: U.S. Parent Banks and the U.S.
Taxpayers Remain on the Hook
It is long-standing practice of corporate governance that
when a parent entity has created a subsidiary engaged in
high-risk activities, the parent entity offers assurances to
third party partners/customers in the form of a downstream
guarantee of the subsidiary.426 The deguarantee loophole
Id.
Levinson, supra note 360.
426 See Cassandra Jones Havard, Back to the Parent: Holding Company
Liability for Subsidiary Banks—A Discussion of the Net Worth
Maintenance Agreement, the Source of Strength Doctrine, and the Prompt
Corrective Action Provision, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 2353, 2355–56 (1995).
424
425
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changes decades of common practice. For example, in 1992,
the then-budding swaps market relied heavily on the
assurances of guarantees as evidenced by the standardized
Credit Support Annex to the ISDA Master Agreement.427
Now, in what is a several hundred trillion-dollar
notional value swaps market, guarantees of swaps trading
subsidiaries are suddenly no longer deemed a business
necessity. This is certainly so because 90% of the U.S. swaps
market is handled by the four huge U.S. bank holding
company swap dealers who, as the aftermath of the Great
Recession shows, are generally understood to be backed by
the U.S. government through U.S. taxpayer-funded
bailouts.428 Swaps counterparties to these huge U.S. bank
holding company swaps dealers and their foreign affiliates
know that these institutions are “too-big-to-fail,” and thus an
explicit guarantee from the parent is really no longer needed.
As mentioned earlier, there is such certainty that these big
banks will be rescued in a financial crisis that that
understanding is embedded in the stock price of these
banks.429
The ISDA deguarantee language is nothing more than
a legal fiction. It does not in fact shield any parent U.S. bank
holding company swaps dealer from the practical, real-world
risk of a foreign subsidiary default. Were a U.S. bank to allow
the failure of their de-guaranteed foreign subsidiary, the
creditworthiness of its many other deguaranteed or
guaranteed affiliates and subsidiaries,430 and even the
See CREDIT SUPPORT ANNEX, supra note 420.
See Collins, supra note 32 and accompanying text.
429 Id.
430 Former CFTC Chairman Gensler has pointed out that, “[t]he nature
of modern finance is that financial institutions commonly set up
hundreds, if not thousands, of ‘legal entities’ around the globe with a
multitude of affiliate relationships.” Gary Gensler, Keynote Address on
the Cross-border Application of Swaps Market Reform at Sandler O'Neill
427
428
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parent U.S. bank itself, would immediately suffer severe
reputational damage, and that damage would manifest itself
with that bank quickly being deemed a credit risk.431 Thus,
even without a guarantee, it is widely understood in financial
circles that the foreign subsidiary has a de facto guarantee
backed by the lender of last resort to the bank holding
company: the U.S. taxpayer.
The CFTC acknowledged this fact when it said in the
July 2013 guidance: “[e]ven in the absence of an explicit
business arrangement or guarantee, U.S. companies may for
reputational or other reasons choose, or feel compelled, to
assume the cost of risks incurred by deguaranteed foreign
affiliates.”432 As one market expert so aptly put it: “The
market knows and relies on the unstated fact that the U.S.
parent bank can and ultimately must bail out any
purportedly unguaranteed subsidiaries to avoid the
Conference, CFTC (June 6, 2013) [hereinafter Gensler Address],
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-141.
431 Jonathan Fiechter et al., Subsidiaries or Branches: Does One Size Fit
All?, 4, 9, 20 (Int’l Monetary Fund Staff Notes, Mar. 7, 2011),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2011/sdn1104.pdf; see Daryl
Montgomery, Coming Soon from Europe: The Next Global Financial
Crisis, SEEKING ALPHA (July 7, 2016), http://seekingalpha.com/article/
3987017-coming-soon-europe-next-global-financial-crisis (“Banks and
Wall Street firms are somewhat unique among all companies in that they
must maintain credibility among their peers. The loss of ability to
perform financial transfers means instant death for them. Bear Stearns
folded overnight in March 2008 because of this, even though it was
hurrying to release its excellent first quarter earnings. Earnings, book
value, PE, and other fundamental measures of a company's strength
become instantly meaningless under such circumstances.”); see also
Greenberger & Waddington Letter, supra note 206.
432 Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance
with Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,292, 45,294 (July 26,
2013) (emphasis added).
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reputational and run risk associated with their failure.”433
The real effect is that using the “deguarantee” to evade DoddFrank means that “banks are again moving their risky
derivatives trading . . . outside U.S. regulation, while
increasing the risk that future losses will still come back
home to the U.S. for the U.S. taxpayer bailouts – just as they
did in 2008.”434 As then-CFTC Chairman Gensler also made
clear: “[W]hen a run starts on any overseas affiliate or branch
of a modern financial institution, risk comes crashing back to
our shores.”435

Cross-Border Factsheet: U.S. Banks are Again Trying to Evade
Financial Reform Law by Changing a Few Words in a Contract: this Time,
it’s Called “De-guaranteeing” Overseas Affiliates, BETTER MARKETS (June
19, 2014) [hereinafter Cross-Border Factsheet], https://bettermarkets.com/sites/default/files/Cross-Border%20Guarantee%20Fact%20She
et%206-19-14%20(2).pdf. This position is fully adopted by the CFTC as
noted in the July 2013 Guidance stating, “[e]ven in the absence of an
explicit business arrangement or guarantee, U.S. companies may for
reputational or other reasons choose, or feel compelled, to assume the cost
of risks incurred by foreign affiliates.”). Interpretive Guidance and Policy
Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations, 78
Fed. Reg. 45,292, 45,294 (July 26, 2013); see also Greenberger &
Waddington Letter, supra note 206; Letter from Michael Greenberger,
Prof., Univ. of Md., Carey Sch. of L., and Brandy Bruyere, Analyst,
CHHS, Univ. of Md., to Melissa Jurgens, Sec’y, CFTC, RIN No. 3038AD85 (Feb. 6, 2013) [hereinafter Greenberger & Bruyere Letter],
https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=5914
9&SearchText; Letter from Am. for Fin. Reform, to Tim Massad,
Chairman, CFTC, RIN 3038-AE54 (Dec. 19, 2016) [hereinafter Letter].
434 Cross-Border Fact Sheet, supra note 433; see also Greenberger &
Waddington Letter, supra note 206.
435 Gensler Address, supra note 430.
433
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D. Incentives for U.S. Bank Swaps Dealers to
“Deguarantee”
Financial markets, especially the markets for swaps, are
global, as the worldwide financial crisis of 2008 made clear.
Accordingly, at the September 2009 G20 Summit in
Pittsburgh, it was agreed that all G20 countries would
develop regulations for swaps according to a set of agreed
upon regulatory principles that are now reflected within
Dodd-Frank.436
The U.S. responded to the G20 call to action by
enacting Dodd-Frank less than a year later.437
Unfortunately, almost all the remaining member nations
failed to act on a timely basis. With the meltdown in the rearview mirror, an international race-to-the-bottom of swaps
regulation was therefore created under the seeming
assumption that non-U.S. counterparties would choose to
enter swaps transactions with foreign dealers under lax
regulation to avoid, inter alia, the regulatory “bother” of
Dodd-Frank. This attitude was claimed to pose a threat to
See Leaders’ Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit, U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS.
2 (2009), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-cen-ter/international/g7-g2
0/Documents/pittsburgh_summit_leaders_statement_250909.pdf
(“We
committed to act together to raise capital standards, to implement strong
international compensation standards aimed at ending practices that
lead to excessive risk-taking, to improve the over-the-counter derivatives
market and to create more powerful tools to hold large global firms to
account for the risks they take.”).
437 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Prot. Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (signed into law July 21, 2010). See also
Robert Reich, Wall Street’s Global Race to the Bottom, HUFFPOST (Oct. 4,
2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-reich/wall-streets-global-ra
ce-_b_750239.html (“Squadrons of lawyers and lobbyists are now pressing
the Treasury, Comptroller of the Currency, SEC, and the Fed to go even
easier on the Street. Their main argument is if regulations are too tight,
the big banks will be less competitive internationally.”).
436
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the big U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers who,
within that race-to-the-bottom, feared that they would be
displaced as leaders of the worldwide swaps markets if they
and their foreign subsidiaries were governed by DoddFrank.438
The claim of the Securities Industry and Financial
Markets Association (“SIFMA”), the international banking
industry’s main lobbying group in, inter alia, Washington,
D.C., was that for a U.S. bank holding company swap dealer
to remain “competitive” in the global swaps market, it had to
free its foreign subsidiaries from Dodd-Frank. “In private
talking points drafted by the [SIFMA] . . . the industry
[claimed] the de-guaranteeing practice is lawful and allows
U.S. banks to compete on a level playing field with their
foreign-based counterparts.”439
However, the argument that U.S. banks would have
suffered by losing competitive swaps battles to true foreign
swap dealers because those U.S. banks would be subject to
the Dodd-Frank framework is flawed. Many U.S. bank
holding company swaps dealers left the swaps market since
the 2008 meltdown, recognizing that swaps were deemed so
financially insecure that the prudential banking regulators
were substantially hiking capital requirements in direct
proportion to a U.S. bank holding companies’ swaps trading
exposure.440 Leaving the swaps market, therefore, is not
FINANCIAL REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (Rainer Kattel et al.
eds., 2015) (commenting on the “light touch” approach adopted by the
British financial system).
439 Silla Brush, Wall Street Faces Scrutiny of Tactic to Evade Swaps Rules,
BLOOMBERG (July 31, 2014, 11:15 AM), https://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2014-07-31/wall-street-faces-new-u-s-scrutiny-of-deriv
atives-tactic.
440 Olivia Oran, Morgan Stanley’s Commodities Head Swaps Swagger for
Small and Smart, REUTERS (Dec. 5, 2016, 9:11 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-morgan-stanley-commodities-idUSKBN13U1FX;
438
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necessarily as financially suicidal as described by, inter alia,
SIFMA.
Moreover, one of the major reasons U.S. bank holding
company swap dealers have been found by regulators,
legislative bodies, and reputable academics to be
systemically “important” (or risky) is because of the very
volatility of the swaps market in which they trade. Warren
Buffet famously called swaps, “weapons of mass financial
destruction.”441 Buffet has also said that to the extent that
Gregory Meyer, Goldman Warns Federal Reserve over Commodity
Trading Rules Fallout, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.
ft.com/content/8f345610-f91c-11e6-bd4e-68d53499ed71.
441 See Warren Buffet, Warren Buffet on Derivatives, BERKSHIRE
HATHAWAY (2002), http://www.fintools.com/docs/Warren%20Buffet%20
on%20Derivatives.pdf; Michael Snyder, Warren Buffett: Derivatives Are
Still Weapons of Mass Destruction and “Are Likely to Cause Big Trouble”,
ETF DAILY NEWS (June 22, 2015, 9:43 PM), https://etfdailynews.
com/2015/06/22/warren-buffett-derivatives-are-still-weapons-of-massdestruction-and-are-likely-to-cause-big-trouble/ (offering Buffet’s reaffirmed sentiment, thirteen years later, that “at some point [derivatives
are] likely to cause big trouble”) (quoting Tony Boyd, Warren Buffett Still
Says Derivatives are “Weapons of Mass Destruction,” FIN. REV. (Jun. 17,
2015, 3:11 PM), https://www.afr.com/markets/derivatives/warren-buffettstill-says-derivatives-are-weapons-of-mass-destruction-20150617ghpw0a); Eric Helleiner & Stefano Pagliari, The G20 Leaders’ Summit
and the Regulation of Global Finance: What Was Accomplished?, CTR. FOR
INT’L GOV. INNOVATION (2008), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/
267240030_The_G20_Leaders'_Summit_and_the_Regulation_of_Global_
Finance_What_Was_Accomplished_The_G20_Leaders'_Summit_and_th
e_Regulation_of_Global_Finance_What_Was_Accomplished; Id. at 4–5:
The G20 Leaders’ Summit has also made commitments
to bring order in the market for credit default swaps
(CDS), a derivatives market involving contracts for
insurance against bond defaults. These contracts have
mainly been traded “over-the-counter” (OTC); that is,
they have been negotiated privately between the buyer
and the seller of the insurance without a formal clearing
house or exchange that could minimize counter-party
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swaps are thought to hedge the risk of underlying risky
investments, e.g., risky loans, the answer is not to make risky
loans in the first place.442
To that end, the U.S. taxpayers should not become the
de facto guarantor of risk for these megalithic U.S. banks
risk and force margin requirements for all contracts. This
market grew at an astonishing speed over the last decade
and regulators left it unchecked. In 2000, for example,
the US Congress voted to exempt the OTC markets from
oversight by the US futures regulator.
While these contracts were seen as beneficial
instruments to spread default risk, they now stand
accused of having exacerbated the current crisis. Warren
Buffett’s famous description of derivative as “weapons of
mass destruction” is now often repeated. The insurance
giant American International Group (AIG) had to be
rescued by the US Treasury after it had issued US$440
billion in swaps to cover defaults on debt. The opacity of
the market has also contributed to uncertainty. In the
aftermath of the default of the US investment bank
Lehman Brothers, both the total amount of credit default
swaps on its debt and the hands in which these contracts
ended were unknown, and these knowledge gaps
heightened the panic in the financial markets.
Most regulatory institutions around the world, including
the FSF, have begun calling for OTC derivatives
transactions to be recorded and cleared through a
clearing house standing between the parties of the trade.
Even the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association (ISDA), the most important private industry
organization in the sector, has shifted its position. After
long resisting tighter public controls over OTC
derivatives, the ISDA recently welcomed the creation of
a centralized clearing house, while developing a series of
protocols to facilitate net settlement of credit default
swaps on the debt of Lehman Brothers, Washington
Mutual, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae.
442 See e.g., Bansi R. Shah, Risk Management Techniques: Do They Pay
Off?, 5 INDIAN J. APPLIED RES. 257, 261 (2015).
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embroiled in trillions of dollars of historically risky and
poorly regulated swap transactions. Furthermore, the
“competitive positioning” advanced by these U.S. banks and
their lobbyists that so consumes this banking rhetoric is
entirely at the expense of U.S. taxpayers. As such,
recognizing that swaps are inherently dangerous
instruments, especially in the volumes transacted by these
huge U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers, the
supposed “loss” of swaps business would be, if fulfilled,
arguably to the betterment of the U.S. and world economies,
and certainly better for U.S. taxpayers.
The deguarantee loophole footnote provided the
perfect foil for ISDA and, inter alia, these large U.S. bank
holding company swap dealers to engage in regulatory
arbitrage. Sources “with knowledge of the situation”
maintain that U.S. banks removed foreign affiliate
guarantees for the express purpose of not “get[ting] caught
by U.S. regulations.”443
E. CFTC’s Belated, and Now Likely Permanently
Unsuccessful,
Attempt
to
End
the
Deguarantee Loophole
In early 2014, press reports began to surface that CFTC staff
at that time first learned of, and reported to unsuspecting
CFTC Commissioners that, the large U.S. swaps dealers
were using a “deguarantee loophole” to move trades from
domestic U.S. parents or affiliates to newly “deguaranteed”
foreign subsidiaries to evade application of Dodd-Frank.444
Katy Burne, Big U.S. Banks Make Swaps a Foreign Affair, WALL. ST.
J. (Apr. 27, 2014, 4:52 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/big-u-s-banksmake-swaps-a-foreign-affair-1398627739.
444 David Aron & Ken McCracken, CFTC’s Anti-Evasion Rule Under
Dodd-Frank Brought to Forefront by “De-guaranteeing” Activity, 36 No. 6
443
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As the year progressed, then CFTC Chairman Massad, who
had shortly before assumed the CFTC chair, began to decry
the practice of deguaranteeing as a pathway to escape DoddFrank.445
F. The CFTC’s First Formal Response to the
Deguarantee
Loophole:
Extraterritorial
Application of the Rules for Margin for
Uncleared Swaps
The first formal CFTC response to the loophole was a new
rule for cross-border application of its Margin Requirements
for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap
Participants (“Cross-Border Margin Rule”) proposed on July
14, 2015, and made final in May 2016.446 The CFTC stated
in the proposed rule that it “is aware that some [U.S. Swaps
FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP. NL 2, n.1 (June 2016) (quoting Peter
Madigan, 100% Not Guaranteed: US Banks Quizzed Over Affiliates,
RISK.NET (July 28, 2014), http://www.risk.net/regulation/2356481/100not-guaranteed-us-banks-quizzed-over-affiliates) (“quoting a ‘senior’
CFTC source, who noted ‘[t]here is no formal investigation into the deguaranteeing of these affiliates’ and that then-Acting Chairman Wetjen
‘instructed staff to gather some facts . . . [, which] isn’t the same as asking
the enforcement division to initiate an investigation.’”); see also Levinson,
supra note 360.
445 Aron & McCracken, supra note 444, at n.5 (citing Andrew Ackerman
& Scott Patterson, CFTC to Scrutinize Swaps Loophole, WALL ST. J.,
(Sept. 5, 2014, 6:37 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/cftc-to-scrutinizebanks-shifting-trading-operations-overseas-1409916820) (reporting on
Massad’s concerns that “activity that takes place abroad can result in the
importation of risk into the U.S. . . . infecting the parent company in
possibly destabilizing ways” and additionally that the CFTC “plans to
scrutinize U.S. Banks that are shifting some trading operations overseas
to avoid tough CFTC rules.”).
446 Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and
Major Swap Participants—Cross-Border Application of the Margin
Requirements, 80 Fed. Reg. 41,376 (July 14, 2015).
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Dealers] removed guarantees in order to fall outside the
scope of certain Dodd-Frank requirements” and that “[t]he
[newly] proposed coverage [in the new proposed rule] of
foreign subsidiaries of a U.S. person as a ‘Foreign
Consolidated Subsidiary’ [“(FCS”)] . . . would address the
concern that even without a guarantee . . . foreign
subsidiaries of a U.S. person with a substantial nexus to the
U.S. financial system [would henceforth be] adequately
covered by the [new] margin requirements.”447
The final Cross-Border Margin Rule adopted the FCS
concept and definition from its proposed version. An FCS is:
a non-U.S. covered swap entity
(“CSE”) in which an ultimate parent
entity that is a U.S. person has a
controlling financial interest, in
accordance with U.S. GAAP, such
that the U.S. ultimate parent entity
includes
the
non-U.S.
CSE’s
operating results, financial position
and statement of cash flows in the
U.S.
ultimate
parent
entity’s
consolidated financial statements, in
accordance with U.S. GAAP.448

Said more simply, an affiliated entity—U.S. or
otherwise—whose performance is consolidated within its
U.S. parent company’s books is subject to the new CFTC
margin rules for uncleared swaps, regardless whether the
affiliate is deguaranteed by the parent. As such, the effect of
the final Cross-Border Margin Rule is that it addresses the
deguaranteeing problem by subjecting to U.S. margin rules
for uncleared swaps both (1) uncleared swaps of non-U.S.
447
448

Id. at 41,385.
Id.
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CSEs (covered swap entity) guaranteed by a U.S. person and
(2) uncleared swaps of FCSs (foreign consolidated
subsidiaries).449
Although this shift is important, the Cross-Border
Margin Rule only applies to certain—not all—margin
requirements and it does not apply to the twelve other types
of Dodd-Frank swaps regulatory tools discussed above.450
Of course, those swaps that moved, under the
deguarantee contract clause provided in the August 2013
ISDA Cross-Border letter, from the U.S. swaps dealer parent
or that parent’s U.S. affiliate to their newly deguaranteed
foreign subsidiaries in trades with “non-U.S. persons would
generally not be cleared pursuant to Dodd-Frank (since the
motivation for moving swaps to a deguaranteed foreign
subsidiarity was to evade Dodd-Frank). As such, the CFTC
January 2016 final rule on margin for uncleared swaps would
have brought foreign subsidiary swaps completely back
under Dodd-Frank margin requirements. If subject to DoddFranks’ margin requirements, the amounts posted for
margin would therefore also be included, inter alia, in the
U.S. prudential regulators’ calculations for that capital that
must be held in reserve under Dodd-Frank for U.S. bank
holding company swaps dealers.451 As a result, the May 16
final rule “recaptured” those “foreign” uncleared swaps,
placing them back under Dodd-Frank margin and capital
reserves requirements.
Id. (emphasis added).
See supra Part V. See also Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps
for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 81 Fed. Reg. 636 (Jan. 6,
2016) (stating the final rule on margin for uncleared swaps.).
451 See Capital Requirements of Swap Dealers and Major Swap
Participants, 81 Fed. Reg. 91,252 (Dec. 16, 2016).
449
450
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As shown in detail below,452 in a CFTC concession
designed to head off a threatened “trade war” over swaps by,
inter alia, the EU (supported by, inter alia, big U.S. swaps
dealers), shortly after the CFTC’s January 2016 margin for
uncleared swaps rule was adopted, the CFTC uncleared
margin rule was completely and permanently preempted by
the CFTC’s later adoption of yet another self-created CFTC
exemption from Dodd-Frank swaps rules: i.e., the wholly
made up doctrine of “substituted compliance,” under which,
inter alia, these foreign subsidiaries’ uncleared swaps outside
of Dodd-Frank that were thought to be brought back into
Dodd-Frank’s collateralization and capital regime, were
instead governed by the “substituted” and much weaker EU
and Japanese margin rules for uncleared swaps.453
G. The Proposed CFTC Rules and Interpretations to End the Deguarantee and ANE
Loopholes
The CFTC finally (more than three years after ISDA’s
deguarantee instruction to its members) recognized that it
must address completely deguaranteeing of subsidiaries as it
applies to all thirteen of the Dodd-Frank swaps regulatory
tools. A proposed October 18, 2016 CFTC rule and
interpretations fully recognized the nature of modern finance
See infra Part XI (discussing the substituted compliance doctrine and
its use by the CFTC). See also infra notes 528–32 and accompanying text
(discussing the EU’s threatened swaps “trade war” with the United
States).
453 See Comparability Determination for the European Union: Margin
Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap
Participants, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,394 (Oct. 18, 2017); Comparability
Determination for Japan: Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for
Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 81 Fed. Reg. 63,376 (Sept.
15, 2016).
452

Journal of Business & Technology Law



351

Too Big to Fail

where “large financial institutions typically conduct their
business operations through a highly integrated network of
business lines and services conducted through multinational
branches or subsidiaries that are under the control of the
ultimate parent entity.”454
The CFTC detailed the swaps operations of, inter alia,
Goldman and Citigroup, noting “the current swap market is
global in scale and characterized by a high level of
interconnectedness among market participants, with
transactions negotiated, executed, and arranged between
counterparties in different jurisdictions, (and booked and
managed in still other jurisdictions).”455 The CFTC concluded
“market realities suggest that a cross-border framework
focusing only on the domicile of the market participant or
location of counterparty risk would fail to effectively advance
the policy objectives of the Dodd-Frank swap reforms, which
were aimed at increasing market transparency and
counterparty protections and mitigating the risk of financial
contagion in the swap market.”456
The CFTC clearly provided that “[a] failure to treat
these [foreign] entities the same in this context could provide
a U.S. financial group with an opportunity to avoid SD . . .
registration by conducting relevant swap activities through
unregistered [foreign affiliated] entities.”457 Accordingly, the
CFTC, in its proposed rule and interpretations,458 adopted
Id. See also Cross-Border Application of the Registration Thresholds
and External Business Conduct Standards Applicable to Swap Dealers
and Major Swap Participants, 81 Fed. Reg. 71,946, 71,950 (Oct. 18, 2016)
(making clear that where Dodd-Frank applied extraterritorially, the
CFTC’s business conduct standards, dealing with protections to non-SDs
and MSPs were to be applied, including protections of due diligence,
disclosure, fair dealing and anti-fraud requirements).
455 81 Fed. Reg. at 71,948.
456 Id.
457 Id. at 71,951.
458 Id. at 71,973.
454
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the definition and use of FCS that it previously used in its
final May 2018 Cross-Border Margin Rules as being
applicable to all extraterritorial applications of Dodd-Frank’s
swaps rules. These consolidated foreign affiliates, it
concluded, must therefore be subject to Dodd-Frank swaps
rules whether guaranteed or not.
H. Yet Another Extraterritorial
Discovered: ANE

Loophole

Through the October 18, 2016 CFTC proposed rule-making,
the CFTC highlighted yet another loophole adopted
unilaterally, inter alia, by U.S. bank holding company swaps
dealers in the application of the deguarantee doctrine. The
CFTC squarely addressed the fact that swaps ultimately
assigned to deguaranteed foreign subsidiaries had often been
“arrange[d] negotiate[d], or execute[d]” (“ANE”) by the U.S.
bank holding company swap dealer’s personnel (or the
personnel of the foreign deguaranteed subsidiary) in the
United States by U.S. bank personnel within the bank) and
only then “assigning” the fully executed trade to a newly
deguaranteed foreign subsidiary.459 Specifically, the CFTC
stated:
In the Commission's view, and as
further explained below, arranging,
negotiating, or executing swaps are
functions that fall within the scope of
the ‘swap dealer’ definition. That the
counterparty risks may reside
primarily outside the United States
is not determinative. To the extent
that a person uses personnel located
in the United States (whether its own
459

Id. at 71,975.
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personnel or personnel of an agent) to
arrange, negotiate, or execute its
swap dealing transactions, the
Commission believes that such
person is conducting a substantial
aspect of its swap dealing activity
within the United States and
therefore, falls within the scope of the
Dodd-Frank Act.460

This ANE practice further shows that U.S. bank
holding company swaps dealers were treating newly
deguaranteed foreign affiliates as mere shells; i.e.,
channeling swaps business through the foreign subsidiary
entity without any real need for the swaps being “executed”
in the claimed foreign jurisdiction.
I. The CFTC’s Proposed Rejection of the
Deguarantee and ANE Loopholes Will Almost
Certainly Never Be Finalized
President Trump has made clear that he wants to “roll back”
Dodd-Frank.461 President Trump has also nominated, and
the Senate has confirmed, CFTC Commissioner Giancarlo as
the new chairman of the CFTC.462 Mr. Giancarlo worked at a
Id. at 71,952.
Ben Protess & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Moves to Roll Back
Obama-Era Financial Regulations, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2017), http://
www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/business/dealbook/trump-congress-financ
ial-regulations.html?_r=1.
462 Barney Jopson & Ben McLannahan, Trump Appointee Gary Cohn to
Stay Clear of Goldman Matters, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2017), http://
www.ft.com/content/f83b253e-f9a4-11e6-9516-2d969e0d3b65; Benjamin
Bain & Robert Schmidt, Trump May Tap Republican Commissioner to
Lead Swaps Regulator, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 11, 2016, 1:18 PM),
460
461

354



Journal of Business & Technology Law

MICHAEL GREENBERGER

brokerage active in derivatives before joining the CFTC in
2014. As a CFTC commissioner, Chairman Giancarlo had a
record of being an “outspoken critic”463 of many CFTC DoddFrank rules.464 While as shown above,465 wholesale statutory
reform of Dodd-Frank swaps statutory provisions to the
benefit of the biggest U.S. banks is not in the offing, it is also
expected that “[c]ontroversial pending [swaps] rules [like
closing the deguarantee loophole] are unlikely to be finalized
anytime soon.”466
It therefore seems a certainty that the October 2016
CFTC proposal to overturn the deguarantee and ANE
loopholes will not be finalized by the CFTC during a Trump
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-11/trump-may-tap-rep
ublican-commissioner-to-lead-swaps-regulator.
463 Jopson & McLannahan, supra note 462.
464 Ben Protess, Trump Picks a Regulator Who Could Help Reshape DoddFrank Act, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/
2017/03/14/business/dealbook/cftc-christopher-giancarlo-futures-regulat
ion.html. Mr. Giancarlo has since published a white paper which—at the
least—acknowledges the need to “limit regulatory evasion” and the risks
to the U.S. financial system attendant with exploitation of the deguarantee loophole, he maintains “there are better means” to address
those risks than the proposed 2016 rules. J. CHRISTOPHER GIANCARLO,
CROSS-BORDER SWAPS REGULATION V. 2.0: A RISK-BASED APPROACH
[hereinafter GIANCARLO WHITE PAPER] 66 (U.S. Commodities & Futures
Trading Comm’n Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/
2018-10/Whitepaper_CBSR100118_0.pdf. What he recommends instead
is an “outcomes-based” framework of determining substituted compliance
in a “comparable jurisdiction,” similar to the recommendations of the
Department of the Treasury, discussed later in this paper. Infra notes
536—37 and accompanying text. What the white paper does not explain
is how its recommendations will address the specific risks created by the
big four banks’ heavy reliance on the deguarantee and ANE loopholes for
their swaps trades.
465 See supra Part VIII.
466 Annette L. Nazareth & Gabriel D. Rosenberg, Eight US Regulatory
Predictions for 2017, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.ft.com/
content/79955066-d81f-11e6-944b-e7eb37a6aa8e.
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Administration. Therefore, the deguarantee and ANE
loopholes will remain available, inter alia, to the four
dominant U.S. bank holding company swap dealers, each of
which has been deemed systemically risky; each of which has
already been bailed out by U.S. taxpayers during the Great
Recession; and each of which in combination now controls
90% of the U.S. swaps market. Moreover, these U.S. bank
holding company swaps dealers will be able to arrange,
negotiate and execute these swaps in the U.S. with U.S.
personnel before assigning the swaps to the newly deguaranteed foreign subsidiary.
X. THE DEGUARANTEEING OF FOREIGN
SUBSIDIARIES EVEN WHEN SWAPS ARE
EXECUTED IN THE U.S. IS A SELF-EVIDENT
“EVASION” OF DODD-FRANK
As shown above,467 Dodd-Frank’s extraterritoriality
provision, by its plain language, applies that statute’s swaps
regulatory regime to “foreign” swaps transactions that are
designed to “evade” Dodd-Frank. It is self-evident that the
four parent U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers have
no other apparent or rational reason to have swaps assigned
to a newly deguaranteed foreign subsidiary other than to
afford opportunities to evade Dodd-Frank. This is seen even
more clearly by the CFTC’s recognition that these “foreign”
swaps transactions are often fully arranged, negotiated and
executed by U.S. bank personnel in the U.S. within the
parent or affiliate domestic banks before they are “assigned”
to a newly deguaranteed “foreign subsidiary”; and a recent
precedent of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
strongly suggests that the “execution” of these swaps in the
467

See supra Part V.
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U.S. constitutes a “domestic” (and not an extraterritorial)
transaction even if the swap is later assigned to a foreign
entity and thus Dodd-Frank would fully apply.468
To implement the anti-evasion component of the
extraterritorial provision, the CFTC, on August 13, 2012,
promulgated Regulation 1.6 within its “Swap Adopting
Release.”469 Regulation 1.6 defines “evasion” in the crossborder context as: (1) conducting activities outside of the U.S.
to “willfully evade or attempt to evade” any portion of the
Dodd-Frank swaps rules; and (2) the form of those activities
(agreements, documents, contracts) shall not be dispositive
to the question of evasion.470
The CFTC provided interpretive guidance471 as a part
of Regulation 1.6, in which that agency adopted a “principlesbased approach” to determine evasion,472 Among these
principles, the CFTC embraced this concept:
[T]he structuring of instruments,
transactions, or entities to evade the
requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act
may be “limited only by the ingenuity
of man.” Therefore, the CFTC will
look beyond the manner in which an
instrument, transaction, or entity is
documented to examine its actual
substance and purpose to prevent
any
evasion
through
clever
draftsmanship — an approach
7 U.S.C. § 2(i) (2012); see also Painter, supra note 345, at 2–3; Choi v.
Tower Research Capital LLC, 890 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 2018).
469 17 C.F.R. § 1.6 (2012).
470 Id.
471 Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “SecurityBased Swap Agreement”; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement
Recordkeeping, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,208, 48,299 (2012).
472 Id. at 48,298.
468
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consistent with the CFTC’s case law
in the context of determining
whether a contract is a futures
contract and the CFTC’s interpretations in this release regarding
swaps.473

By focusing the inquiry on the “substance and
purpose” of the underlying swaps transactions or swaps
entities, the CFTC expressly avoided being trapped by the
words within swaps documentation and allowed itself to
focus on the real underlying motive for the form of execution,
as well as its economic impact.474 In this regard, the CFTC
has said: “[W]here a consideration of all relevant facts and
circumstances reveals the presence of a purpose that is not a
legitimate business purpose, evasion may exist.”475
In applying this “substance and purpose” test to the
practice of deguaranteeing foreign subsidiaries, there is an
unanswerable case that deguaranteeing is willful evasion.476
Id. at 48,300.
Id.; see also Aron & McCracken, supra note 444, at 1.
475 Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,208,
48,302 (Aug. 13, 2012) (emphasis added). Legitimate business purposes
are evaluated on a case-by-case basis where the CFTC considers common
industry practices and accepted business routines. Further related to the
concept of legitimate business purpose, the CFTC has advised that
regulatory cost avoidance is not de facto evasion; the CFTC even went so
far as to say that legitimate business purposes include weighing all
manner of costs; regulatory being among them. See Aron & McCracken,
supra note 444, at 1.
476 Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,208,
48,301 (Aug. 13, 2012) (stating “to the extent a purpose in structuring an
entity or instrument or entering into a transaction is to evade
requirements of Title VII with respect to swaps, the structuring of such
instrument, entity, or transaction may be found to constitute willful
evasion”).
473
474
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As the data cited above demonstrates,477 many of the
transactions moved abroad by U.S. bank holding company
swaps dealers had previously been executed within the
United States, thereby self-evidently showing that the real
purpose of these transactions is to afford the chance to evade
Dodd-Frank. Indeed, neither ISDA nor the deguaranteeing
swaps dealers themselves have offered any explanation for
the transfer abroad of what were, and what could be, U.S.
swaps trades except for “[candidly and openly] reason[ing]
that if they stripped out the word ‘guarantee’ and equivalent
terms [from the ISDA swaps contract language], they could
avoid the CFTC [swaps] rules.”478
They acknowledge that the “deguaranteeing” strategy
is premised upon the unsupported general allegation that
“[i]nternational clients . . . threatened to take their business
to non-U.S. banks in order to avoid the new American
rules . . . .”479 However, “evading” Dodd-Frank as a
competitive business strategy cannot justify evading the very
provisions of that statute that are central to preventing a
repeat of worldwide economic chaos and a U.S. taxpayer
multi-trillion-dollar intervention on those banks behalf.
Indeed, the “legitimate business purpose” test itself is
nowhere mentioned in Dodd-Frank, much less authorized as
a cure for otherwise banned behavior. Moreover, the CFTC
interpretations of “evasion” expressly recognize that masking
evasion as a legitimate business concern is flatly in conflict
with one of the fundamental purposes of Dodd-Frank.480
Moreover, the CFTC “evasion” guidance itself
identifies economically irrational behavior as presumptively
477 See Blater, supra note 364, and Levinson, supra note 414 and
accompanying text.
478 Levinson, supra note 360.
479 Id. (clarification provided).
480 See generally Aron & McCracken, supra note 444.

Journal of Business & Technology Law



359

Too Big to Fail

an “[il]legitimate business purpose.”481 The irrationality of
the ISDA-driven deguaranteeing box-checking process482 is
reinforced by the fact that neither the “foreign” subsidiary
nor the subsidiary’s counterparty, both of which lose the
benefit of the guarantee, are compensated for accepting the
economic risk assumed by deguaranteeing. The only “benefit”
derived from the deguarantee transaction is that given to the
U.S. parent, which escapes application of Dodd-Frank.
In sum, because “deguaranteeing” is clear-cut evasive
behavior, these swaps transactions, even if executed abroad
are, for this reason as well, subject to Dodd-Frank by the
clear “evasion” terms of the extraterritorial provision in that
statute.
XI. DODD-FRANK SWAPS RULES CAN STILL BE
AVOIDED
BY
EVEN
CFTC-REGISTERED
GUARANTEED FOREIGN AFFILIATES USING
THE
CFTC
CREATED
DOCTRINE
OF
“SUBSTITUTED COMPLIANCE”
Even where a non-U.S. person is required by Dodd-Frank’s
extraterritorial provision to comply with Dodd-Frank, the
CFTC’s July 2013 guidance creates out of whole cloth a
further exemption from the application of Dodd-Frank: the
so-called “substituted compliance” doctrine. “Substituted
compliance” are words found neither in Dodd-Frank nor in
its legislative history.483 The doctrine is wholly based on the
CFTC’s adoption of an unrelated and otherwise legally
Id.
See supra note 424 and accompanying text.
483 Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance
with Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,292, 45,340-42 (July 26,
2013).
481
482
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irrelevant “international comity” test, which, as used by the
CFTC in this context, has no basis in U.S. law.
“Substituted compliance,” as created by the CFTC, is
designed to avoid purported conflicts between Dodd-Frank
and a conflicting swaps regulatory scheme of the foreign
country in which the swaps transaction was executed.484 In
other words, if a foreign swaps transaction is otherwise
required by Dodd-Frank’s extraterritorial provision to be
subject to Dodd-Frank, the CFTC has created a “legal fiction”
to make that agency free to ignore Dodd-Frank and accept,
under “substituted compliance,” a foreign government’s—
rather than U.S.—swaps regulations.
Under the “substituted compliance” doctrine, the
CFTC, upon application by any one of a broad group of
stakeholders, determines whether foreign swaps rules at
issue are, “comparable to and as comprehensive as the
requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act,” even if the rules are
not “identical” to U.S. law.485 Entities entitled to request such
a comparability determination from the CFTC include:
foreign regulators; a non-U.S. entity or group of non-U.S.
entities; a U.S. bank that is, inter alia, an SD with respect
Id.
Id. at 45,342–43. See also id. (“After receiving a submission from an
applicant, the resulting comparability determination would be made by
the Commission with regard to each of the 13 categories of regulatory
obligations, as appropriate.”). The categories are: (i) capital adequacy; (ii)
chief compliance officer; (iii) risk management; (iv) swap data
recordkeeping; (v) swap data repository reporting and large trader
reporting; (vi) clearing and swap processing; (vii) margining and
segregation for uncleared swaps; (viii) trade execution; (ix) swap trading
relationship documentation; (x) portfolio reconciliation and compression;
(xi) real-time public reporting; (xii) trade confirmation; and (xiii) daily
trading records.
484
485
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to its own foreign entities, a trade association, or other group
on behalf of similarly-situated entities.486
Determinations when compliance with a foreign rule
may be “substituted” for Dodd-Frank are made on a
requirement-by-requirement basis, across the thirteen
categories of Dodd-Frank‘s swaps regulatory rules.487 In
other words, the CFTC may, for example, allow substituted
compliance for one of the thirteen Dodd-Frank swaps
regulatory requirements, but apply Dodd-Frank for all other
requirements.488 Finally, and of great import here, once a
comparability decision has been made by the CFTC to rely on
a foreign country’s swaps rule (rather than a Dodd-Frank
rule), that decision is binding precedent in that it will
automatically apply to all subsequent swaps transactions, of
any swaps trade or by any swaps traders within the foreign
jurisdiction.489

Id. at 45,344.
See supra notes 317–20 and accompanying text (listing the thirteen
regulatory topics).
488 Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance
with Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,292, 45,343 (Jul. 26,
2013). In cases where the CFTC permits substituted compliance, the
Commission retains its examination and enforcement authorities. Id. at
45,342. It is important to note however, that if a substituted compliance
regimen is in play, the CFTC’s examination and enforcement authorities
are largely a mirage. The normal hooks that the CFTC would use to assert
its authority may not be present, e.g., the SD may not even be registered.
489 Id. at 45,344 (“Once a comparability determination is made for a
jurisdiction, it will apply for all entities or transactions in that
jurisdiction to the extent provided in the determination, as approved by
the Commission.”).
486
487
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A. “International Comity” is the CFTC’s Only
Rationale for “Substituted Compliance”
Again, the doctrine of “substituted compliance” is found
nowhere in Dodd-Frank or its legislative history. The CFTC’s
entire legal underpinning for its invented “substituted
compliance” rule is the doctrine of “international comity,”490
a term also not found within Dodd-Frank. The reason given
by the CFTC for following the international comity doctrine
is because, inter alia, the European Union (“EU”), the United
Kingdom (“U.K.”), and Japan vigorously protested when the
CFTC contended that “too-big-to-fail” U.S. swaps dealers
were, under the plain language of the Dodd-Frank
extraterritorial swaps provision, subject to that U.S. statute
even where swaps trades were conducted abroad.491
Foreign countries, actively supported by ISDA and
U.S. swaps dealers, were offended that their own laws would
not apply to swaps executed in their countries, even if by U.S.
See generally William S. Dodge, International Comity in American
Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2072 (2015).
491 See Interpretive
Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding
Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. at 45,292 (Jul.
26, 2013); see also id. at 45,300 (Jul. 26, 2013) (setting forth the CFTC’s
guidance regarding Title VII’s extraterritorial application); Id. at 45,371–
72 (Jul. 26, 2013) (describing the cross-border rules as “overbroad” and
without adequate grounding in the “direct and significant” standard as
articulated by CFTC Commissioner Scott D. O’Malia in his dissenting
statement).
490
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persons.492 Allegations of sharp elbows493 by U.S. regulators
were almost certainly against the then-CFTC Chairman
Gensler, who steadfastly maintained that the extraterritorial
provision within Dodd-Frank applying Dodd-Frank to swaps
executed abroad by, e.g., the four big U.S. bank holding
company swaps dealers, prevents U.S. taxpayers from having
to once again make multi-trillion dollar bailouts of those U.S.
systemically risky institutions, and this otherwise saves the
U.S. and worldwide economy from another calamitous
meltdown.494
See Eileen Bannon, The Extraterritorial Reach of Derivative
Regulation under Dodd-Frank, HOLLAND & KNIGHT (Apr. 8, 2013)
Westlaw 20130506A NYCBAR 1.
In 2009, the members of the G-20 agreed that: (i) the OTC
derivatives contracts should be reported to trade
repositories; (ii) standardized OTC derivatives contracts
should be cleared through central counterparties by the
end of 2012; and (iii) non-centrally cleared contracts
should be subject to higher capital requirements. In light
of such reform initiatives, there has been substantial
concern that regulation be coordinated on an
international basis . . . . Regulatory requirements for
derivatives have advanced to different levels in various
jurisdictions, and the Commodities Future Trading
Commission (CFTC) is the first regulator to have
attempted to define its jurisdictional reach. . . . The
CFTC states that it will use an outcomes-based approach
to determine whether the foreign requirements are
designed to meet the same regulatory objectives, and
anticipates a robust and ongoing coordination and
cooperation between the CFTC and its foreign
counterparts.
493 Id.
494 Gary Gensler, Keynote Address on OTC Derivatives Reform, MARKIT’S
OUTLOOK FOR OTC DERIVATIVES MARKETS CONFERENCE (Mar. 9, 2010),
www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-32 (stating that
“[t]hough credit default swaps have existed for only a relatively short
period of time, the debate they evoke has parallels to debates as far back
492
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Once Mr. Gensler left the Commission at the end of
2013, however, little deference was thereafter given to the
U.S. taxpayer’s plight as the lender of last resort to those very
large, systemically risky U.S. bank holding company swaps
dealers. Rather, an emphasis was placed completely on
calming international distress over the CFTC’s assertion of
extraterritorial jurisdiction on its own CFTC registered U.S.
systemically risky institutions, as contemplated by DoddFrank.495 The therapy adopted to lay this international
“distress” to rest was the invention by the CFTC out of whole
cloth of the ‘substituted compliance” doctrine and its easy
application to foreign swaps trades that otherwise would
lawfully be governed by Dodd-Frank.
The CFTC’s entire support for its novel “substituted
compliance” doctrine was the use of the legal common law
rule of “international comity.” Reliance on “international
comity” in this context is completely misplaced. The United
States Supreme Court has made clear that the use of
“international comity” is merely the use of a rule of statutory
construction that “reflects principles of customary
international law—law that (we must assume) Congress
as 18th Century England over insurance and the role of speculators.
English insurance underwriters in the 1700s often sold insurance on
ships to individuals who did not own the vessels or their cargo. The
practice was said to create an incentive to buy protection and then seek
to destroy the insured property. It should come as no surprise that
seaworthy ships began sinking. In 1746, the English Parliament enacted
the Statute of George II, which recognized that ‘a mischievous kind of
gaming or wagering’ had caused ‘great numbers of ships, with their
cargoes, [to] have . . . been fraudulently lost and destroyed.’ The statute
established that protection for shipping risks not supported by an interest
in the underlying vessel would be ‘null and void to all intents and
purposes.’”).
495 Bannon, supra note 492.
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ordinarily seeks to follow.”496 In this context, it is “the respect
sovereign nations afford each other by limiting the reach of
their laws . . . exercised when they come to interpreting the
scope of laws their legislatures have enacted.”497
Therefore, under U.S. Supreme Court precedent,
“international comity” is merely an interpretive tool used by
U.S. judges to discern whether ambiguous legislative
language about which country’s law will be applied among
countries competing to have their law applied.498 For
example, when it is unclear whether a U.S. statute applies
extraterritorially, U.S. courts apply the doctrine of
international comity to interpret the statute in question to
limit its scope only to application within the U.S. unless there
is a clear contrary intention through the language of the
statute itself or the statute’s legislative history. As shown in
detail above,499 the Dodd-Frank extraterritorial provision
was written in the wake of a then-recent Supreme Court
decision holding that if a statute is to have extraterritorial
effect, Congress must say so clearly. And, within three days
of that Supreme Court precedent, the extraterritorial
provision of Dodd-Frank was inserted, which, by its plain
language and contemporaneous legislative history, makes
expressly clear that Congress wanted Dodd-Frank to be
applied extraterritorially when swaps trading abroad could
seriously hurt the U.S. economy or where the foreign trade is
conducted as a ruse to evade application of Dodd-Frank.500
F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164
(2004).
497 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 817 (1993) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
498 Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); United States v. Aluminum
Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) (explaining that the courts
“are not to read general words . . . without regard to the limitations
customarily observed by nations upon the exercise of their powers . . .”).
499 See supra notes 17, 341–45 and accompanying text.
500 Id.
496
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There is no legal precedent extant that defines
“international comity” as giving authority to a U.S.
administrative agency to weaken unilaterally the otherwise
clear Congressional statutory language or intent that the
statute must be applied extraterritorially.
However, the CFTC decided in the July 13 guidance
that “international comity,” as it improperly conceived of that
doctrine, would completely trump the statute’s express
extraterritorial mandate with respect to how the statute
would apply abroad.501
B. The
CFTC’s
“Substituted
Compliance”
Rulings are Self-Evidently Flawed
The CFTC’s wholly novel doctrine of substituted
compliance—completely unmoored from the language or
intent of Dodd-Frank—has been fraught with difficulties
since its inception. On November 15, 2008, the G20 heads of
state met in Washington, D.C. to address the then-current
worldwide economic turmoil.502 The G20 “is an informal
forum for advancing international economic cooperation
Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance
with Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. at 45,297 (Jul. 26, 2013).
For a full discussion of this issue, including the inapplicability of the cases
the CFTC improperly relied on to conceive of “international comity” see
generally Michael Greenberger, The Extraterritorial Provisions of the
Dodd-Frank Act Protects U.S. Taxpayers from Worldwide Bailouts, 80
UMKC L. REV. 965 (2012); Greenberger & Bruyere Letters supra note
433.
502 Colin Bradford, Johannes Linn & Paul Martin, Global Governance
Breakthrough: The G20 Summit and the Future Agenda, BROOKINGS
(Dec. 17, 2008), https://www.brookings.edu/research/global-governancebreakthrough-the-g20-summit-and-the-future-agenda/.
501
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among 20 major advanced and emerging-market countries . .
. .”503
“[A]t the November 2008 Washington DC [G20]
summit, the leaders [of G20 countries] supported actions by
[their] regulators to speed up efforts to reduce the systemic
risks associated with credit default swaps and [other] overthe-counter [swaps] transactions.”504 At the follow-up
Pittsburgh G20 Summit in September 2009, G20 leaders
further agreed that all standardized swaps should be traded
on exchanges, or electronic trading platforms; and that they
should be cleared. The leaders also agreed that all swaps
should be reported to regulators through trade
repositories.505 Reforms were to be completed by each of the
member countries by the end of 2012.506
At that 2009 G20 summit, a commitment was also
made to bring regulators from Australia, Brazil, the
European Union, Hong Kong, Japan, Ontario, Quebec,
Singapore, Switzerland, and the United States together in
November of 2012 to finalize the cross-border regulation of
the swaps market.507
After that November 2012 G20 meeting, however,
regulators from these countries concluded that, “complete
harmonization—perfect
alignment
of
rules
across
jurisdictions—[would be impossible] as it would need to
503 JAMES JACKSON & RENA S. MILLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42961,
COMPARING G-20 REFORM OF THE OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES
MARKETS 2 (2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42961.pdf (including a
list of the twenty participating nations).
504 Id. at 8.
505 Id. at 9.
506 Id.
507 Press Release, U.S. CFTC, Joint Press Statement of Leaders on
Operating Principles and Areas of Exploration in the Regulation of the
Cross-border OTC Derivatives Market (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.cftc.gov/
PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6439-12.
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overcome jurisdictions’ differences in law, policy, markets
and implementation timing, as well as to take into account
the unique nature of jurisdictions’ legislative and regulatory
processes,” and that, “regulatory gaps may present risks to
financial markets and provide the potential for regulatory
arbitrage.”508 In and of itself, this conclusion of a lack of
compatibility makes clear that there can be little
“comparability” among the swaps regimes of the different
member countries that would justify “substituted
compliance.”
Moreover, by the end of 2012, only the United States,
through the July 21, 2010 passage of Dodd-Frank, and Japan
had enacted legislation meeting the G20 swaps reform
recommendations.509 Most other G20 countries, including the
EU, were “markedly behind.”510
Also, after the November G20 2012 meeting, the CFTC
Division of Swap Dealer and Intermediary Oversight
(“DSIO”) issued an advisory that certain important DoddFrank swaps rules would apply to non-U.S. CFTC-registered
persons, i.e., foreign institutions registered with the CFTC as
SDs, if there were no corresponding foreign swaps rules
within their home country.511
At that time, roughly four years after the meltdown,
none of the G20 nations, except the United States through
Dodd-Frank and Japan, had adopted their own complete
swaps regulatory regime despite the prior 2008-2009
commitments made by the G20 in the immediate wake of the
crisis. There was vociferous outrage about the CFTC’s initial
DSIO advisory among those G20 nations without completed
Id.
See Jackson & Miller, supra note 503, at Summary and 10.
510 Id. at 11.
511 Press Release, U.S. CFTC, Applicability of Transaction-Level
Requirements to Activity in the United States (Nov. 14, 2013),
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6771-13.
508
509
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swaps regimes. That outrage was repeatedly expressed
through, inter alia, direct contacts with top U.S. financial
regulators. The complaints stated that the CFTC’s proposal
that applied Dodd-Frank to foreign swaps dealers in
countries without complete swaps regulation, and who were
registered with the CFTC to conduct swaps trading, was
diplomatically inappropriate.
Faced with this international outrage (wholeheartedly
supported by, for example, U.S. bank holding company swaps
dealers and their representatives) other U.S. financial
regulators applied strong pressure on the CFTC to provide
relief to the complaining G20 countries.
In response, the CFTC’s DSIO staff, inter alia, through
informal “no-action” orders, suspended these important
Dodd-Frank swaps rules as applied to foreign CFTC
registrants even in countries with virtually no swaps
regulation. That exemption originally was to expire January
14, 2014, or days after Chairman Gensler (the strongest
Obama administration supporter of the extraterritorial
application of Dodd-Frank to large systemically risky U.S.
swaps dealers) left the CFTC.512 When he left at the end of
CFTC Staff Letter no. 13-71, No-Action Relief: Certain TransactionLevel Requirements for Non-U.S. Swap Dealers (Nov. 26, 2013),
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral
/documents/letter/13-71.pdf; Nihal S. Patel, United States: CFTC Extends
No-Action Relief For Non-U.S. Swap Dealers, MONDAQ (Aug. 11, 2017),
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/618862/Commodities+Derivative
s+Stock+Exchanges/CFTC+Extends+NoAction+Relief+For+NonUS+Sw
ap+Dealers (“The relief provided by the Divisions applies to swap dealers
(‘SDs’) who are non-U.S. persons and enter into transactions with other
non-U.S. persons (other than ‘guaranteed affiliates’ or ‘conduit affiliates’)
using personnel or agents in the United States to ‘arrange, negotiate, or
execute’ the transactions (referred to in the letter as ‘Covered
Transactions’). In accordance with previous letters (CFTC Staff Letter
Nos. 13-71, 14-01, 14-74, 14-140 and 15-48), the Divisions stated that they
will not recommend enforcement action against non-U.S. SDs (whether

512
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December 2013, Gensler was also unaware of the
“deguarantee loophole,” which did not appear on the CFTC’s
radar until May 2014; or of the assigning of swaps contracts
to newly deguaranteed subsidiaries that were otherwise
wholly arranged, negotiated, and executed in the U.S. by U.S.
bank personnel—a practice that apparently did not come to
light until 2016.513
However, because the G20 countries continued to
move slowly in creating their own swaps regulatory regimes,
and because of the ferocity of the G20 and U.S. bank swaps
deals’ lobbying against the CFTC’s adherence to Dodd-Frank,
the original preemption date of January 14, 2014, was
extended on a “time limited” basis, by the CFTC staff five
times: to September 15, 2014;514 December 31, 2014;515
or not the SDs are affiliated with U.S. persons) for failure to comply with
the following requirements in connection with Covered Transactions:
transaction-level requirements for Covered Transactions other than
those made with other non-U.S. SDs; and transaction-level requirements
(other than those in Regulations 23.503 (‘Portfolio compression’) and
23.504 (‘Swap trading relationship documentation’)) for Covered
Transactions with other non-U.S. SDs.”).
513 See supra notes 451–58 and accompanying text. Nor did Gensler know
before he left the CFTC in December 2013 that the original January 2014
deadline for foreign swaps traders registered by the CFTC as, inter alia,
swaps dealers to comply with Dodd-Frank’s swaps rules would be
extended by CFTC staff six times with the final January 25, 2017
extension having no deadline for compliance in rules would be extended
by CFTC staff six times with the final January 25, 2017 extension having
no deadline for compliance in any way. See infra notes 514–19.
514 CFTC Staff Letter no. 14-01, Extension of No-Action Relief:
Transaction-Level Requirements for Non-Swap Dealers (Jan. 3, 2014),
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral
/documents/letter/14-01.pdf.
515 CFTC Staff Letter no. 14-74, Extension of No-Action Relief:
Transaction-Level Requirements for Non-Swap Dealers (June 4, 2014),
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral
/documents/letter/14-74.pdf.
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September 30, 2015;516 September 30, 2016;517 and
September 30, 2017.518 On July 25, 2017,519 CFTC staff for a
sixth time exempted foreign swaps dealers registered to trade
swaps by the CFTC from certain important CFTC swaps
rules. Unlike the five previous “time limited” exemptions,
however, the July 25, 2017 exemption did not specify an end
date, stating only and confusingly that: “the Divisions believe
that an extension . . . is warranted until the effective date of
any Commission action addressing whether a particular
Transaction-Level Requirement is or is not applicable to a
Covered Transaction.”520
Under the CFTC staff no action regime, foreign swaps
dealers registered with the CFTC to do swaps business under
Dodd-Frank, inter alia, need not comply with key DoddFrank swaps regulations when trading with “non-U.S.
persons” (which would include newly deguaranteed foreign
subsidiaries of the four large U.S. bank holding companies).
This is so, even if the foreign swaps dealers’ home country
has no or inadequate applicable swaps regulation to take the
place of the ignored and otherwise applicable CFTC swaps
516

CFTC Staff Letter no. 14-140, Extension of No-Action Relief:
Transaction-Level Requirements for Non-Swap Dealers (Nov. 14, 2014),
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral
/documents/letter/14-140.pdf.
517 CFTC Staff Letter no. 15-48, Extension of No-Action Relief:
Transaction-Level Requirements for Non-Swap Dealers (Aug. 13, 2015),
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral
/documents/letter/15-48.pdf.
518 CFTC Staff Letter no. 16-64, Extension of No-Action Relief:
Transaction-Level Requirements for Non-Swap Dealers (Aug. 4, 2016),
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral
/documents/letter/16-64.pdf.
519 CFTC Staff Letter no. 17-36, Extension of No-Action Relief:
Transaction-Level Requirements for Non-Swap Dealers (July 25, 2017),
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral
/documents/letter/17-36.pdf.
520 Id.
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rules. This then is yet another unending CFTC staff-directed
exemption from key Dodd-Frank swaps regulation
requirements.
C. “Substituted Compliance” Threatens Global
Financial Stability and U.S. Taxpayers


1. Japan
On January 6, 2016, the CFTC made favorable “substituted
compliance” comparability determinations for Japan’s
margin requirements for uncleared swaps. However, CFTC
Commissioner Bowen issued a withering and highly
analytical dissent to this CFTC substituted compliance
approval by the remaining two CFTC commissioners.
Commissioner Bowen showed the extreme divergence of
Japanese swaps rules from those of the CFTC regarding the
Japanese: (1) lax requirements to keep customer margin safe
from default;521 (2) allowance of trading with counterparties
in bankruptcy-risky venues;522 and (3) the volatility and
521

Sharen Y. Bowen, Comm’r, CFTC, Dissenting Statement Regarding
Comparability Determination for Japan: Margin Requirements for
Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants (Sept.
8, 2016), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/bowenstate
ment090816b. The Commissioner stated, “[o]ur rules require customer
collateral to be held by a third party—not by either one of the
counterparties. This is a safeguard for bankruptcy. If the money is held
by one of the counterparties, then a bankruptcy court may use that money
to meet the counterparty’s debts.” Id.
522 See id. (“There are certain developing countries where there is little
certainty that collateral will be there if there is a bankruptcy (non-netting
jurisdictions), and/or where they do not adequately protect customer
funds from that of the dealer (‘non-segregation jurisdictions’). Under our
rules, our US dealers have to limit the way they trade with counterparties
in these bankruptcy-vulnerable jurisdictions because we are not
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instability of the collateral allowed by the Japanese – but not
the U.S.—to be eligible as margin.523
Commissioner Bowen noted that these significant
areas of divergence between Japanese and the United States’
margin rules would likely substantially compound
difficulties for swaps customers in bankruptcy proceedings of
failed Japanese swaps dealers where the collateral, unlike
that required by the United States, was so unreliable that it
would likely disappear by the time of bankruptcy. Bowen
illustrated this concern by showing that
Though these [Japanese-regulated]
companies are physically located in
Japan; their cash line runs right back
to the United States. That risk could
be borne again [upon Japanese
defaults or threatened defaults] by
American households. A comparability determination should not be
the back-door way of undoing or
weakening our regulations and
thereby incentivizing our companies
to send their risky business to their
affiliates located in Japan.524

confident that our American investors will get their money back in a
bankruptcy scenario.”).
523 See id. (“There are significant differences in the treatment of collateral
between our margin rule and the Japanese rule. First, while our rules
limit daily variation margin to cash for dealer-to-dealer swaps, under
Japanese law, variation margin could be in a number of much less liquid
instruments. And second, while we require a 25% haircut for certain
equities not included in the S&P 500, under Japanese law, equities
included in major equity indices of certain designated countries just have
a 15% blanket haircut.”).
524 Id. (emphasis added).
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2. The European Union


a. EU financial regulation generally
The EU has similarly been granted favorable CFTC
“substituted compliance” determinations in replacing the
CFTC’s rule requiring margin for uncleared swaps with a
much weaker EU margin rule.525 However, there have been
strong intimations that the EU extracted these favorable
rulings from the CFTC by threatening a swaps “trade war”
with the U.S. by threatening application of extremely harsh
EU rules to U.S. persons seeking to trade swaps within EU
countries. For example, EU “proposals would [have] force[d]
US investment banks such as Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan
to have additional capital and liquidity in the EU so their
subsidiaries [in the EU supposedly] can better withstand a
crisis and be separately wound up if needed by European
authorities.”526
In this regard, the Bank of England concluded that:
[u]nder EU proposals, non-EU banks
with significant activities in Europe
would be forced to group their
operation
under
“intermediate
holding companies” . . . The[se] plans
have largely been viewed as
retaliation against the US, . . . [These
EU] commission proposals “may not
be aligned with US rules on the
separation” of banks and broker
See Comparability Determination for European Union: Certain EntityLevel Requirements, 78 Fed. Reg. 78,923, 78,927–36 (Dec. 27, 2013).
526 Alex Barker, Jim Brunsden, & Martin Arnold, EU to Retaliate Against
US Bank Capital Rules, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.ft.com/
content/26078750-b003-11e6-a37c-f4a01f1b0fa1.
525
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dealers, . . . and are not in line with
international standards.
[The
British have] told [EU] counterparts
that . . . [it] believes the [EU]
measures are protectionist and anticompetitive.527

Elsewhere, certain EU swaps rules, applied only to
non-EU banks doing business in the EU, have been described
as an “attempt to build ‘walls’ around the EU. [T]his would
be an extreme version of extraterritorial effect of legislation,
one that would not go down well in other capitals . . . . We
have no trouble imagining that if the authorities in
Washington were writing in such terms, Brussels would be
up in arms.”528
The CFTC’s favorable EU “substituted compliance”
comparability
determination was therefore widely
recognized as an “olive branch to Europe,” to end an EU
inspired swaps trade war.529 In this regard, the CFTC’s
favorable EU substituted compliance determination was a
matter of rote, rather than guided by reality, in that that the
U.S. agency merely compared swaps regulatory language of
the EU to the U.S. rather than compare the regulatory effect
of the EU language. Just as one could not logically compare
free speech rights within the old Soviet Union to those of the
United Sates by merely reading those two countries’
Caroline Binham & Jim Brunsden, Bank of England Attacks Brussels
Bank Capital Reforms, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.ft.com/
content/600df898-e4ac-11e6-9645-c9357a75844a.
528 Phillip Stafford, Clearing Houses Saddled with ‘Too Big to Fail’ Tag,
FIN. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/3460ff68-edf011e6-930f-061b01e23655.
529 Frances Faulds, CFTC Offers Olive Branch to Europe, THE BANKER
(Mar. 11, 2014, 9:03 AM), https://www.thebanker.com/World/CFTCoffers-olive-branch-to-Europe/(language)/eng-GB.
527
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constitutional free speech language, by ignoring the complex
and lax application of the EU’s swaps regime, the CFTC
managed to mask a true comparability of the EU’s swaps
regulation to that of the United States.
For example, upon examination of the effect of EU
financial directives in the “real world,” it is clear that there
can be no viable comparability of the EU regulatory approach
with that of Dodd-Frank. It has been widely recognized that
“[t]here is no common regulatory philosophy between [EU]
Member States, let alone a common legal system.”530 This
starting premise of the EU swaps regulation certainly does
not bode well for a “comparability” finding with the U.S.
when there is so little comparability among EU members.
Indeed, the “[n]ew European Union rules [, supposedly]
designed to bring stability and clarity to opaque derivatives
markets [,] are sowing confusion . . . raising more questions
than answers.”531 The EU has “a rule book without totally
defined rules . . . . Is it going to protect anybody? No. Will it
stop rogue traders? No. So what is it for?”532
The U.S. Department of the Treasury, in a report to
President Trump, has at least tacitly acknowledged the
problem of examining the language and not the effects
regarding substituted compliance, by recommending that the
CFTC and SEC “adopt substituted compliance regimes . . . in
an outcomes-based approach, in their entirety, rather than
Georges Ugeux, Can Europe Produce a Coherent and Effective
Financial Regulation?, COLUM. J. EUR. L. ONLINE at 4 (2012),
https://galileoglobalgroup.com/gga/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/11gga_media_ColumbiaJournalofEuropeanLawOnline-102012.pdf.
531 Alexander Winning, EU Derivatives Rules Sow Confusion in Metals
Markets, REUTERS (Feb. 26, 2014, 4:51 AM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/lme-derivatives-idUSL6N0LT1IL20140226.
532 Id.
530
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relying on rule-by-rule analysis.”533 It also acknowledged the
general issues in extra-territorial application of swaps
regulation and the uncertainty caused by the CFTC’s
constant extension of its no-action relief letter.534 However,
the report does not explicitly recognize the deguarantee
loophole or the risk that loophole may pose, and seems to
favor less extraterritorial application overall.535 One of the
claimed principal concerns of the Treasury Department’s
recommendations is that market participants have argued
that “the cross-border application of U.S. rules has
contributed to . . . foreign entities avoid[ing] trading with
U.S. counterparties for fear of being captured by the U.S.
regulatory regime.”536 What the report’s concerns and
proffered solutions seem to ignore, however, is the volume of
trades that occur among “foreign” entities that have been set
up expressly for the purpose of evading Dodd-Frank and not
for the sake of vying for business from legitimate foreign
counterparties. The report does not explain how its solutions
would deal with such entities, reduce the systemic risk they
might create, or how they would result in the “outcome’ of
principal importance: avoiding another major financial crisis.
As will be discussed immediately below, even if the CFTC
adopted an “outcomes-based” cross-border application
regime, it is unlikely that many EU member-states could
truly meet its requirements.
The EU rules are often described as a “quagmire of
uncertainties.”537 For example, because “Europe does not
533 DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 15, at 135 (emphasis added.). See
also GIANCARLO WHITE PAPER, supra note 464 (also supporting an
“outcomes-based” substituted compliance regime).
534 See generally DEPT’ OF THE TREASURY, supra note 15.
535 Id.
536 Id. at 134.
537 Winning, supra note 531; see also James Politi, Italian Central Bank
Chief Blames Recession and EU rules for Bank Collapses, FIN. TIMES
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require [the] use [of] a regulated exchange to ensure
transparency and the clearing of derivative transactions . . .
[i]t is an area where the risk of regulatory arbitrage is real
and could lead to market distortions.”538 Furthermore,
several financial observers have sounded the alarm that,
because of banking weakness throughout the EU and the
increasing success of populist political parties within the EU
member countries that want to abandon the union entirely,
the EU as a whole is nearing “economic crisis,”539 with many
reasoning that it is because the EU "was always the most
fragile and fragmented economic entity.”540
b. Greece and Cyprus
Because of the laxity in EU financial regulatory rules, EU
country banking systems have shown substantial weakness
under the EU financial regulatory paradigm. One example,
as it has been shown extensively above, is the weakness of
the Greek economy and banking system.541 Another EU
country, Cyprus was so adversely affected by the Greek
dysfunctions, it also required a bailout for its failing banks
(Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/601d5637-f181-38ed-b8ff5efcb8d087c0.
538 Ugeux, supra note 530, at 20-21.
539 Zoltan Ban, The EU Serves as Early Warning as It Nears Economic
Crisis, SEEKING ALPHA, Feb. 26, 2019. https://seekingalpha.com/article/
4244104-eu-serves-early-warning-nears-economic-crisis. See also Here
Comes the Next Euro Crisis, POLITICO, Nov. 21, 2018, https://
www.politico.eu/article/here-comes-the-next-euro-crisis; Matt C. Klein,
Get Ready for Europe’s Next Crisis, BARRON’S, Dec. 23, 2018,
https://www.barrons.com/articles/europe-economic-crisis-is-coming51545951011 (stating that “[t]he latest official data show the euro area
growing at the slowest annual rate in more than four years” and
“Europe’s incomplete monetary union makes it especially fragile”).
540 Ban, supra note 539.
541 See supra Part III.C.1.
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from the EU in 2012.542 Despite being a “tiny island nation,”
the Cyprus banking problems put “the entire Eurozone on
red alert” because of the large number of wealthy Russians
that had used the nation’s banks as a tax haven.543 As such,
the amount of assets held by Cyprus’ banks was considerably
larger than its GDP, and the fallout had global
implications.544
c. Italy
By the end of fall 2018, Italian banks were reported to have
211 billion euros in non-performing loans, which the World
Bank estimates is about 14.4% of all Italian bank loans.545 As
a widespread practice, Italian banks regularly “loaned money
to hundreds of small companies that had no business taking
on debt.”546 Consequently, it is considered by experts to be
Cyprus Asks EU for Financial Bailout, AL JAZEERA (June 25, 2012),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2012/06/201262517189248721.h
tml.
543 Ned Resnikoff, Cyprus Disaster Shines Light on Global Tax Haven
Industry, MSNBC (Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.msnbc.com/the-ed-show/
cyprus-disaster-shines-light-global-tax-ha.
544 Id.
545 Going South: Bad Loans Remain a Concern in Italy and Across
Southern Europe, THE ECONOMIST, (May 26, 2018), https://www.
economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/05/26/bad-loans-remain-aconcern-in-italy-and-across-southern-europe (noting that the amount of
non-performing loans held by Italian banks were the largest in the EU by
the end of 2017); Bank Nonperforming Loans to Total Gross Loans—Italy,
THE WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FB.AST.NPER.
ZS?locations=IT (last visited Apr. 23, 2019). A non-performing loan is
defined as “a loan on which the borrower is not making interest payments
or repaying any principal.” Definition of Non-Performing Loan NPL, FIN.
TIMES, http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=non_performing-loan--NPL (last
visited Mar. 29, 2017).
546 Jim Edwards, Italy’s Banks Might Need a €52 Billion Bailout, BUS.
INSIDER (Nov. 29, 2016, 8:54 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/stat
542
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likely that the overwhelming majority of these Italian bank
loans will remain unpaid.
In the past four years, eleven Italian banks have been
bailed out and wound down by the government or “rescued
via takeover or the arrival of a big investor,” including Banca
Monte dei Paschi di Siena, the oldest surviving and operating
bank in the world.547
The dissatisfaction of Italians with that country’s
deteriorating financial infrastructure were laid bare in the
March 4, 2018 Italian election, resulting in substantial gains
for the anti-establishment party, the Five Star Movement
istics-non-performing-loans-npls-italy-banking-system-2016-11; see also
Rachel Sanderson, Once-Thriving Veneto Becomes Heart of Italy’s Bank
Crisis, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/04869ecab15e-11e6-9c37-5787335499a0 (“The banks’ close relationships with
customers led to cozy banking practices, such as the award of azioni
baciate, or kissing shares, which backfired as business failures mounted
and the money ran out.”).
547 Foo Yun Chee, Stephen Jewkes & Antonella Cinelli, EU Clears Italy’s
$6 Billion State Bailout for Monte dei Paschi, REUTERS (July 4, 2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-montepaschi-stateaid/eu-clearsitalys-6-billion-state-bailout-for-monte-dei-paschi-idUSKBN19P1PQ
(describing Italy’s bailout of MPS); Rachel Sanderson, Alex Barker &
Claire Jones, Italy Sets Aside €17bn to Wind Down Failing Lenders, FIN.
TIMES (June 25, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/83ad52a8-59a5-11e79bc8-8055f264aa8b (describing the bailout of Banca Popolare di Vicenza
and Veneto Banca); Robert Smith, Banca Carige Shows that Italy
Remains Master of the Bank Bailout, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/c0cb7604-1332-11e9-a581-4ff78404524e
(discussing the Italian government’s decision to bailout Banca Carige
despite promises not to support ailing lenders by the newly empowered
Five Star Movement party and while working around “supposedly tough”
new EU rules regarding bailouts).
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(“M5S”).548 But little improvement has been seen.549
Currently, almost a third of young Italians are jobless and
about twenty percent of the total population is deemed “at
risk of poverty.”550
Larry Elliot, A Perfect Economic Storm Made Italy Ripe for a Protest
Vote, GUARDIAN (Mar. 5, 2018, 1:15 PM), https://www.theguardian.
com/world/2018/mar/05/italy-election-perfect-economic-storm-ripe-for-aprotest-vote (explaining that the stagnant Italian party facilitated
substantial gains for anti-establishment political parties).
549 See, e.g., Annalisa Merelli, Italy’s New “Political Government” Will be
a Technical Government, Minus the Expertise, QUARTZ (May 22, 2018),
https://qz.com/1284254/italy-analysis-five-star-movement-and-lega-nord
-have-a-coalition-goxvernment (reporting that the Five Star Movement
and the Far Right League had made a deal to have a coalition government
after two and a half months). However, the Five Star Movement’s
popularity has since begun to wane. See also Holly Ellyatt, Italy’s Antiestablishment M5S Could be Headed for ‘Political Disaster’ as Support
Collapses, CNBC (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/26/italym5s-could-be-headed-for-political-disaster-after-regional-collapse.html
(noting that despite its popularity in the 2018 elections, poor results for
the Five Star Movement in a recent regional election may foreshadow
similarly poor results in the European Parliament elections in May).
550 Italy Youth Unemployment Rate, TRADING ECONOMICS, https://
tradingeconomics.com/italy/youth-unemployment-rate (last visited Apr.
19, 2019); Freddy Tennyson & Claudio Lavanga, One-Fifth of Italian
Citizens Deemed “At Risk of Poverty—Will New Income Scheme Inspire
Them?, EURONEWS (Mar 6, 2019), https://www.euronews.com/2019/03/06/
one-fifth-of-italian-citizens-deemed-at-risk-of-poverty-will-new-incomescheme-inspire-the; Miles Johnson, Italian Populists Concede Sharply
Lower Economic Growth This Year, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2019)
https://www.ft.com/content/c48db112-5af9-11e9-9dde-7aedca0a081a
(reporting that the Italian government “has formally conceded that
economic growth will be sharply lower this year than it had previously
forecast” which will mean the economy will “burst through the cap on its
budget deficit [2.4% of GDP] that was only agreed with the European
Commission late last year . . .).
548

382



Journal of Business & Technology Law

MICHAEL GREENBERGER

The Italian economy is experiencing sharply lower
economic growth.551 Worse, some economists believe Italy is
now trapped in a “perma-recession” with its debt posing a
“systemic risk for the euro-zone as a whole.”552
The International Monetary Fund projects that Italy’s
budget deficit will continue to grow “in chronic violation of
the Maastricht treaty.”553 This has contributed to the waning
popularity of M56; however, anti-establishment, right-wing
populist, and/or Eurosceptic political parties continue to gain
momentum in Italy and the rest of the euro zone in the runup to the next European Parliament elections.554 These
parties tend to see “Brussels, international banks, and
multinational corporations” as the “enemy,”555 and a
Miles Johnson, Italian Populists Concede Sharply Lower Economic
Growth This Year, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/
c48db112-5af9-11e9-9dde-7aedca0a081a (reporting that the Italian
government “has formally conceded that economic growth will be sharply
lower this year than it had previously forecast” which will mean the
economy will “burst through the cap on its budget deficit [from 2% to 2.4%
of GDP] that was only agreed with the European Commission late last
year . . .).
552 Jim Edwards, Italy’s ‘Perma-recession’ Could Trigger a €2 Trillion
Financial Crisis that Threatens the Eurozone Itself, BUS. INSIDER (Apr.
22, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/italy-perma-recession-syste
mic-crisis-threatens-eurozone-2019-4.
553 Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Macron’s Brexit Brinkmanship Risks
Pushing Italy Over the Edge, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Apr. 11, 2019)
https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/7ed22bf7-2d58-46ce-80c7-ba369
33f1900/?context=1000516.
554 See, e.g., Jon Stone, EU Election Polls: Right-wing Populist and
Eurosceptic Parties Would be Biggest Single Group in European
Parliament, INDEPENDENT (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.indepe
ndent.co.uk/news/world/europe/eu-election-polls-european-parliamentsalvini-orban-conservatives-a8876011.html (projecting that Eurosceptic
parties may win 184 seats in the May European parliament elections).
555 See, e.g., Alexander Stille, How Matteo Salvini Pulled Italy to the Far
Right, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/news/
551
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nationalist-leaning power balance in the European
Parliament could further diminish the possibility of forging a
more uniform regulatory philosophy and application among
EU member-states.
d. Spain and Portugal
Italy is far from an isolated example of European bank
distress. For example, bank failures also threaten the
financial security of both Spain and Portugal.556 In June
2017, Spain’s sixth largest lender, Banco Popular, was sold
to Banco Santander for 1 Euro.557 Three months earlier,
Spain’s Bankia and Banco Mare Nostrum (BMN) both failed
2018/aug/09/how-matteo-salvini-pulled-italy-to-the-far-right (analyzing
the growing popularity of the Lega party and its leader after becoming a
nationalist party).
556 See, e.g., Sarah Gordon, Bankia A Symbol of Europe’s New Banking
Wobble, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/1078df3ada55-11e5-a72f-1e7744c66818 (discussing how the near collapse of
Bankia, one of Spain’s largest banking institutions, cost the country and
its taxpayers billions in “a series of bailouts.”); see also Elena Holodny,
Italy Isn’t the Only European Country with ‘a Systemic Banking Crisis’,
BUS. INSIDER (July 12, 2016, 4:45 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
portugal-banking-crisis-2016-7 (“Regarding Portugal’s financial system,
its banks are loaded with bad debts and are starved for capital . . . .
Portugal’s largest deposit taker, Caixa Geral de Depositors, needs a cash
injection of 5 billion euros ($5.53 billion), while its largest private bank,
BCP, is facing similar issues and may need an estimated 2.5 billion euros
($2.76 billion) . . . .”).
557 See, e.g., Jim Brunsden, Eurozone is Learning to Deal with Failed
Banks, Regulator Says, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2019), https://www.ft.com/con
tent/9816d9d6-04fc-11e9-9d01-cd4d49afbbe3 (describing the operations
of the eurozone’s Single Resolution Board and its resolution of Banco
Popular’s failure in 2017).
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and had to merge.558 In 2018, Portugal had to prop up its “socalled ‘good bank,’” Novo Banco with a €1.1 billion injection
of funds.559
e. Germany
Moreover, Germany has been plagued with banking crises.
Since 2008,
Deutsche Bank has faced numerous
lawsuits and investigations over its
alleged role in rigging of interest-rate
benchmarks and commodity prices,
violations of US sanctions and misselling mortgage backed securities.
Even after paying over $16 [billion] in
fines and settlements worldwide . . .
for serious misconduct, the troubles
of [that bank] are not yet over[,] as it
has lost more than half of its value in
2016.560

Accordingly, Deutsche Bank, the largest continental
European bank in deposits, has been widely recognized as
being on the brink of possible collapse. Under the watchful
eye of the EU financial regulators, “Deutsche Bank failed the
U.S. Fed’s stress test . . . ,” and it is “sitting on a mountain of
See, e.g., George Mills, Spain Greenlights Merger of Bankia and Banco
Mare Nostrum, EL PAIS (Mar. 15, 2017), https://elpais.com/elpais/
2017/03/15/inenglish/1489573772_758618.html.
559 Peter Wise, Portugal’s Novo Banco to Receive New Capital Injection
after Posting €1.4 bn Loss, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.
ft.com/content/a8ded072-3c5e-11e9-b856-5404d3811663. Novo Banco
was considered the “’good bank’ rescued from the ruins of Banco
Espírito Santo in 2014.” Id.
560 WEED, supra note 352, at 13.
558
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derivatives, estimated to be as high as $75 trillion.”561 During
the first quarter of 2018, James von Moltke, Deutsche Bank’s
chief financial officer, announced that the Deutsche Bank’s
investment banking division would lose €450m in revenue
due to “the strong euro and higher refinancing costs . . . .”562
Furthermore, Two Deutsche Bank traders have been
convicted for manipulating the global benchmark listed in
interest rate swaps.563
In this regard, “[i]n June 2016, the IMF in its report
on Financial System Stability Assessment on Germany
stated that ‘among the G-SIBs (globally systemically
important banks), Deutsche Bank appears to be the most
important net contributor to systemic risks, followed by the
[United Kingdom’s] HSBC and [Switzerland’s] Credit
561 Daryl Montgomery, Coming Soon from Europe: The Next Global
Financial Crisis, SEEKING ALPHA (July 7, 2016, 5:50 PM), https://
seekingalpha.com/article/3987017-coming-soon-europe-next-global-finan
cial-crisis.
562 Olaf Storbeck, Deutsche Bank Slides After Warning on €450 Q1
Headwind, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/
4a8e0bba-2d13-11e8-a34a-7e7563b0b0f4. See also William Canny,
“Deutsche Bank's Bad News Gets Worse With $35 Billion Flub”,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 20, 2018, 12:20 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2018-04-19/deutsche-bank-flub-said-to-send-35-billionbriefly-out-the-door (stating that Deutsche Bank “inadvertently
transferred 28 billion euros ($35 billion) to one of its outside accounts . . .
. The routine payment that went awry last month was one that
Germany’s biggest lender unintentionally sent to an exchange as part of
its daily dealings in derivatives, a person familiar with the matter said.”);
Richard Milne, Latvia banking scandal leaves Europe’s regulators redfaced, FIN. TIMES: INSIDE BUSINESS (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.ft.com/
content/b396d6ac-37f2-11e8-8eee-e06bde01c544.
563 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Two Former Deutsche
Bank Trader Convicted for Role in Scheme to Manipulate a Critical
Global Benchmark Interest Rate [hereinafter “DOJ Press Release”] (Oct.
17, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-former-deutsche-bank-trad
ers-convicted-role-scheme-manipulate-critical-global-benchmark.

386



Journal of Business & Technology Law

MICHAEL GREENBERGER

Suisse.’”564 It has been estimated that a “failure of Deutsche
Bank may trigger a far bigger financial crisis than the 2008
crisis. As Deutsche Bank is highly interconnected with other
big banks and insurance companies in Germany, there is a
valid concern that it could pose a systemic threat to
Germany’s entire financial sector.”565
In result, and with the encouragement of the German
government, Deutsche Bank had been in merger talks with
Germany’s second largest bank, Commerzbank, because
Deutsche Bank “has struggled to generate sustainable profits
since the 2008 financial crisis.”566 The merger talks as of this
writing seem to have failed,567 but not before news of the
merger amplified concerns of systemic risk within the
German banking system568 and caused financial observers to
note that the problems which drove the banks to consider
merger are a “sign that something is wrong at the heart of
WEED, supra note 352, at 13.
Id.
566 REUTERS, Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank go Public in Merger Talks
(Mar. 17, 2019) https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/17/deutsche-bank-a ndcommerzbank-go-public-on-merger-talks.html (reporting on Deutsche
Bank’s struggle to generate profits); Silvia Amaro, Deutsche Bank Swings
to First Full-Year Net Profit Since 2014, CNBC (Feb. 1, 2019),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/01/deutsche-bank-earnings-q4-2018.html
(but also noting that it still failed to meet market expectations and
sustained a large fourth quarter loss).
567 Silvia Amaro, Spriha Srivastava, Deutsche Bank-Commerzbank
Merger Talks Collapse, CNBC (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/
2019/04/25/deutsche-bank-and-commerzbank-merger-talks-collapse.
html.
568 See, e.g., Olaf Storbeck, Officials ‘Unconcerned’ by Deutsche BankCommerzbank Merger Risks, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.
ft.com/content/fe61ae6c-5c42-11e9-9dde-7aedca0a081a (stating officials
are “unconcerned” of additional systemic risk posed by the merger
because Deutsche Bank is already “too big to fail” regardless of the
merger, and that “’German government obviously does not believe in the
assumption that systemically important banks can be wound down”).
564
565
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the euro zone’s half-formed banking union.”569 In light of the
failed merger talks, those problems persist.
If destabilizing financial infrastructure performance
occurs in Germany, for example, it defies the imagination
how any EU-driven swaps regulatory regime could serve as
a proper ‘substitute’ for Dodd-Frank as applied to the four
large U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers, especially
when U.S.—not EU—taxpayers are understood to be those
U.S. banks’ lender of last resort—as they were in 2008.
3. The United Kingdom


If the banking problems that are rippling through the
continental European banks do not sufficiently raise the level
of concern about deferring to EU financial regulatory law to
regulate the swaps of, inter alia, the four biggest U.S. bank
holding company swaps dealers, then the prospect of
applying the United Kingdom’s financial regulation,
especially if as seems likely the U.K. goes outside of the EU
under “Brexit,” should certainly tip the scales. London’s
financial services center, the so-called “City,” has been the
home to many of the most troubling financial regulatory
calamities immediately before, during, and after the
financial 2008 meltdown.
a. Northern Rock
The massive 2007 failure at Britain’s Northern Rock bank
demonstrates the nexus between the U.K.’s once highly
lauded “light touch regulation” and the increased risk of
Ferdinando Giugliano, There is an Alternative for Deutsche Bank,
BLOOMBERG, (Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/arti
cles/2019-03-29/deutsche-bank-there-is-an-alternative-to-commerzbankdeal.
569
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systemically significant big bank failures. Relying on a
business model which prioritized “short-term funding from
the wholesale market to make long-term mortgage loans,”570
Northern Rock was forced to ask the Bank of England for an
unprecedented, emergency bail out in 2007. The very-public
€25 billion loan resulted in massive queuing outside of
Northern Rock branches, as customers lined up to withdraw
billions of pounds.571 The “lines of Northern Rock depositors”
“through many main streets across the U.K. provided a vivid
demonstration of [financial] regulatory crisis.”572 And, the
regulatory response to that failure has been described as a
“serious test of the workability of the regulatory model
exemplified by” Northern Rock's then-U.K. financial
regulator.573 One leading financial academic noted that, “in
spite of the promise [by British financial regulators] of
cohesive, clear, and consolidated [financial market]
oversight, the conduct of [those regulators] in preventing the
Northern Rock debacle, and in reacting to it subsequently,
fell substantially short of expectations.”574
The U.K.’s own HM Treasury Select Committee, in its
report on the failure of Northern Rock, noted that Britain’s
inadequate financial regulatory structure, had contributed to
the state of affairs that culminated in the U.K.’s first bank
Brooke Masters, Northern Rock Exposed Regulatory Failings, FIN.
TIMES (Sept. 12, 2012), https://www.ft.com/content/7bb1ab1a-fc00-11e1af33-00144feabdc0.
571 Alan G. Hallsworth & Frank Skinner, Visibly in Trouble: Northern
Rock, a Post-Mortem on a Financial Crisis, 40 ROYAL GEOGRAPHICAL
SOC’Y 278 (2008).
572 Yesha Yadav, Looking for the Silver Lining, Regulatory Reform After
the Credit Crunch, 15 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 314, 334 (2010).
573 Id.
574 Id. (citing FIN. SVCS. AUTHORITY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE
INTERNAL AUDIT REPORT (Mar. 26, 2008), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/
other/exec_ summary.pdf.
570
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run since the Victorian era.575 The then-prime British
regulator, the Financial Services Authority (“FSA”),
identified numerous serious failures in its oversight in its
report on its handling of the Northern Rock crisis. 576
Throughout the Northern Rock crisis, a major
criticism leveled at British financial regulation was of the
lack of readiness displayed in acknowledging and reacting to
the extent and depth of Northern Rock's troubles.577 The
dysfunction among British regulators during that crisis
belied a fundamental incompatibility in the regulatory
priorities of the U.K. financial regulatory institutions, rather
than “demonstrating the coordination that had been
promised and practiced in trial runs conducted by [those
regulators] for just such a crisis.”578
Generously described, the U.K “[h]as a fragmented
regulatory system, consisting of regulators that are keen to
pass on their responsibilities to others. Overlapping U.K.
financial regulatory structures squander time and resources,
making it difficult for regulation to be both effective and
timely.”579

TREASURY COMMITTEE, THE RUN ON THE ROCK, 2007-8, HC 56–I, at 5
(UK).
576 Id.
577 Id. at 34 (“The failure of Northern rock, while a failure of its own
Board, was also a failure of its regulator . . . . [T]he Financial Services
Authority exercises a judgment as to which ‘concerns’ about financial
institutions should be regarded as systemic and thus require action by
the regulator. In the case of Northern Rock, the FSA appears to have
systematically failed in its duty as a regulator to ensure Northern Rock
would not pose such a systemic risk . . . .”).
578 Yadav, supra note 572, at 338.
579 ‘Captured Regulators, Impunity Behind HSBCs Decision to Keep HQ
in London’ — Experts, REUTERS (Feb. 17, 2016, 6:13 PM),
https://www.rt.com/uk/332791-hsbc-city-hq-remain.
575
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b. HSBC’s Money Laundering
Britain’s HSBC laundered nearly $1 billion of drug and terror
money on behalf of the Mexican Sinaloa and Colombian
Norte del Valle drug cartels, and it violated international
sanctions by offering banking services to Iran, Cuba, Burma,
Libya, and Sudan.580 Despite this unprecedented illegal
behavior, U.K. regulators did not prosecute, or otherwise
sanction HSBC or its officers and employees involved in this
widespread misconduct. Rather, British financial regulators
and HSBC together exerted their influence within the British
Government, to put unrelenting pressure on the U.S.
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to: (1) not prosecute HSBC in
the United States under U.S. criminal law; and (2) otherwise
lobby hard and successfully for the lowering of the
substantial proposed civil penalties to be assessed by DOJ on
HSBC.581 The British lobbying of the DOJ consisted mainly
of “warn[ings] that prosecuting a ‘systemically important
financial institution’ like HSBC ‘could lead to [financial]
contagion’ and pose ‘very serious implications for financial
and economic stability, particularly in Europe and Asia.’”582
It was also contended: “If HSBC had been found guilty of the
potential charges, the US government would have been
required to review and possibly revoke HSBC’s charter to do
business in the US. The [British government] repeatedly
warned that even the threat of possible charter withdrawal
could have caused a fresh global financial crisis.”583 In the
580 Rupert Neate, HSBC Escaped US Money-Laundering Charges
Osborne’s Intervention, GUARDIAN (July 11, 2016, 3:36
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jul/11/hsbc-us-moneylaundering-george-osborne-report.
581 Id.; 'Captured Regulators, Impunity Behind HSBCs Decision to
HQ in London' – Experts, REUTERS (Feb. 17, 2016, 6:13
https://www.rt.com/uk/332791-hsbc-city-hq-remain.
582 Neate, supra note 580 (second alteration in the original).
583 Id. (emphasis added).
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end, the DOJ did not prosecute HSBC; it lowered
substantially the civil fines it assessed; and it did not trigger
a review of HSBC’s right to conduct business in the U.S.
That the “light touch” financial regulatory handling of
HSBC by the U.K. government had no long-lasting remedial
effect is made clear by recent investigative journalistic
reports that HSBC has also laundered $740 million in
Russian organized crime funds; whereas, RBS, majorityowned by the U.K. government, handled $113 million in
Russian laundered money from a network originally dubbed
the “Global Laundromat,” Now widely referred to as the
“Russian Laundromat,”584 it has been ranked as “the world’s
biggest money-laundering scandal.585
Further damaging the U.K.’s financial regulatory
regime’s reputation regarding this scandal, Danske,
Denmark’s (a member of the EU) largest bank published a
report acknowledging that it also had been—unwittingly—
involved in the Laundromat.586 While making this admission
however, Danske’s report also found that even more UK
financial entities were implicated through it, those entities
being “vehicle[s] of choice for money launderers around the
world” because of their “completely permissive attitude
toward money laundering.”587
The Guardian broke the “Laundromat” scandal
stating that financial records showed that Russians moved
“at least $20 billion” out of the country between 2010 and
Zeke Faux & Yalman Onaran, Laundered Russian Cash went Through
Big Banks, Guardian Says, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 20, 2017, 2:08 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-20/launderedrussian-cash-flowed-through-major-banks-guardian-says.
585 Caroline Binhaim, London’s Role in Danske Dirty Money Scandal
Under Spotlight, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/
ba1a0c2a-bdb6-11e8-94b2-17176fbf93f5.
586 Faux & Onaran, supra note 584.
587 Id.
584
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2014, and a portion of that amount “ended up at overseas
banks.”588 In addition to HSBC, the records implicated a
number of other prominent banks, including RBS, which
allegedly handled $113 million of Global Laundromat cash.589
Other cited banks were Standard Chartered Plc, UBS Group
AG, Citigroup Inc., Bank of America Corp., Barclays Plc, and
ING Group NV, which are said to have processed between $2
million and $37 million.590 Moreover, U.S. regulators have
begun probing Sweden’s Swedbank (also within EU financial
regulatory jurisdiction) for involvement in this money
laundering scandal.591 In response to these allegations,
HSBC replied: “HSBC is strongly committed to fighting
financial crime. The bank has systems and processes in place
to identify suspicious activity and report it to the appropriate
government authorities . . . .”592
c. The Libor Fixing Scandal
At the center of the now notorious Libor London interest rate
fixing scandal were the U.K.’s Barclays Bank and Barclays
Capital, which, inter alia, were found to have manipulated
and made false reports concerning the published Libor
Id.
Id.
590 Id.
591 Richard Milne, US Regulator Starts Probe into Money Laundering at
Swedbank, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.ft.com/
content/acc757b0-507a-11e9-b401-8d9ef1626294 (“US regulators have
launched multiple inquiries into the rapidly expanding moneylaundering scandal at Swedbank, demanding more information on the
Swedish bank’s conduct amid new allegations that it handled €135bn
from high-risk clients.”).
592 Russian Money and the ‘Global Laundromat’: What Banks Said,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/
mar/20/russian-money-and-the-global-laundromat-what-uk-banks-said.
588
589
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benchmark for interest rate swaps index.593 One Wall Street
Journal editor and author has recently explained in a
thorough analysis of this Libor bank manipulation:
[Libor is] often known as the world’s
most important number. Financial
instruments all over the globe—a
volume so awesome, well into the
tens of trillions of dollars, that it is
hard to accurately quantify—hinge
on tiny movements in Libor. In the
United States, the interest rates on
the most variable-rate mortgages are
based on Libor. So are many auto
loans, student loans, credit card loans
. . . almost anything that doesn’t have
a fixed interest rate. The amounts
that
big
companies
pay
on
multibillion-dollar loans are determined by Libor . . . . Pension funds,
university endowments, cities and
towns, small businesses and giant
companies all use them to speculate
on or protect themselves against
swings in interest rates. So if
something was wrong with Libor, the
pool of potential victims would be
vast. As it turned out, something
wasn’t wrong with Libor, everything
was.594

Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Orders Barclays to Pay $200 Million
Penalty for Attempted Manipulation of and False Reporting Concerning
LIBOR and Euribor Benchmark Interest Rates (June 27, 2012),
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6289-12.
594 See ENRICH, supra note 93, at 5.
593
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One thing is certain: those harms from manipulating
Libor far exceeded the fines and penalties that were
extracted during settlement of the misconduct.595 In May
2015, the Department of Justice announced that four major
banks—Citicorp, JPMorgan Chase, Barclays PLC, and RBS
— pled guilty to felony charges for “conspiring to manipulate
the price of U.S. dollars and euros exchanged in the foreign
currency exchange (FX) spot market.”596 In all, the criminal
fines totaled over $2.5 billion, which was to be paid to the
Department of Justice and U.S. regulators.597 Pleading guilty
to one separate felony count of wire fraud in connection to its
manipulation of Libor, UBS was fined $203 million.598
Attempts, however, by U.K. and U.S. prosecutors to gain
criminal convictions after a trial have generally proven quite
elusive.599
Id.; see also Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Five Major Banks Agree to
Parent-Level Guilty Pleas (May 20, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
five-major-banks-agree-parent-level-guilty-pleas. The criminal fines
owed by each bank is as follows: Citicorp—$925 million, Barclays—$650
million, JPMorgan—$550 million, and RBS—$395 million. Id.
596 DOJ Press Release, supra note 563.
597 Id.
598 Id.
599 Chris Dolmetsch, Libor-Rigging Judge’s Musings Raise Doubt About
U.S. Prosecution, BLOOMBERG MKT. (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-29/libor-rigging-judge-s-musingsraise-doubt-about-u-s-prosecution (“A judge voiced skepticism of a U.S.
case against two former Deutsche Bank AG traders charged with rigging
the Libor interest-rate benchmark, questioning whether the government
will be able to present sufficient evidence to convict the pair.”); Chad
Bray, Two Former Barclays Traders Acquitted in Libor Retrial, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/business/
dealbook/stylianos-contogoulas-ryan-reich-barclays-acquitted-libor.html
(detailing how attempts to convict individual traders on criminal charges
for manipulation of interest-rate benchmarks in both the U.K and U.S.
have been difficult as six former brokers from financial firms and two
former Barclays traders have been acquitted of conspiracy to defraud
595
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Establishing Libor in 1986, the British Banker’s
Association (“BBA”) oversaw the calculation of Libor rates for
nearly three decades.600 In September 2012, the British
Government commissioned a report to review Libor.601
Referred to as the Wheatley Review, the main
recommendation issued by the report was that
administration of Libor be transferred to a new
administrator: “The BBA should transfer responsibility to a
new administrator, who will be responsible for compiling and
distributing the rate, as well as providing credible internal
governance and oversight. This should be achieved through a
tender process to be run by an independent committee
convened by the regulatory authorities.”602 In 2014, the Hogg
Tendering Advisory Committee replaced the BBA with the
Intercontinental Exchange Group (ICE), which has since
worked to impose greater transparency and oversight.603
charges in the U.K); see also Chad Bray, Convictions of 2 Former Traders
in Libor Scandal Are Dismissed, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/19/business/dealbook/convictions-of-2former-traders-in-libor-scandal-are-dismissed.html (noting that in 2017,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed
conspiracy and fraud charges against two former traders in “what had
been the first American criminal case to arise from investigations into”
the Libor scandal); but see Barney Thompson, Jailed Libor Trader Hayes
Loses Appeal Over Family House Sale, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/b27b5226-32a1-11e8-ac48-10c6fdc22f03
(“Tom Hayes, the former UBS and Citigroup trader who was jailed for
conspiring to rig the Libor benchmark interest rate, has lost his appeal
against a confiscation order that forced his wife to sell their family
home.”).
600 John Kiff, What is Libor?, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Dec. 2012),
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2012/12/basics.htm. .
601 Prableen Bajpai, Why BBA Libor Was Replaced by ICE Libor,
INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/
investing/033115/why-bba-libor-was-replaced-ice-libor.asp.
602 Id.
603 Id.
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d. Brexit
The U.K.’s likely departure from the EU creates a further
shroud of uncertainty over what form swaps regulations may
take in the U.K. once it is freed of any EU constraints.604
Alarm bells have been ringing over Britain’s likely
future loss of the EU “passport” rule, under which London
banks would no longer automatically have license to do
business throughout the EU.605 However, that potential lost
business is likely to pale in comparison to the increased
regulatory “race to the bottom” the U.K. will likely exhibit
when it no longer needs to follow what certain U.K. bankers
have referred to as the “idiot rules that the EU has tried to
place upon The City [London].”606
The animosity expressed by U.K. banking institutions
toward EU financial regulation is likely to inspire a dramatic
undoing of the EU financial regulatory structure as it was
applied to the U.K. Indeed, so worried has been the EU over
Caroline Binham, BoE Warns of ‘Material Risks’ from Brexit, FIN.
TIMES (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/4c79e2f2-28fc-11e8b27e-cc62a39d57a0 (explaining that outstanding derivative contracts
between parties in the EU and U.K. are valued at €26 trillion).
605 Tim Worstall, Brexit Effects: A Deregulated City Will Thrive Outside
the European Union, FORBES (June 27, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/timworstall/2016/06/27/brexit-effects-a-deregulated-city-willthrive-outside-the-european-union/#49ae5ef13998. Firms will be able to
use the passporting arrangement through the transitional period,
scheduled to end December 2020. See Caroline Binham, Regulators Step
Up Efforts to Safeguard City of London’s Status, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 28,
2018), https://www.ft.com/content/2fbb0c8c-3288-11e8-ac48-10c6fdc22f0
3.
606 Worstall, supra note 605; Binham, supra note 605; see also Laura
Noonan, Caroline Binham & Chris Giles, Treasury Promises Further
Work on Standards after Claims BoE Pressure Libor, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 10,
2017), https://www.ft.com/content/d9732af1-f3c0-3e5a-8c54-a88483bf4b4
b.
604
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the U.K.’s likely Brexit response to being freed of EU
financial regulation, that it has already warned the U.K. that
the latter’s likely relaxed resulting financial regulations will
not be granted “equivalency” by the EU “if [the U.K.]
conducts a regulatory bonfire or retreats to a light-touch
supervision.”607 And, the head of the Bank of England’s
Prudential Regulation Authority warned against a “retreat”
by the U.K. to “‘light touch’ regulation after Brexit . . . .”608
Through the lens of the CFTC’s substituted
compliance doctrine, the CFTC’s “comparability” approvals of
what is sure to be lax post-Brexit U.K. swaps rules will
present an untenable risk, which will ultimately fall on the
U.S. taxpayer.
XII. THE LONE SURVIVING EXTERRITORIAL
REMEDY: STATE PARENS PATRIAE ACTIONS TO
ENFORCE DODD-FRANK’S EXTRATERRITORIAL
PROVISION
As mentioned above,609 the CFTC’s October 18, 2016
proposed rule and interpretations of Dodd-Frank’s
extraterritorial
framework
would
eliminate
the
“deguarantee”610 and “ANE” loopholes.611 With the
subsequent election of President Donald Trump and with
President Trump’s control of the CFTC by his nominations
thereto, the October 18, 2016 proposal will almost certainly
Jim Brunsden & Lindsay Fortado, Brussels Sets Out Tough New Line
on Equivalence, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/
f9f3ffc2-fc1a-11e6-96f8-3700c5664d30.
608 Caroline Binham, BoE Official Warns Against Return to ‘Light-Touch’
Regulation, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/0e36
b7fe-fac2-11e6-9516-2d969e0d3b65.
609 See supra notes 454–56 and accompanying text.
610 Id.
611 Id.
607
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never see the light of day as a final rule during his
Presidency. Moreover, with Republicans in control of both the
House and Senate, there will be no near-term Congressionalled “fix” to the deguarantee and ANE problems.612 Even now
that Democrats control the House after the mid-term, if they
repeal the loopholes in question, that legislation would
almost certainly be vetoed.
However, there is one important remedy still
available. The Commodity Exchange Act, as amended by
Dodd-Frank, expressly allows a State (through its Attorney
General, or its securities or other appropriate financial
regulatory officials)613 to bring in federal district court an
action, with exceptions not relevant here,614 to enjoin
violations of Dodd-Frank insofar as residents of that state
“may be threatened [to be] adversely affected” by those
violations.615
It is now common knowledge that the states’ attorneys
general, for example, have been and are frequent litigants in
federal court to enforce federal constitutional or statutory
mandates.616 Their intense involvement in challenging many
See supra notes 461–66 and accompanying text.
7 U.S.C. § 13a-2 (2018).
614
Id. Under this provision, states may not sue exchanges,
clearinghouses, floor brokers or floor traders. But states would be free to
sue the four large, systemically-risky U.S. bank holding company swaps
dealers that are the subject of this paper and that are defying Dodd-Frank
and the CFTC for misreading the extraterritorial provision of DoddFrank.
615 Id.
616 Charles Krauthammer, Revolt of the Attorneys General, WASH. POST
(Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/revolt-of-theattorneys-general/2017/03/02/13928c82-ff81-11e6-99b49e613afeb09f_story.html; Cornell W. Clayton & Jack McGuire, State
Litigation Strategies and Policymaking in the U.S. Supreme Court, 11
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 17, 17 (2001); Cornell W. Clayton, Law, Politics
612
613
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of the Wall Street practices that led to, or have aggravated,
the 2008 financial crisis is well documented.617 Given the
clarity of the Dodd-Frank’s extraterritorial provision that
requires Dodd-Frank to be applied to “foreign” swaps
transactions that have a “substantial and adverse” effect on
U.S. commerce, or are an evasion of that statute, the case to
invalidate the CFTC’s adherence to the bank’s “deguarantee”
and ANE loopholes or to the “substituted compliance”
doctrine is straightforward. The states are therefore likely to
be the last bastion of defense against another financial
meltdown from poor swaps regulation that results either in a
second multi-trillion-dollar U.S. taxpayer bailout of Wall
Street (and corresponding Second Great Recession); or, in the
absence of such a bailout, the onset of the Second Great
Depression.
CONCLUSION
By their own design, large U.S. bank holding company swaps
dealers and their representatives have crafted their own
massive loopholes from Dodd-Frank swaps regulations,
which they can exercise at their own will. By arranging,
negotiating, and executing swaps in the U.S. with U.S.
and the New Federalism: State Attorneys General as National
Policymakers, 56 REV. POL. 525, 552 (1994).
617
The Final Bill, ECONOMIST (Aug. 11, 2016), https://
www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2016/08/11/the-final-bill;
Jean Eaglesham, Ruling in Rate Probe Doesn't Slow Cases, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 4, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873239163
04578400822011096476; Danielle Douglas & Brady Dennis, To Rein in
Big Banks, States Go Solo, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2012, at A10; The
National Mortgage Pact: A Glimpse of Four Key Players in the Accord,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2012, at A2; Michael Powell, The States vs. Wall St.,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2010, at B1; Brooke A. Masters, States Flex
Prosecutorial Muscle; Attorneys General Move into What Was Once
Federal Territory, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2005, at A1.
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personnel and then “assigning” them to their “foreign” newly
“deguaranteed” subsidiaries, these swaps dealers have the
best of both worlds: swaps execution in the U.S. under the
parent bank holding companies’ direct control, but the ability
to move the swaps abroad out from under Dodd-Frank. As
history has demonstrated all too well, unregulated swaps
dealing almost always ultimately leads to extreme economic
suffering and then too often to systemic breaks in the world
economy, thereby putting U.S. taxpayers, who suffer all the
economic distress that recessions bring, in the position of
once again being the lender of last resort to these huge U.S.
institutions. The Obama CFTC tried to put an end to these
loopholes through a proposed rule and interpretations in
October 2016. However, those efforts were never finalized
before Donald Trump assumed the Presidency. There will
almost certainly be no relief from these dysfunctions during
the Trump Administration or Congress. However, state
attorneys general and various state financial regulators have
the statutory legal tools to enjoin these loopholes and save
the world’s economy and U.S. taxpayers from once again
suffering a massive bailout burden and an economic
Armageddon.
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